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I. SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR POVERTY 
REDUCTION IN INDONESIA:  
AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
 
Sirojudin Arif and Widjajanti I. Suharyo 
 
 
After several golden years of development that significantly reduced poverty in Indonesia, the 
1997/1998 crisis had made poverty a major issue again in Indonesia’s national development 
agenda. Some studies indicated that a significant number of people lived just around the 
poverty line so that any shock to their livelihood might slip them into poverty or deepen their 
poverty status (Suryahadi and Sumarto: 2003; Pritchett at al., 2000). In order to solve the 
problem, the government of Indonesia makes poverty reduction as one of its main targets, 
with one of its pillars relies on the provision of social protection especially for the poor. 
Unlike programs the previous era, in which the poor were never specifically targeted except in 
that of IDT (Inpres Desa Tertinggal – Presidential Aid for Disadvantageous Areas) program 
introduced by Soeharto administration in 1994/1995, many post-crisis  programs were created 
to directly target the poor. Started with the introduction of social safety nets (SSNs) during the 
crisis period, the government of Indonesia (GoI) continues to maintain and improve its 
poverty reduction programs as also required by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
In terms of budget, for instance, national spending for poverty related programs increased 
significantly from around Rp 15 trillion in 2001 to more than Rp 50 trillion in 2007. 
Nevertheless, it is important to look more deeply at how these programs have been 
implemented so far. How effective had the programs been so far at reaching the targeted poor 
and helping them move out of poverty? Thus, lessons can be learned for better preparation of 
social protection programs to respond to the current crisis. 
 
 
1.1 An Evolutionary Thinking of Social Protection1 for Poverty Reduction 
 
There has been a growing consensus among policy makers at both national and international 
agencies to place social protection at the frontier of poverty eradication agenda. Social 
protection is basically consisting of public policies or programs carried out by government or 
societies to provide support and assistance for the poor in dealing with their vulnerability, 
difficulty and deprivation.  Its increasing popularity as alternative solution to the persistence of 
poverty was reflected in the World Development Report 2000 that placed social protection as 
one of the three pillars necessary to fight global poverty (World Bank, 2001). As risk and 
vulnerability become major concern in many parts of the world, it is believed that social 
protection could address not only the symptoms of poverty but also its causes. According to 
De Haan, the main strength of social protection lies primarily on its focus to extend the 
support to the poorest (in Barrientos and Hulme, 2008a: 3-4). Therefore, taking the idea a 
little bit further, some urge for the continuation of the policy at both national and 
international levels to strengthen solidarity and security at international level (Barrientos and 
Hulme, 2008a: 4).  
 
 
 
                                                 
1The term ‘social protection’ here is referring to both ‘social insurance’ involving private user-pay contribution 
and ‘social assistance’ involving government funded programs to assist the needy in coping with shocks and 
vulnerability.  
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In line with this development, a number of approaches or perspectives have been developed 
by scholars as well as policy makers. First, as promoted by the International Labor Office 
(ILO), some view social protection as fundamental rights that every citizen is entitled to. 
Commonly known as rights-based approach, this perspective is rooted in a number of 
international declarations and conventions. According to the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, ‘every one has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of 
his family’. Based on the conception of human dignity, these rights consists of inter-related but 
indivisible components like health, education, work, information or participation in social and 
cultural life, the realization of which are necessary for the dignity of every person. ILO 
suggests these conditions reflect the Declaration’s commitment to extend social protection to 
all. The ILO further proposes social protection not merely as a policy option but also as an 
obligation of governments and other international structures to secure every one’s rights 
(Barrientos and Hulme, 2008a: 6). The Office defines social protection as ‘a form of social security 
which provides assistance to persons of small earnings granted as of right in amounts (that should be) sufficient 
to meet a minimum standard of need’ (ILO 1942: 84 in Munro, 2008: 32).  
 
Widely known as needs-based approach, the second approach comes from the United 
Nations (UN). Unlike the ILO’s proposal, the UN views social protection as policies or 
programs to help poor families or individuals in response to various contingencies that may 
affect their income. Underlying this perspective is the idea that every individual or household 
should have certain amount of income to fulfill their needs. Yet unlike the proponents of the 
mainstream economic development, that sees growth and the increase of per capita income as 
the main goal to be achieved, the UN places social protection policy as an effort to achieve 
both human and economic development. The foundational work in this perspective suggests 
the importance of distributional issues in addition to the growth of gross national product per 
capita as the development goals. The idea is that every one has basic needs to be satisfied, and 
the satisfaction of these needs was the pre-condition for human and economic development 
(Barrientos and Hulme, 2008b: 6-7). Within such perspective, the task of the state in providing 
social protection is to ensure that these basic needs if they cannot be met by individual or 
community efforts (Munro, 2008: 35).  
 
Finally, the third approach is centered on the notion of risk so that it is often called risk-
based approach. The salient example of this approach is the Social Risk Management (SRM) 
proposed by the World Bank. More problem-oriented in nature, the perspective assumes that 
risk and vulnerability are the main causes behind people’s falling into the trap of poverty. A 
person could fall into poverty due to his/her vulnerability to respond properly to risks arising 
from economic and political shocks or natural hazards. Economic transformation may only 
pose some risks for the poor though the transformation may also provide some opportunities. 
It can be that risk and vulnerability constrain the poor from gaining advantage of economic 
opportunity, but on the contrary avoiding risks may also reduce future welfare levels 
(Holzmann and Kozel, 2007: 8). Therefore, by reducing vulnerability or providing a better risk 
management, social protection provides the poor with the assistance not only to cope with 
shocks or crisis but also to help them move out of poverty in the long term. According to 
Bender et al., (2008: 3), ‘by reducing existential fears of the members of society, social protection policy 
encourages individuals to take risks that they would not otherwise be willing to take, such as investing in new 
business opportunities’.   
 
The history of international development has witnessed the rise and fall of the three 
approaches. The risk-based approach dominated the discourse in the 1960s, before the human 
needs approach was introduced in the 1970s. For years, the human needs approach did not 
develop much until the appearance of human development goals in the 1990s, which in many 
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respects can be seen as a re-interpretation of human development from the human needs 
perspective. Another important development was the introduction of rights based approach 
during the last decade with the support of the UN agencies, especially ILO and several non-
government organizations (NGOs) that support the right based approach. Meanwhile, the 
supporters of risk based approach continuously improving their theory and show its strength 
trough enforcing Social Risk Management of the World Bank since late 1990s.  
 
Nevertheless, Munro (2008) notes minimum interaction between the three approaches. On 
the contrary, there are many disputes and disagreements among them. For example, the 
supporter of risk-based approach rejects right-based approach because it does not explain as 
how to prioritize when the economic resources are limited. According to risk-based approach, 
the provision of sustainable social policy should take into account pragmatic consideration 
such as efficiency and the cost-benefit of a policy model. Right can only be used as value 
judgment but it can be used only in determining goal.  If the goal is agreed upon, then how to 
achieve the goal should rest in the hand of necessary technical skill. In contrast, the supporter 
of right based approach considers the separation between way and end as unacceptable.  Right 
is a right, so that any negligence, even small, is considered as a violation. For the needs based 
approach, the supporter of right based approach also deliver strong critics on the basis that 
the paternalistic and caricative moral judgment the needs based approach can not provide 
strong basis for the development of social policy. 
 
Indeed, further exploration finds several points that allow interaction and a more constructive 
dialogue between the three approaches. Based on Munro’s assessment (2008), besides using 
international laws and agreements, the right based approach also using human basic needs as a 
foundation. Thus, it can be seen that both are developed based on the same foundation, which 
is human basic needs.  While regarding the risk based approach, citing Viner’s view, Munro 
explained that every human should have the right for utility, and consequently government 
should assure that all citizen will get their utility right. Because of that, ‘welfare losses’, 
following this line of thinking, can be categorized as a violation of right (Munro, 2008: 38). 
 
In addition, it might not be realized that each approach and the discourses that it raised, are at 
different level of discourse. While risk based approach is focusing on operational and technical 
framework, right based approach talks more on philosophical basis, and needs based approach is 
located in the middle of the two. Compared to risk-based approach, both the right-based and 
human needs approaches are more concentrated on the goal or the ideal condition to be achieved 
by the social protection without adequately considering problems to be addressed in the field or 
reliable methods to tackle the problem. There is no explanation on how the government can fulfill 
the rights or the basic needs as assested by both approaches. Yet at the philosophical level, it is 
apparent that the right-based approach is the theoretically strongest in spite of being too literalist 
and hyper-legalistic. Both the principles of utility of the risk based approach and of human basic 
needs of the basic needs approach still need to be further elaborated as to provide strong 
philosophical foundation for establishing a good social protection system. While the human basic 
need suffers from its weaknesses of being charitable and paternalistic, calculate ing for efficiency 
or cost-benefit in the risk based approach will potentially not benefiting the poor, especially the 
poorest. Thus, the fact that the differences are originated from differences in the level of 
discourse, and the existence of common views, provide sufficient reasons to the possibility of 
opening a more positive dialogue across approaches.  
 
Nevertheless, besides basic theory as discussed by Murno that has been discussed in the above 
passage, it is of the same important to assess the empirical how social protection programs are 
implemented in the community. Such assessment can also assess the applicability and 
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effectiveness of social protection programs, as not all plans can be implemented especially 
because the plan in not implemented in a socially vacuum place but in a certain community 
that has its own history and characteristic of its social development. That is why the success of 
social protection program is not only affected by its theoretical foundation but also by the 
social context where the program is implemented. As reflected in the Indonesian case that will 
be explained in the following passage, besides the history of the social protection system that 
was affected by the crisis, the actual condition at the local level will affect the implementation 
of social protection programs.  
 
 
1.2 Social Assistance Programs in Indonesia  
 
The establishment of social assistance in Indonesia has been shaped much by the country’s 
historical development, namely its effort to deal with the impact of economic crisis that hit the 
country in 1997. Due to its magnitude, the crisis had increased the number of poor people 
significantly as the national economy slowed down and many people lost their jobs. During 
the crisis period, Indonesian Rupiah was highly depreciated and the inflation rose sharply. 
Within only a year, domestic prices rocketed by nearly 80 percent and nominal food prices 
increased threefold (Sumarto, et al., 2008: 121). Meanwhile, many banks were liquidated from 
bankruptcy, and increasing number of people was laid off from their work places. In short, 
unemployment, under-nutrition, withdrawal from schools and poverty became the general 
picture people might think about the situation in Indonesia during the crisis. Indeed, as had 
been expected, the headcount poverty rate increased from 15.3 before the crisis in the mid 
1997 to 33.2 at the end of 1998. Therefore, in order to mitigate the depleting impacts of the 
crisis, the Government of Indonesia (GoI), with the support from donors like the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other bilateral agencies, launched social safety net 
(SSN) programs in 1998/1999 (Sumarto et al., 2004: 1).  
 
Prior to the crisis, Indonesia had no formal or state-run social protection system that 
specifically designed to prevent its citizens from any economic or social risk affecting their 
livelihood. The insurance provided by the state only covered the military and civil servant. 
While a limited number of insurance schemes were already available, but they only covered 
certain groups of people on private basis. Thus, only those able to pay the premium might be 
protected, while the rest in general had to rely on their own resources. Yet for poor people in 
particular, such resources might be very limited or even not available at all. Several studies 
have shown that borrowing from others or reducing expenditures are the most common 
mechanism for the poor to cope with the risk or shocks. Some might diversify their income 
sources or try to increase the income in general, yet in time of crisis or shocks it seems quite 
difficult for them to do so. What is much easier is to cut non-primary expenditures such as 
those on recreation, clothing, or transportation; or to borrow some money from families or 
neighbors (Perdana, 2005: 5-7; Sumarto et al., 2008: 124). While the first might decrease the 
quality of their life or well-being, the second will be dependent very much on the generosity of 
others. In the case of big shocks like the 1997 economic crisis, it is very likely that such 
mechanism will not work. Meanwhile, a formal system of social protection was not developed 
yet to help these people to cope with the impacts of such shocks.   
 
From this perspective, the implementation of SSN program in 1998 characterized the new effort 
of the country in dealing with the vulnerability aspect of poverty. Previously, Indonesia’s strategy 
to address the problem of poverty was generally based on economic growth as the main tool the 
increase people’s welfare. Some programs were meant for the poor, but they were also 
implemented through general development programs like funding for basic health and education 
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services, development programs for improving economic productivity of the poor and small 
programs for disadvantaged people (Sumarto et al., 2008: 124). Not until the early nineties did 
more specific programs specifically targeted to the poor appear on the priority of Soeharto 
administration, namely IDT program in 1993. Yet it is apparent that they had different natures 
and goals from those of the SSN program. While the IDT program used community as the basis 
of program targeting, the SSN targeted mainly the individual poor. It was meant as social 
assistance to help traditionally poor or newly poor people cope with the impacts of the crisis. 
Other than to ensure the availability of food at affordable prices, the program also aims to 
increase the purchasing power of the poor through the creation of employment, and to preserve 
their access to basic social services like education and health.  
 
The SSN program was initially classified as ‘emergency’ or ‘ad hoc’ program for poverty 
alleviation during the crisis. Once the crisis has been solved, the program will be terminated 
(Remi and Tjiptoheriyanto, n.d.: 3). However, by the GoI, the program was then modified and 
continued after the crisis to develop social protection program for the whole country. A 
number of external and policy induce shocks, such as the reduction of fuel subsidies in 2000, 
were thought to have disturbing impacts on poor people’s welfare condition. To mitigate 
disturbing impacts of such changes, as well as other disturbing shocks possibly affecting the 
country again, the government had to prepare again some policy instruments to help the poor, 
or at least to minimize the impact of such shock on their welfare condition. Some programs 
previously implemented under the SSN were modified to make better its weaknesses so that 
their main goals to help the poor mitigate the depleting impacts of the shocks could be 
achieved effectively.  
 
Table 1. The SSNs for the 1997/1998 Crisis and Its Later Modification 
Safety Net Area During the Crisis After the Crisis 
Food security Special Market Operation (Operasi Pasar 
Khusus, OPK) program: sales of subsidized 
rice to targeted households. 
Rice for the Poor (Raskin); subsidies in kind 
(rice) targeted directly to poor households 
Education Scholarship and block grants, providing: 
• Scholarships directly to elementary 
(SD), lower secondary (SLTP), and 
upper secondary (SMU) students; and 
• Block grants to selected schools 
Bantuan Operasional Sekolah (BOS) or 
school operational fund; instead of providing 
scholarship to students from poof households 
and block grants to selected school, the BOS 
channeled operational funds to all schools 
qualified to receive the funds.  
Health Health Sector Social Safety Net (JPS-BK); 
a program providing subsidies for: 
• Medical services; 
• Operational support for health centers; 
• Medicine and imported medical equipment; 
• Family planning services; 
• Nutrition (supplemental food); and 
• Midwife services 
Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan untuk 
Keluarga Miskin (JPK Gakin), the 
employment of insurance principles to 
establish a health-financing scheme that 
enables poor people to access health care 
in public facilities, including primary and 
secondary health care.  
Employment 
creation 
Program Padat Karya: a loose, 
uncoordinated, collection of several ‘labor 
intensive’ programs in a variety of 
government departments 
Community 
empowerment 
Regional Empowerment to Overcome the 
Impact of Economic Crisis (PDM-DKE); a 
‘community fund’ program that provides 
block grants directly to villages for either 
public works or revolving fund for 
subsidized credit 
These two categories of programs were 
then simplified and modified further with 
some programs deleted from the list. Later, 
the program was then named employment 
creation program to include particularly 
some labor intensive programs on 
infrastructural developments. 
Source: Sumarto, et al., 2004. 
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Besides improving the distribution system, particularly related to targeting, the GoI also made 
some changes in the design of the programs (Table 1). These changes were not merely 
intended to improve program implementation but also to increase the effectiveness as well as 
the performance of the programs in general. The various community empowerment programs 
during the crisis has been simplified and merged with labor intensive programs focusing on 
the improvement of infrastructure in disadvantage regions. In health sector, program 
improvements have been continuously progressing by means of introducing insurance 
principle in social protection in the provision of health services by implementing health care 
for poor family (Jaminan Kesehatan untuk Keluarga Miskin – JPK Gakin) program. To improve 
targeting in the provision of food assistance, the OPK that was initiated during the crisis has 
been modified to become rice for the poor (Raskin).  The modification is intended to make 
clear that the purpose and target of the program are the poor families.  Finally, the most 
significant change was introduced in education sector. Started in 2004/2005 academic year, 
the GoI has changed the scholarship for poor families at the primary and junior high school 
levels for School Operational Assistance (Bantuan Operasional Sekolah – BOS) program.  
Different from the previous program that was specifically targeted for the poor, BOS is more 
universal in nature as not only the poor, but all schools that are willing to meet government 
requirement, are eligible to receive the assistance.  
 
 
1.3 About this Paper 
 
This paper is intended to discuss the social assistance programs that were implemented in 
Indonesia after the 1997/1998 crisis, until 2004/2005. The programs are discussed 
individually so that the reader can select the chapter of interest. Every chapter discusses in 
detail the program history and development, coverage and targeting, program impacts, 
funding, and the institutional structure.  The program assessment presented in this paper is 
basically based on literature review, supported by additional quantitative analysis mostly from 
the social economic survey (SUSENAS) conducted by Statistics Indonesia (BPS). Although 
the review covers a rather old dated data up to 2004/2005, it is hoped that the assessment will 
enriched policy analysis for the improvement of social assistance program in Indonesia.  
 
After the introductory note in Chapter I that discuss the discourse of social protection in the 
poverty reduction framework and the brief development of the Indonesian social assistance 
programs, Chapter II to Chapter VI will discuss the individual programs. Chapter II discusses 
social assistance to support food consumption, in the form of subsidized rice for the poor.  
Chapter III talks about social assistance in education sector. Chapter IV and V are focusing on 
health sector. Chapter IV specifically discusses health service assistance for the poor, while 
Chapter V is focusing on immunization and prevention of communicable diseases. Finally, 
Chapter VI presents infrastructure and clean water programs that were part of job creation 
efforts.   
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II. RASKIN – RICE (SUBSIDY) FOR THE POOR 
 
 
The Raskin (rice for the poor) program is a program of the Government of Indonesia 
intended to provide social protection to poor families in meeting their food adequacy needs 
and reducing their financial burden by providing rice at a subsidized price. It is supposed to 
distribute 20 kg of rice per family per month at a price of Rp 1,000 per kg at the distribution 
points. In 2002-2004, the target of the program was maintained around 8.6 million poor 
families, with the highest target in 2003 reaching nearly 9.8 million poor families. Yet the 
realization data shows that the actual beneficiaries of the program were always larger than the 
target. On average, it reached around 12 million poor families in 2002 – 2004. Unfortunately, 
this increase in the number of recipients was not followed by a better delivery system. Some 
studies reveal that considerable part of the rice went to 20 percent of the highest quintile 
expenditure, making the ratios of the targeting nealyb 0.9, wich means that the opportunity of 
the poor and the non-poor in receiving the rice was almost the same. Based on the data on the 
quantity purchased by average households and the prices they paid, it is also apparent that 
only a very small fraction of the subsidy through the Raskin program was received by the poor 
and the near poor, for whom the program had been designed.    
 
 
2.1 Background and Brief Detail of the Program 
 
The Raskin program is basically a continuation of the food support program for the poor, 
which was known as Operasi Pasar Khusus (OPK) Keluarga Pra-Sejahtera or Special Market 
Operations for Pre-Prosperous Households, introduced in July 1998 under the Social Safety 
Net (SSN) program in response to the 1997 economic crisis. The original design of OPK 
called for the National Logistics Agency, BULOG, through its provincial and district 
(kabupaten) logistic storehouse offices, to make available 10 kg, and later 20 kg, of medium-
grade rice every month at a purchase price of Rp1,000/kg for targeted poor households. In its 
operation, OPK is implemented in collaboration with local government in all provinces and 
districts, and the National Family Planning Board (BKKBN). The definition of poor 
households used in this program refers to Pra-Sejahtera (Pre-Prosperous or poor) and Sejahtera I 
(Prosperous level 1, which is near poor) based on BKKBN classifications.   
 
By the second half of 2001, it became obvious that the problems and weaknesses of OPK 
needed to be addressed so that the aim of delivering the benefit to the poorest families could 
be achieved. Some changes had been introduced starting in 2002 and the most obvious one 
was the change of name. Since OPK did not indicate anything about the real purpose of the 
program, a new label “Raskin – Beras untuk Masyarakat Miskin” was introduced to better reflect 
the nature of the program, i.e. to provide subsidized rice only for poor families. This message 
was also reinforced through a national television advertising campaign. The program was no 
longer considered to be an emergency measure, but rather a social protection program with 
the target provision of rice in the amount of 20 kg -a change from the previous program 
design that provided a minimum of 10 kg and a maximum of 20 kg. The target group within 
the population, however, remained the same as it was under OPK, which was families who 
were poor and at risk of being unable to provide an adequate measure of food security. There 
was also a serious attempt to introduce the use of VAM (Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping) 
methodology, but it did not win the support of provincial and district administrations. There 
were, therefore, essentially few differences between the Raskin and the OPK programs 
(Hastuti and Maxwell, 2003). 
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In the second half of 2001, the Government of Indonesia made an allocation of food relief under 
a temporary program known as the Program for Reducing the Impact of Reduced Energy 
Subsidies (PPD PSE). Similar allocations, which amounted to Rp500 billion were also made in the 
2002 budget under the Fuel Subsidy Compensation Program (Program Kompensasi Subsidi BBM: 
PKS BBM).  Both programs had been integrated into the existing OPK program, although 
BULOG had required that its own internal financial administration and internal reporting of the 
PKS BBM program be kept separate from Raskin. In almost all locations, the rice provided under 
the PKS BBM program was simply added to the Raskin allocation so that from the perspective of 
the villagers there has been a single subsidized rice program in operation since 2002.  
 
 
2.2 Coverage and Targeting 
 
From 1998 to 2004, the OPK and Raskin programs together had disbursed more than 12.8 
million tonnes of subsidized rice to all provinces in Indonesia. With the exception of the 
1999/00 period when OPK was in full operation to mitigate the crisis impact, rice distribution 
was increasing during the period of 1998/99 to 2002, and then it slightly decreased in 2003 
and 2004 (Figure 1). During the period of 1998/99 to 2002, most of the rice was distributed in 
Java/Bali (64%) where most of the population and the poor live, followed by Sumatra (16%); 
while Papua received the least of around 1.8% (Figure 2). 
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Figure 1. Disbursement of OPK and Raskin   
Sources: Hastuti and Maxwell (2003) for 1998/99 – 2001;  
Tabor  and Sawit (2005) for 2002-2004 
 
In 2000, OPK was designed to assist 7.5 million families, and increased to 8.7 million and 9.8 
million families in 2001 and 2002, respectively. In 2003 and 2004, the target was maintained at 
around 8.6 million families. Based on BULOG’s estimation (Table 1) this target should cover 
around 58% of the total poor (and vulnerable) of around 15 million families in 2001.  The 
coverage target was increased to 66% of the poor and vulnerable families in 2002, 57% in 
2003, and 55% in 2004.  Indeed, the realization data (based on BULOG’s report) shows that 
except for 2001, the numbers of actual beneficiaries were always larger than the target, and it 
reached around 12 million families in the 2002-2004 period. Assuming that there were, in 
total, around 50 million families in Indonesia in 2000, this would account for around 24% of 
the total number of families in Indonesia. So, on paper, it should be enough to cover all 
households in the lowest expenditure quintile, if perfect targeting applied.   
Figure 2. Distribution of OPK and Raskin 
Across Regions, 1998/99 - 2002
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Table 1. Estimated Target and Realization of Raskin (2000 – 2004) 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of poor families  15,000,000 14,782,000 15,135,561 15,746,843 
Quantity of disbursed rice (tonnes) 1,353,248 1,481,829 2,235,137 2,023,698 2,060,198 
Target (Plan): 
  Number of target (family) 7,500,000 8,700,000 9,790,000 8,580,313 8,590,804 
  % target to poor families  58% 66% 57% 55% 
  Rice quantity (kg/family/month) 15.0 14.2 19.0 19.7 20.0 
Realization: 
  Number of beneficiaries (family) 10,934,861 8,316,185 12,333,923 11,832,897 11,664,050 
  % beneficiaries to poor families  55% 83% 78% 74% 
  % beneficiaries to target 146% 96% 126% 138% 136% 
  Rice quantity (kg/family/month) 10.3 14.8 15.1 14.3 14.7 
Source: Calculated from BULOG, 2005 
 
Table 2. Coverage and Targeting of OPK and Raskin Program 
Percentage of each quintile covered by the program  
 1999 2001 2002 2003 
Indonesia 40.09 39.72 43.86 36.57 
Quintile 1 52.64 57.87 61.88 52.10 
Quintile 2 46.24 46.98 51.26 42.75 
Quintile 3 41.71 39.00 43.61 36.62 
Quintile 4 35.76 32.51 36.70 30.35 
Quintile 5 24.33 22.26 25.88 21.07 
Sources: Sumarto and Suryahadi (2001) for 1999; 2001-2003 are calculated from the 2002, 
2003 and 2004 SUSENAS data. 
 
The SUSENAS data, on the other hand, revealed a rather different picture of how rice had 
been distributed in the community. Based on the 1999 SUSENAS data, Sumarto and 
Suryahadi (2001) estimated that the program had covered a larger portion than the BULOG 
estimation, as around 40% of households received the subsidized rice in 19992, and it was 
distributed among households in all expenditure quintiles (Table 2). Estimations for 2001, 
2002 and 2003 based on SUSENAS 2002, 2003 and 2004 also reveal a similar pattern. The 
largest coverage of around 44% was attained in 2002, the year when the quantity of rice 
disbursed was also the largest compared to the disbursement in 2000, 2001, and 2003 (see 
Table 1). On average, around 50%-60% of the households in the poorest expenditure quintile 
bought Raskin rice while around 20% of the highest quintile also enjoyed it. These figures 
indicate that there was almost no targeting in the disbursement of Raskin rice. Less than 30% 
of the subsidized rice went to the household in the lowest quintile3, and a total of around 50% 
                                                 
2This was around 16 million households, assuming that total number of households was 40 million.  
3Similarly, McCulloch estimates based on the 2002 SUSENAS, that the poor received around 26% of the benefit 
of the program.   
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went to the two lowest quintiles (Table 3). This has made the targeting ratios of around 0.9, 
which means that the opportunity of the poor and the non-poor in receiving Raskin rice was 
almost the same, with very limited preference given to the poor. The time series data also 
shows that, in general, the targeting performance did not change over time, indicating no 
improvement in targeting of the program. The targeting ratio is calculated as the proportion of 
non-poor who received the program divided by the proportion of the non-poor in the 
population. 
 
Table 3 also presents variations in the targeting performance across regions. The targeting was 
relatively better in Maluku/NTB/NTT, which are among the poorest regions in Indonesia. 
On the other hand, the targeting in Kalimantan and Papua regions were the worst, where the 
households in the two lowest quintiles only received around 30% of the program benefit. In 
Kalimantan, there was a tendency for the targeting performance to get worse over time; while 
the targeting performance in Papua was improving over the course of 2001 – 2003.   
 
A similar targeting feature was also reported by Suryahadi et.al. (1999). In the earlier stage of 
OPK, he calculated data from 100 Village Survey (covering 10 districts) that showed that two 
districts in Central Java had been highly successful in ensuring that the poor received the 
benefits of the program and the program coverage of the poor was over 90%.  The coverage 
of the poor in 8 other districts in the survey ranged from less than 50% to 67%. The worst 
case was in Kutai (East Kalimantan), where curiously only 5% of the poor reported receiving 
the benefits of this program. In terms of targeting ratio, it showed that in most districts the 
value of this ratio was only slightly less than one. This indicates that the majority of districts 
did not target the basic necessities provisions program solely for the poorest as measured by 
consumption expenditure.  Instead, they provided cheap rice from the program for the general 
population, with only a slight inclination to favor the poor. 
 
Table 3: Targeting Performance of Raskin Program 
Targeting Ratio 
Percentage of program 
benefits distributed to 
quintile 1 
Percentage of program 
benefits distributed to 
quintile 1 and 2  
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
Indonesia 0.89 0.90 0.89 29.1 28.2 28.5 52.8 51.6 51.8 
Sumatra 0.86 0.89 0.88 31.1 28.4 29.4 54.2 51.6 52.0 
Java/Bali 0.90 0.91 0.92 27.8 27.2 26.8 51.9 50.9 50.5 
Kalimantan 0.99 1.02 1.01 21.2 18.4 19.3 39.8 36.5 39.1 
Sulawesi 0.84 0.84 0.82 33.0 32.5 34.6 56.4 55.3 58.0 
Maluku/NTT/NTB 0.74 0.76 0.70 40.6 39.5 44.3 63.5 63.6 67.8 
Papua 1.17 0.96 1.01 6.2 23.0 19.6 28.0 40.8 38.9 
Source: Calculated from the 2002, 2003 and 2004 SUSENAS 
 
These quantitative findings from the survey accord well with various qualitative reports that 
recorded various problems on the ground regarding allocation and disbursement of the 
subsidized rice. Regarding allocation procedures, under the Raskin program, the central 
government assumed responsibility for determining the quotas for each of the provinces. The 
precise allocation for each province was calculated proportionally according to the BKKBN 
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data on pre-prosperous households (KPS ALEK) and prosperous level 1 households (KS-1 
ALEK) for economic reasons. The provincial governments were informed in November of 
their precise allocations for the following year. On the basis of these allocations, every 
provincial government was asked to determine the quotas for each kabupaten and kota within 
its area of jurisdiction, again drawing on BKKBN data. Finally, at the kabupaten and kota level, 
the local administration was given the task of deciding on the exact quotas for each of the 
distribution points within their region (Hastuti and Maxwell, 2003). 
 
In relation to the selection of beneficiaries, according to the program guidelines, each village 
was given considerable responsibility and autonomy over the selection of the actual 
beneficiaries. The BULOG planners who designed the program simply stipulated that the 
determination of the families to be listed as beneficiaries should be made in the first instance 
with reference to BKKBN’s data on those families classified as KPS ALEK and KS-1 ALEK. 
This data was subject to further discussion and consultation at village-level meetings attended 
by village heads (kepala desa or lurah), prominent local community leaders, local family planning 
and family welfare cadre (PKK and PLKB), local NGO leaders and other leading community 
figures. As a result of these deliberations, a list of beneficiaries was to be finalized.  
 
In addition, the guidelines also stipulate one more important consideration, which was village 
decision-makers were expected to work within the limitations of the ceiling or quota that had 
already been determined for each village. This means that every village was to receive a 
specific allocation of rice each month that was intended to supply a certain fixed number of 
families with a 20kg allotment. Thus, in theory, the number of families listed by the village as 
recipients of the Raskin program should not exceed this quota. The agreed list of beneficiaries 
was to be ratified by the village head, and forwarded to the local camat. The list of eligible 
families was also to be posted in a prominent place within the village for all members of the 
community to see. Each family on the list was to be issued with an official Raskin Card 
containing coupons for each month of the year, which were to be used each month when the 
allocation of rice was collected at the distribution point. The guidelines also set out in 
considerable detail the procedures that were to be followed for the delivery and distribution of 
the rice at the distribution points, the payment process, as well as arrangements for 
monitoring and evaluation (Hastuti and Maxwell, 2003).  
 
So, in principle OPK and Raskin make use of household-level data collected by BKKBN to 
identify the neediest households. BKKBN data focuses on five indicators of overall standard of 
living and well-being – food intake, housing, clothing, medical and religious practices. 
Households failing to meet a minimal standard on any one of these five variables are designated 
as “pre-prosperous families”, or keluarga pra-sejahtera (KPS). These minimal standards include:  
• eating at least twice every day; 
• having a house with a floor that is not primarily earthen; 
• having different clothes for work and leisure; 
• going to a medical clinic (as opposed to a traditional healer) when children are sick; and 
• following the fundamental practices of the family’s religion. 
 
In addition to the original five BKKBN criteria used to categorize families as KPS, there are 
three additional criteria being unofficially used to identify needy families: 1) families that 
consume protein only once a week, 2) families with children who drop out from school, and 
3) families led by unemployed adults, or victims of PHK (pemutusan hubungan kerja – laid off).  
These additional “updating” criteria have not been formally announced by the central 
BKKBN office in Jakarta, but in the field they are being actively used and are considered 
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appropriate. In fact, PPLKB (family planning extension) workers and village administrators 
were the investigators of, and advocates for, these additional criteria.   
 
In practice, several studies had uncovered problems and inconsistencies in the use of BKKBN 
data for calculating allocations as well as for individual targeting. In the early program 
implementation, the allocation faced a problem of sudden increases in the target group 
numbers. When the most recent data were collected in early 1998, approximately 7.3 million 
households were identified as KPS, or poor - roughly 15% of Indonesia’s population. Soon 
after the program began, reports began filtering back to Jakarta that, because of the deepening 
economic crisis, many families in the next-higher BKKBN category – keluarga sejahtera satu, or 
KS1 – had slid down into much more desperate circumstances and were as needy as those 
already called “poor” (KPS). At this juncture, the government announced its intention to 
expand the OPK program to include KS1 families as well – an expansion which had the 
potential to increase the number of families served by up to 130%. The expansion is occurring 
gradually as people are added to the program in each district (Hastuti and Maxwell, 2003).  
 
Later, in 2002, there was also a dispute over the decision on total allocations. How did the 
government arrive at the 2002 allocations? According to BULOG officials, the original quota 
of 9.8 million families was the result of a process of consultation with other government 
agencies, in particular the Ministry of Finance and the National Development Planning Board 
(Bappenas). The government also took into account the most recent poverty data that was 
available from the BPS and the BKKBN lists of family socio-economic status. According to 
the BKKBN data for 2000 that was available to BULOG when the 2002 programs were being 
drawn up, the original allocation was aimed at assisting approximately 20% of all Indonesian 
families, while the revised figure would assist 19% of the total number. Nevertheless, the 
allocation was insufficient to cover all those families in the lowest welfare categories, KPS 
ALEK and KS-1 ALEK, even though these were the two categories specifically referred to in 
the Raskin program official guidelines. 
 
The 9.8 million figure was suddenly revised downwards before the program began when the 
government decided to set aside a special allocation of rice to assist the victims of social and 
political unrest in several regions that were hosting temporary camps of internally displaced 
refugees. As a result, the national quota for the 2002 subsidized rice program was reduced to 
2,167,100 tonnes intended to assist 9,029,584 families.4 By way of comparison, the actual 
disbursements of subsidized rice for each of the previous four funding periods are also 
included in the attached table. With the exception of the 1999/2000 OPK program – the 
period when the government’s social safety net program was at its maximum level of 
operation as a result of the economic crisis – the table reveals that the amount of rice being 
disbursed under OPK and now Raskin has been rising every year. Furthermore, the allocations 
for the 2002 Raskin program represent a considerable increase over the previous year’s OPK 
program (Hastuti and Maxwell, 2003). 
  
With regard to individual targeting exercise, a study conducted by Olken et.al. (2001) claimed 
that the differences in rice distribution had many causes, both economic and political. In all 
villages visited, village officials reported that the BKKBN lists were not accurate 
representations of who in the village was actually poor. A commonly-heard situation was of a 
family with a good house-and therefore classified as non-poor by BKKBN-but with few other 
assets and little in the way of income. As a result, all villages visited making any attempt at 
targeting rice to the poor created their own list of who was poor. The number of people 
                                                 
4The original figure of 9.8 million families appears in the Raskin program guidelines. BULOG planned to revise 
the quotas again later in the year when the actual disbursements to the recipients were finally realized. 
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added to the official BKKBN lists depended on the economic conditions of the village-the 
more people who were near the poverty line, the more difficult it was for a village to draw 
distinctions and keep rice tightly targeted. Therefore, a relatively flat income distribution near 
the poverty line seemed to lead to a much wider distribution of rice.5  
 
A second economic cause of targeting problems revealed by Olken et. al. (2001) was the fact 
that, in all villages visited, the rice was sold on a cash-and-carry basis. As a result, many of the 
very poorest families did not have cash on hand to immediately purchase the total amount to 
which they were entitled, creating a surplus of rice in the village. Since the village needed to 
pay for all of the rice received, the surplus was sold to other families, with relatively little effort 
made to target the surplus rice to poor families. As the team heard from one RT 
(neighborhood association) head, the instruction from the village head was that all rice must 
be sold; to whom it was sold was a lower priority. 
 
Another study by Hastuti and Maxwell (2003) also found that although the list of rice 
recipients was supposed to follow the national BKKBN social welfare guidelines, in fact, 
village officials had almost complete authority to determine how the rice would be distributed 
within their villages. As a result, the implementation of the OPK program varied dramatically 
from village to village, even within the same sub-district. In some areas, the rice was well-
targeted to poor families; in others, the rice was simply divided equally among recipients. In 
yet other areas, it was simply announced that cheap rice was available for sale, and whoever 
could afford to buy it was allowed to do so. Virtually all aspects of the rice distribution, from 
the generation of eligibility lists to the amount of rice each household was allowed to buy, to 
the price of the rice, varied dramatically from village to village.  
 
In addition, Hastuti and Maxwell (2003) pointed out that there were several important caveats 
to the usefulness of the BKKBN data, which were apparently not considered in the original 
OPK program design. The first is that only married households are included in the BKKBN 
data – thus, households with single heads, or widows, or groups of single people living 
together, are not included. A second important drawback is that even though national policy 
does not require an identity card (KTP) for inclusion in the program, in specific urban areas it 
was found that many families cannot be included and categorized if their head of household 
does not possess a national identity card issued by, and valid for, the location in which they 
are living. The crisis has intensified the movement of newly unemployed workers and families 
displaced by drought and fires, adding to the already acknowledged high number of unofficial 
residents of big cities like Jakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, and Medan. Consequently, the KTP 
issue in urban areas is a substantial one which may represent an under-counting of literally 
millions of people who should be listed as poor and food-insecure. 
 
 
2.3 Impacts and Outcomes 
 
The provision of rice at a subsidized price through OPK and Raskin is a form of indirect 
transfer to the program recipient. The benefit accrued will depend on the prevailing market 
price in the location. Olken et. al. (2002) estimated that the monthly distribution in 1998 
represented the equivalent of a cash transfer of about Rp 15,000 per household, which was 
less than 30% of the official poverty line for a household of one person and less than 6% for a 
household of five. For a typical poor household receiving the full 20kg of rice at the 
subsidized price, the subsidy would be equivalent to approximately 10% of annual monthly 
                                                 
5Olken et.al. (2001) argued that this case was not necessarily a bad thing. The fact that local governments had the 
authority to spread OPK rice to such families may have been welfare-improving.  
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household expenditure. Meanwhile, according to Tabor and Sawit (2005), in 2003, Raskin 
provided a transfer benefit equivalent to 4% of the minimum income, and 10% of rice 
expenditures of the average beneficiary household.  The gross transfer benefit (GTB)6, or 
indirect income transfer from Raskin was equivalent to Rp3.5 trillion in 2002, Rp3.1 trillion in 
2003, and Rp3.1 trillion in 2004, for a three year annual average of Rp3.25 trillion (See also 
Annex 2). Some 53% of the total GTB was received by beneficiaries in Java, and 47% by 
beneficiaries elsewhere. The amount of GTB per beneficiary family was Rp 246,581 or about 
Rp 20,500 per month (if we assume that the program reached an average of 13.2 million 
families and an average ration of 13.3 kg/month). Assuming an average family size of 4.9 
persons, this implies a GTB per capita of Rp 50,322 per beneficiary per year, or Rp 4,200 per 
capita per month. On a per kilogram basis, the subsidy equivalent of Raskin averaged Rp 1,550 
or 61% of the total cost of the Raskin rice. 
 
A related concern, however, is that the quantities of Raskin rice distributed in some of the 
poorest villages, in certain regions, may be as low as 4 to 5 kilograms per family per month. 
Those poor families who are only able to obtain 4 to 5 kg per month from Raskin would draw 
substantially less benefits from the program, so that their annual average transfer benefit would 
be equivalent to Rp92,600 per year, or just Rp8,000 per month (Tabor and Sawit, 2005). Various 
studies also confirm the differences in quantity of rice purchase from Raskin. Strauss et. al. 
(2004) estimate that the actual average amount of rice received per month by targeted 
households is around 6 kilograms, while the LP3ES survey (2000) found that it was about 10.4 
kg.  Meanwhile, SMERU’s qualitative study found that during the period of 1998-2000, the 
actual average amount of rice received per moth was estimated between 3-11 kilograms. 
  
The 2004 SUSENAS has added a specific question regarding the purchase of rice from Raskin. 
In addition to the question that was already on the 2002 and 2003 SUSENAS questionnaire 
on whether the respondent (household) received Raskin, the 2004 survey asked about the 
quantity of rice that has been bought from Raskin in the past three months and the price of 
the rice purchased. An estimation using this data set shows that on average a household 
bought around 15 kg of Raskin during the past three months or equivalent to about 5 kg per 
month. This quantity is very low compared to the 20 kg stated as the target, but it is quite 
possible since the SUSENAS data also revealed the fact that around 20 million households 
actually bought Raskin rice, instead of 8.58 million households set in the target (see Table 1).   
 
As can be seen from Table 4, the quantities of Raskin rice purchased vary across regions and 
across welfare levels. The average quantity purchased in Java/Bali was the smallest at around 4 
kg/month, while on average a household in Papua purchased the largest quantity of around 
9.64 kg per month. In most regions, the average quantity purchased was almost the same 
across quintiles of expenditure group, except in Maluku/NTB/NTT and Papua where the 
richest groups seem to have bought more than the poorest. This data, indeed, is similar to the 
qualitative findings in showing the variation of rice quantity bought from Raskin.   
 
Regarding the price of rice, the SUSENAS data shows that, on average, a household bought 
Raskin rice at the price of Rp 1,157 per kg. The Rp 157 difference from the target price of 
Rp1,000 at the distribution point was the cost of delivery from the BULOG distribution point 
to the local distribution points. It is still possible, however, that a household still had to pay 
additional transport costs from their home to the local distribution points where they collect 
Raskin rice. This average price also varies across regions, with the lowest price paid in 
Maluku/NTT/NTB and the highest paid in Kalimantan.  
 
                                                 
6GTB = Market price – co-payment (Rp1,000 per kg) – incidental charges borne by beneficiaries. 
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Table 4. Average Quantity of Raskin (kg/month) Purchased by Household in 2003 
 
Indonesia Sumatra Java/ Bali Kalimantan Sulawesi Maluku/ NTB/ NTT Papua 
Total 5.14 8.19 4.76 8.35 7.69 8.26 9.64 
Quintile 1 5.26 8.16 4.83 8.19 8.23 7.97 8.96 
Quintile 2 5.11 8.06 4.77 8.59 7.60 8.26 7.15 
Quintile 3 5.05 8.60 4.79 9.13 7.03 8.30 9.60 
Quintile 4 5.05 7.89 4.64 8.41 7.71 8.57 11.64 
Quintile 5 5.17 8.26 4.67 7.46 7.23 9.65 10.71 
Source: Calculated from the 2004 SUSENAS 
 
Table 5. Average Price of Raskin (Rp/kg) Paid by a Household 
 
Indonesia Sumatra Java/Bali Kalimantan Sulawesi Maluku/ NTB/ NTT Papua 
Total 1,157 1,240 1,135 1,371 1,145 1,093 1,306 
Quintile 1 1,158 1,244 1,150 1,358 1,120 1,072 1,269 
Quintile 2 1,154 1,233 1,138 1,361 1,137 1,092 1,185 
Quintile 3 1,155 1,245 1,131 1,404 1,156 1,112 1,179 
Quintile 4 1,149 1,237 1,122 1,356 1,152 1,124 1,204 
Quintile 5 1,173 1,244 1,124 1,379 1,216 1,141 1,644 
Source: Calculated from the 2004 SUSENAS 
 
Table 6. Average Monthly Subsidy Received by Raskin Beneficiary Household/Rp 
 
Indonesia Sumatra Java/Bali Kalimantan Sulawesi Maluku/ NTB/NTT Papua 
(Market Price: Rp2,790) 
Total 8,393 12,692 7,870 11,849 12,659 14,023 14,300 
Quintile 1 8,593 12,621 7,920 11,736 13,741 13,695 13,638 
Quintile 2 8,364 12,546 7,881 12,281 12,563 14,020 11,482 
Quintile 3 8,260 13,289 7,948 12,653 11,481 13,918 15,455 
Quintile 4 8,280 12,258 7,736 12,052 12,634 14,283 18,463 
Quintile 5 8,351 12,771 7,783 10,518 11,383 15,922 12,276 
(Market Price: Rp3,340) 
Total 11,235 17,222 10,500 16,468 16,914 18,592 19,629 
Quintile 1 11,504 17,134 10,590 16,267 18,293 18,103 18,595 
Quintile 2 11,191 17,001 10,519 17,032 16,768 18,586 15,438 
Quintile 3 11,054 18,045 10,598 17,702 15,368 18,505 20,762 
Quintile 4 11,070 16,623 10,300 16,700 16,900 19,024 24,901 
Quintile 5 11,208 17,339 10,366 14,642 15,382 21,260 18,200 
Source: Calculated from the 2004 SUSENAS 
 
Based on the quantity bought and price paid by Raskin beneficiaries, it can be estimated that, 
on average, a beneficiary household could receive subsidy equivalent to around Rp 8,393 to 
Rp 11,235. Assuming that average household size was 4.9 people, this monthly subsidy was 
equivalent to a per capita transfer of Rp 1,713 to Rp 2,293 or around 1.7% to 2.2% of the 
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official poverty line. These estimations are calculated on the assumption that the market price 
of rice was somewhere between the BULOG procurement price of Rp 2,790 and the GoI 
purchase price from BULOG of Rp 3,340 per kg.7 Because of the differences in quantity 
bought and price paid by Raskin recipients across regions and across different welfare levels, 
the subsidy received also varies. On average, the household in the fourth quintile in Java 
received the lowest subsidy, while the household in the fourth quintile in Papua received the 
highest of more than double the subsidy received by the average household in Java. 
 
As presented in Table 7, out of the total Raskin subsidy received by the people, only 29% went 
to the 20% poorest households, and only around 52.4% went to households in quintile 1 and 2 
combined, that can be considered as the poor and the vulnerable (near-poor). The proportion of 
subsidy received by the poor and the vulnerable was largest in Maluku/NTB/NTT regions, 
followed by Sulawesi. On the other hand, the poor and the vulnerable in Kalimantan and 
Sulawesi received the least. In total, most of the Raskin subsidy went to Java (65%) and Sumatra 
(21%), and the rest was distributed to other regions (Figure 3).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of Raskin Subsidy Across Regions, 2003 
 
 
Table 7: Proportion of Subsidy (%) Received by Various Welfare Levels 
 
Indonesia Sumatra Java/Bali Kalimantan Sulawesi Maluku/ NTB/NTT Papua 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Quintile 1 29.1 29.3 27.0 19.1 37.5 43.2 18.8 
Quintile 2 23.3 22.3 23.8 20.6 23.2 23.5 15.6 
Quintile 3 19.7 19.9 21.1 21.1 16.8 15.0 21.7 
Quintile 4 16.4 15.6 17.0 21.3 13.9 10.6 24.6 
Quintile 5 11.5 12.9 11.2 17.9 8.5 7.6 19.3 
Source: Calculated from the 2004 SUSENAS 
 
 
                                                 
7These prices could be used as a benchmark estimate, as the current (2005) price of rice in Jakarta for medium 
quality rice, for example, ranges between Rp2,800 to Rp3,000 per kg. 
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2.4 Budget Allocation and Effectiveness 
 
In 2002, the GoI allocated almost Rp4.23 trillion for the Raskin program, and it increased to 
Rp4.83 trillion in 2003, Rp4.83 trillion in 2004, and Rp4.68 trillion in 2005. The budget for 
2005 is not fixed yet, and other sources stated that the 2005 budget for Raskin will be Rp4.99 
trillion, or Rp4.97 trillion. These budgets accounted for around 0.20 percent of Indonesia’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) during this period. Raskin also took a substantial portion of 
the Government’s development expenditures. In 2002, the Raskin budget accounted for 
around 11% of the development budget, and it decreased to 8.2%, 7.8% and 5.6% in 2003, 
2004 and 2005, respectively (Tabor and Sawit, 2005).  
 
Although Raskin is one of Indonesia's biggest social protection programs, the effectiveness of 
the program is still debatable. A study conducted by Tabor and Sawit (2005) argued that the 
real cost incurred by BULOG was greater than what has been paid by GoI, meaning that 
BULOG is actually subsidizing the program. According to Tabor and Sawit’s calculation, the 
total costs of the Raskin program were Rp7.4 trillion in 2002, Rp7.2 trillion in 2003, and Rp7.6 
trillion in 2004. Of these total costs, Rp2.23 trillion were covered as co-payments from 
beneficiaries in 2002; Rp2.02 trillion from beneficiaries in 2003, and Rp2.06 trillion from 
beneficiaries in 2004.  Excluding costs recovered, the total Raskin costs were Rp5.12 trillion in 
2002, Rp5.16 trillion in 2003, and Rp5.6 trillion in 2004. They came up with this cost after 
considering other costs, which include: procurement, packaging, exploitation, management, 
interest charges, and carry over costs. Annex 2 provides the budget and cost estimation. 
 
On the other hand, McCulloch (2005) argued that it could not be the case. According to his 
calculation, assuming BULOG pays the rice purchase price of  Rp2,790/kg for the rice it 
purchases and sells it to households at Rp1,000/kg, then the subsidy to households is Rp3.69 
trillion. The remaining Rp1 trillion or 21% of the Raskin budget is retained by BULOG to 
cover their operating costs. Regarding BULOG's claim that additional funds are needed to 
cover the operational costs of the program, most notably the interest cost which they incur 
when they borrow for the purpose of making the initial purchases, he argued that private 
traders also borrow for the purpose of making purchases of gabah, which is milled and 
transported to village markets at the market price. In principle, therefore, all BULOG should 
need is the difference between the market price and the price at which it sells the rice 
(Rp1,000/kg). In practice it is paid the difference between the administrative purchase prices 
which is above the market price. Furthermore, he pointed out that an analysis of the 2002 
SUSENAS data indicates that only 26 percent of the Raskin recipients are poor. This implies 
that only Rp0.96 trillion, or 20 percent of the Raskin budget is provided as a subsidy to the 
poor, with Rp2.73 trillion going to the non-poor.  
 
An estimation based on the 2004 SUSENAS is presented in Annex 4. This estimation revealed 
that total rice purchased from Raskin in 2003 was around 1.237 million tonnes, an amount 
equivalent to 61% of the rice quantity disbursed in 2003 reported by BULOG (see Table 1).8  
Out of this purchased quantity, only 29% went to the 20% poorest quintile and, in total, 52% 
went to the poorest and the near poor (quintiles one and two).  So, it implies that only 17.68% 
of the Raskin rice (as reported by BULOG) was received by the poorest (quintile one), and 
around 31.72% received by the poorest and the near poor (quintile one and two).  
 
                                                 
8This estimation is based on the data on the amount purchased during the last three months (around November 
2003 – January 2004) and multiplied by 4 to estimate rice purchased in one year. There is a possibility, however, 
that the rice distribution was not stable in one year period and this might cause this gap. 
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Based on the data on the quantity purchased by average households and the prices they paid, it 
can be estimated that the total subsidy received by all Raskin beneficiaries could range between 
Rp2,020.78 billion to Rp2,704.95 billion, or 42% - 56% of the Raskin budget in APBN 2003. 
This estimate is calculated using two market price assumptions, which is the BULOG 
purchasing price (Rp2,790 per kg rice) as the minimum price and GoI purchase price from 
BULOG (Rp3,340 per kg rice) as the maximum price. The household purchasing price is 
taken from the household purchasing price collected in SUSENAS, as it reflects the real cost 
paid by the households. Because only 29% of the rice was enjoyed by the poorest, and around 
52% was enjoyed by the poorest and the near-poor, the estimated subsidy that went to the 
poorest quintile was around Rp588.95 billion to Rp788.50 billion, which is equivalent to 12%-
16% of the APBN budget for Raskin. If the target was to be the poorest and the near-poor 
that belong to the first and second quintiles, the subsidy that they received was around 
Rp1,058.22 to Rp1,416.33, or equivalent to 22% to 29% of the Raskin budget in APBN. These 
figures indicate that only a very small fraction of the subsidy through the Raskin program was 
received by the poor and the near poor, for whom the program had been designed. 
 
 
2.5 Institutional Structure and Incentive Effects 
 
The Raskin program is implemented though a collaboration between various government agencies:  
• The Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) through the Directorate General of Regional 
Community Development (PMD) is responsible for guiding and implementing the program.  
• The Ministry of Finance (MoF) through the Directorate General of Budget is responsible 
for providing the subsidy. 
• BKKBN is responsible for the provision of data to determine poor families who will 
receive the programs’ benefits.  
• Perum BULOG (The National Food Logistics State Company) is responsible for 
providing the rice, distributing it to localities, and collecting the subsidy from MoF.  
• Local governments are the implementing agencies for the program at local level 
(provincial, district) but the structure depends on the existing administrative arrangements 
of each agency and this varies across localities.  
• The sub-district and village administration are responsible for the distribution of the rice 
to targeted families and collecting payments from them. Although the distribution points 
are determined based on the agreement between local government and local BULOG 
office, they are usually located at the village government’s office. 
  
With regards to monitoring and evaluation, neither BULOG nor any other institution has a regular 
monitoring mechanism for Raskin’s targeting performance (McCulloch’s note, 2005). The only 
routine monitoring mechanism has been developed through SUSENAS by including questions since 
the 2002 SUSENAS on whether the sample household received benefits from several programs 
including Raskin. BULOG, however, seems to have rarely used the result for their evaluation. Local 
government and the PKPS BBM monitoring team should conduct regular monitoring activities to 
look at whether the program has been delivered to the right target, in the right amount, at the 
appropriate time, in the appropriate quality, and has been utilized for the stated purpose. It is not 
clear, however, how this monitoring will contribute to the betterment of the program. Evidence 
shows that it works only in cases where large-scale corruption or misuse of rice was found.    
 
In non-regular monitoring activity, both OPK and Raskin have been monitored and evaluated, 
both by implementers and by independent NGO and University teams. On OPK, the first 
evaluation from independent institution was the HIID project at the Ministry of Finance that 
conducted rapid field assessments of OPK in Lombok and West Java. This was followed by 
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the teams of SMERU’s Crisis Impact researchers who visited 10 districts in five provinces to 
learn more about the implementation of OPK: the targeting, leakage, quality of rice, 
administration and deliver issues. Other site-specific analyses conducted included the study by 
Tim Pengendali JPS, LP3ES, Ministry of Finance, and Benjamin Olken in collaboration with the 
SMERU Research Institute team. More than 10 prominent universities spread across the 
provinces were also asked by BULOG to evaluate the program. Based on BPS’s 100 village-
survey in 1999 and the 1999 SUSENAS, SMERU did quantitative analysis of targeting of the 
program. Apart from that, until 2001, there has not been a systematic representative or nation-
wide assessment of OPK and its implementation or impact. In addition, for Raskin, notable 
examples of field-study based evaluations of the Raskin program include Hastuti and Maxwell 
(2003), University of Indonesia (2003 and 2004), Gajah Mada University (2003), Brawijaya 
University (2003) and a group of 35 universities and the Coordinating Minister for Social 
Affairs (2004). Finally, the most recent study was a macro assessment conducted by Steve 
Tabor from Emsi and Husein Sawit from the Ministry of Agriculture.  
 
This institutional arrangement seems to be too loose in the sense that there is no single government 
agency or institution that is mandated to lead the program, and accountable for the overall 
performance of the program. The multi-agencies cooperation could possibly lead to nobody 
accepting responsibility for failures, or blaming other agencies for the poor program performance. 
This provides no incentive for any agencies involved to look into, and improve, the program 
performance over time. In addition, according to Hastuti and Maxwell (2003), the institutional 
arrangement of Raskin suffers from at least three weaknesses, namely: (1) lack of coordination 
among related government agencies; (2) additional workload of sub-district and village government 
officials; and (3) lack of transparency in the distribution of the operational funds.  
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 Annex 1. Subsidized Rice Programs 1998/1999 – 2002:  Disbursements and Quotas 
2002 
Raskin (& PKS-BBM) 
Province 
1998/1999 
OPK 
(tonnes) 
1999/2000 
OPK 
(tonnes) 
2000 
OPK 
(tonnes) 
2001 
OPK (& 
PPD-PSE) 
(tonnes) Allocation (tonnes) 
Disburse-
ments 
(tonnes)  
Target No. 
of Families 
KPS 
ALEK 
KS1 
ALEK 
Aceh Darussalam 17,418 79,993 48,596 58,793 77,977 85,691 324,070 237,059 213,891 
North Sumatra 8,552 46,121 26,092 31,933 40,310 32,224 167,958 184,886 394,293 
Riau 9,354 35,315 20,086 24,472 33,856 26,573 141,069 76,632 157,460 
West Sumatra 1,417 18,289 11,672 17,975 24,789 25,470 103,286 16,307 117,442 
Jambi 7,758 22,399 10,526 14,774 20,426 21,434 85,109 118,203 11,067 
South Sumatra 26,644 65,865 21,209 42,119 57,886 63,886 241,192 248,842 307,910 
Bangka & Belitung – – – – 6,441 7,641 26,838 – – 
Bengkulu 5,695 13,523 9,770 17,411 23,315 25,612 97,147 44,541 85,979 
Lampung 65,590 122,501 64,969 72,324 114,139 125,585 475,579 429,916 297,011 
DKI Jakarta 6,804 18,172 12,915 20,559 28,278 24,258 117,825 11,794 116,157 
West Java 115,976 435,145 197,200 233,026 270,867 266,522 1,128,613 1,100,809 1,823,309 
Banten – – – – 44,348 53,691 184,783 – – 
Central Java 367,383 706,206 357,946 325,658 498,007 498,006 2,075,031 1,934,757 710,172 
Yogyakarta 16,082 41,350 21,144 31,829 43,385 43,385 180,770 128,052 143,764 
East Java 299,006 579,827 277,314 250,305 428,763 424,619 1,786,511 1,799,518 933,541 
West Kalimantan 4,364 30,772 18,856 25,184 30,431 30,364 126,797 9,990 188,822 
East Kalimantan 1,521 14,453 7,766 12,956 17,599 21,590 73,331 35,677 93,016 
South Kalimantan 4,160 31,310 17,917 24,893 34,187 36,013 142,444 50,955 146,350 
Central Kalimantan 3,934 12,492 10,075 13,575 19,969 22,079 83,206 43,897 88,056 
North Sulawesi 8,673 42,449 16,509 24,087 18,224 20,206 75,933 73,296 69,471 
Gorontalo – – – – 11,660 13,116 48,582 – – 
Central Sulawesi 3,764 21,070 16,376 28,521 30,604 34,559 127,516 128,116 90,648 
Southeast Sulawesi 4,921 18,969 23,699 19,323 19,902 22,438 82, 925 87,537 114,390 
South Sulawesi 10,146 69,432 28,235 32,858 40,370 44,634 168,207 191,868 335,171 
Bali 691 7,015 6,453 7236 11,003 12,922 45,844 37,896 56,030 
West Nusatenggara 25,549 68,836 39,170 42,442 65,784 72,731 274,099 312,236 244,175 
East Nusatenggara 15,674 44,970 40,191 47,374 84,355 92,828 351,481 585,538 – 
Maluku (Ambon) 3,745 8,907 18429 31,630 21,609 28,928 90,038 135,605 69,578 
North Maluku – – – – 10,020 7,702 41,750 – – 
Irian Jaya (Papua) 8,429 35,853 31,135 30,574 38,596 42,141 160,816 236,400 92,181 
East Timor 7,124 6,947 – – – – – – – 
Total 1,050,374 2,598,180 1,353,248 1,481,829 2,167,100 2,226,847 9,029,584 8,260,327 6,899,8844 
Source: Hastuti and Maxwell, 2002:  
Notes:   
(a) Figures for 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000, and 2001 are the actual disbursements of subsidized rice. The data are sourced from BULOG 
records. The time span of the 1998-99 and 2000 phases of the OPK program was nine months only; all other phases were for a full twelve-
month period. 
(b) Figures for the 2002 Raskin program (including PKS-BBM) are BULOG’s own announced allocations (tonnage quotas and the target 
number of families that the program was intended to reach) and the actual tonnage of rice disbursed throughout the course of the twelve 
months of the program.  The data on disbursements are taken from BULOG’s own official figures based on the monthly reports received 
from Dolog offices in all provinces.  The figures on KPS ALEK and KS-1 ALEK included above are those used by BULOG to allocate quotas 
to each of the provinces in 2002, and were drawn from BKKBN 2000 data.  
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Annex 2. Raskin Budget and Cost 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
APBN Raskin (Billion Rp)  4,238.7   4,830.8   4,827.1   4,682.5  
APBN-Revised Raskin (Billion Rp.) 
 -    -    -    4,968.0  
Government Purchase Price for Rice from BULOG   2,804.0   3,343.0   3,343.0   3,494.0  
(HPP Rp/kg)     
     
APBN Raskin/GDP (%) 
 0.23   0.24   0.21   0.19  
APBN Raskin/Development Expenditure (%) 
 11.91   8.23   7.82   5.60  
     
BULOG Procurement Price (Rp/kg)     
- Rough Rice (gabah) 
 1,519.0   1,725.0   1,725.0   1,765.0  
- Milled Rice (beras) 
 2,470.0   2,790.0   2,790.0   2,790.0  
          
Realized Raskin Program Costs per kg delivered 
    
Procurement Cost  1,781.55   1,582.09   1,410.14   
Packaging Cost  96.59   106.74   36.83   na  
Exploitation Cost  157.54   175.75   175.84   na  
Management Cost  87.54   84.52   90.35   na  
Bank Fees  21.53   25.32   21.41   na  
Interest Charges  280.51   277.44   232.32   na  
Historic Cost and Carry Over Costs  677.21   1,086.98   1,494.67   na  
Total Realized  APBN Costs  3,102.47   3,338.84   3,461.56   na  
     
Distribution Point to beneficiary Indirect Costs *)  190.00   210.00   250.00   na  
(Rp/kg)     
Total Costs/kg delivered to program beneficiaries  3,292.47   3,548.84   3,711.56   na  
     
Total Tonnages (,000 kg) and Cost (Rp1,000/kg)  2,235.14   2,023.70   2,060.20   na  
Total Costs (million Rp.)  7,359.12   7,181.78   7,646.55   na  
Total Costs less beneficiary co-payment (trillion Rp)  5.12   5.16   5.59   na  
Source: Tabor and Sawit, 2005: 12-14 
Note: *)  Estimated total costs of distributing the rice from the distribution points to the communities 
(including the use of local labor to distribute and manage the program). 
These figures are based on field-based program evaluations 
Na = data not available 
 
 
 
Annex 3. Target and Realization of Raskin Program 
  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of Target (Planned) - families 7,500,000   8,700,000   9,790,000   8,580,313   8,590,804  
Number of Beneficiaries (Realization) - 
families 10,934,861   8,316,185  12,333,923   11,832,897   11,664,050  
      
Number of poor families  15,000,000  14,782,000   15,135,561   15,746,843  
      
% Target to the Number of Poor Families   58.00   66.23   56.69   54.56  
% Beneficiaries to the Number of Poor 
Families   55.44   83.44   78.18   74.07  
            
Source:  BULOG, 2005 
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Annex 4. Estimation of Raskin Benefit and Efficiency, 2003 
APBN Raskin 
 4,827.10  Billion Rp   
Raskin Quantity (BULOG) 
 2,023,698  tonnes   
Number of Target (Plan)  8,580,313  families   
Rice/Family (Plan)  235.85  kg/year   
  19.65  kg/month   
GoI Purchase Price (I)  3,343  Rp/kg   
BULOG Procurement Price (II)  2,790  Rp/kg   
Raskin Selling Price 
 1,000  Rp/kg   
Total Subsidy (I)  4,741.52  Billion Rp 98% of APBN 
Total Subsidy (II)  3,622.42  Billion Rp 75% of APBN 
Subsidy/Family (I)  46,050  Rp/month   
Subsidy/Family (II)  35,182  Rp/month   
2004 SUSENAS Data: 
    
Total Population 54,862,825 households (HH)   
Raskin Beneficiaries - Total 20,063,738 HH   
Q1 5,711,865 HH 28% of Total 
Q1 & Q2 10,400,946 HH 52% of Total 
Quantity of Raskin Purchased - Total 5.14 kg/HH/month   
Q1 5.26 kg/HH/month   
Q1 & Q2 5.19 kg/HH/month   
Price of Raskin - Total 1,157 Rp/kg   
Q1 1,158 Rp/kg   
Q1 & Q2 1,156 Rp/kg   
Raskin Purchased - Total 
 1,237,198.30  tonnes 61% of BULOG Quantity 
Q1  360,856.44  tonnes 29% of Total 
Q1 & Q2  647,570.18  tonnes 52% of Total 
Subsidy/HH (I) - Total  11,235  Rp/month   
Q1  11,504  Rp/month   
Q1 & Q2  11,348  Rp/month   
Subsidy/HH (II) - Total  8,393  Rp/month   
Q1  8,593  Rp/month   
Q1 & Q2  8,479  Rp/month   
Total Subsidy (I) - Total  2,704.95  Billion Rp 56% of APBN 
Q1  788.50  Billion Rp 16% of APBN 
Q1 & Q2  1,416.33  Billion Rp 29% of APBN 
Total Subsidy (II) - Total  2,020.78  Billion Rp 42% of APBN 
Q1  588.95  Billion Rp 12% of APBN 
Q1 & Q2  1,058.22  Billion Rp 22% of APBN 
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III. SSN AND PKPS BBM FOR EDUCATION SECTOR 
SCHOOL GRANTS AND SCHOLARSHIPS 
 
 
At the start of 2005/06 academic year (July 2005), the Government of Indonesia (GoI) 
introduced a big change in the programs to compensate the removal of fuel subsidy (PKPS-
BBM) for education sector by introducing a new scheme known as Bantuan Operasional Sekolah 
– BOS (assistance for school operational costs) for primary and junior high schools (SD and 
SMP), whilst maintaining Beasiswa Khusus Murid – BKM (scholarship for students) for students 
at senior high school level (SMA). These schemes replaced the previous schemes consisting of 
BKM (Bantuan Khusus Murid – Special Assistance for Students) managed by the Ministry of 
National Education (MoNE) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) 9 , and BKG 
(Bantuan Khusus Guru – Special Assistance for Teachers) managed by MoRA. The objective 
was that such programs are important to maintain enrollment rate of students at primary and 
secondary schools. Based on SMERU studies and other related sources this paper will analyze 
how this program worked and the impact it generated on the provision of basic education in 
the country.   
 
 
3.1 Brief Description of the Program 
 
The main objective of the BOS program is to ease the burden of the people in paying school 
fees in order to complete 9 years compulsory basic education. BOS provides block grants to 
primary and junior high schools to be used for paying selected school operational costs in 
order to provide free education or reduce school fees and maintain the quality of education, as 
well as providing special assistance in the form of a transportation allowance to the needy. The 
amount of the block grant is calculated based on the number of students enrolled. Its 
complementary payment, the BKM for students in senior high schools is aimed at providing 
assistance to senior high school students from poor families in order to prevent school 
dropouts at the senior high school level. These programs are managed by the Ministry of 
National Education in cooperation with the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 
 
Historically, the government has provided assistance to schools and students through various 
programs. Table 1 presents the evolution of this assistance. Before fiscal year (FY) 1998/1999, 
government assistance for paying school operational cost was funded by government routine 
budget called Bantuan Operasional Pendidikan (BOP). In addition to BOP, school operational 
costs were covered by parents’ contributions known as Badan Pembantu Penyelenggara Pendidikan 
(BP3). BOP for primary schools was funded by Kabupaten/Kota, while BOP for junior and 
senior high schools was funded by provincial and central governments. 10  Because of the 
limited fiscal capacity of Kabupaten/Kota governments and the large numbers of public primary 
schools that are located in almost all villages, the condition of primary schools was relatively 
poorer compared to public junior and senior high schools. There was also scholarship 
program with very limited coverage (around 1% of total students). These scholarships were 
provided by various sources, including GN-OTA (National movement of foster parents), 
Supersemar Foundation, and other private institutions and foundations.   
 
                                                 
9MoRA manages public Islamic schools. 
10After the implementation of regional autonomy in early 2001, district governments still provide financial 
assistance to primary, junior high and senior high schools, especially public schools, although the amount of 
grants is usually small and varies across districts. 
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As a response to the economic crisis in 1997, the GoI initiated social safety net (SSN) programs 
for the education sector starting in 1998/1999 academic year. This program lasted until the 
2002/2003 academic year. The SSN program for education sector consisted of block grant to 
schools known as Dana Bantuan Operasional (DBO) and scholarship program. The schools 
eligible for this program were all private, public and religious schools, including: primary schools 
(Sekolah Dasar - SD), primary schools for students with special needs (Sekolah Dasar Luar Biasa - 
SDLB), Islamic primary schools (Madrasah Ibtidaiyah – MI),  junior high schools (Sekolah 
Menengah Pertama - SMP), junior high schools for students with special needs (Sekolah Menengah 
Pertama Luar Biasa - SMPLB), Islamic junior high schools (Madrasah Tsanawiyah – MTs), senior 
high schools (Sekolah Menengah Atas - SMA), senior high schools for students with special needs 
(Sekolah Menengah Luar Biasa - SMLB), vocational schools (Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan - SMK), and 
Islamic senior high schools (Madrasah Aliyah – MA). DBO was aimed at maintaining the 
education service provided by schools after the crisis that significantly increased the cost of 
education. It provided block grants to selected schools amounting to Rp2 million per month for 
SD, Rp4 million per month for SMP and Rp10 million per month for SMA. In addition, the 
scholarship program provided money to poor students in the amount of Rp10,000 per month 
for primary school students, Rp20,000 per month for junior high school students, and Rp25,000 
per month for senior high school students. This scholarship was to be used for paying all costs 
related to schooling activities, including transportation costs. This scholarship was intended to 
prevent student dropouts, so that students from poor families could continue their study, at least 
until they completed junior high school. This program was managed by the Ministry of National 
Education in cooperation with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) and Ministry of Religious 
Affairs (MoRA). 
 
Table 1. The Evolution of Grants and Scholarship Programs 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1. BOP & Scholarship        
 2. SSN for Education Sector – DBO & Scholarship   
    3. PKPS – BBM for Education Sector 
    3a. BKS, 
BKM & 
Scholarshi
p for 
university 
students 
3b. MoNE (BKM & Scholarship for 
university students); MoRA (BKM & 
BKG) 
3c. BOS 
for SD & 
SMP, and 
BKM for 
SMA 
 
Following the removal of the fuel subsidy in 2001, the GoI also created programs for the 
education sector to compensate for the removal of this subsidy (PKPS-BBM).  This PKPS 
BBM 11  program for the education sector was designed to complement the ongoing SSN 
program in the sector. In 2001, the PKPS-BBM for the education sector was implemented by 
MoNE and it consisted of scholarships for students at primary, junior high and senior high 
schools called Bantuan Khusus Murid (BKM), and block grants to schools called Bantuan Khusus 
Sekolah (BKS). BKM provided scholarships to selected students in the same amount as 
provided by scholarships under the SSN program. BKS was, however, distributed for only one 
semester in the amount of Rp40 million for primary schools, Rp50 million for junior 
secondary schools and Rp60 million for senior secondary schools for one semester. The BKS 
was no longer continued in the following years.   
                                                 
11In 2001 and 2002, this program was called PPDPSE, an acronym for Program Penanggulangan Dampak Pengurangan 
Subsidi Energi (Program for reducing the impact of reduction in energy subsidy). 
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In 2002, the management of the programs was split into two. One was managed by the Ministry 
of National Education and the other was managed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.12 Since 
this year, the program managed by MoNE only consisted of BKM for public and private 
schools and it was integrated through the JPS Program. It had been implemented by structuring 
Bantuan Khusus Murid - BKM (scholarship for students) in such a way that it provided 
scholarships to the groups that did not receive scholarships under the SSN program. In the first 
semester of the program, the BKM was targeted at students in primary school grades 1 to 4, and 
grade 1 in junior high school, as these groups were not covered by the SSN scholarship program 
that were awarded to grade 4 and above in primary school. Similarly, in the following years the 
BKM scholarships moved in where the SSN scholarship moved out, and as of August 2003 the 
BKM has completely replaced the SSN scholarship (Sparrow, et al., 2003). 
 
The program managed by MoRA adopted a slightly different arrangement by diverting part of 
the program to provide assistance to school teachers that mostly did not hold civil servant 
status. So the program under MoRA management consisted of BKM, assistance for teachers 
known as Bantuan Khusus untuk Guru (BKG) and assistance for contract teachers known as 
Bantuan Khusus Guru Kontrak (BGK) for Islamic schools (Madrasah).  
 
For primary and junior high schools, the BKM, both under MoNE as well as MoRA 
management, lasted until the end of the 2004/2005 academic year, and was replaced by the 
new scheme, BOS. Meanwhile, the BKM program for senior secondary schools still continues 
although the scholarship benefit has been increased to Rp 65,000 per student per month. 
 
 
3.2 Coverage and Targeting Performance 
 
The SSN scholarship program was targeted to cover around 6% of students at primary 
school, 17% at junior high school level, and 10% at senior high level. The BKM introduced 
under the PKPS BBM program added more than two million scholarships for primary 
school students, more than one million for junior high school students, and around 400 
thousand for senior high school students. As presented in Table 2, these additional numbers 
should increase the scholarship coverage to more than 10% of students at primary school in 
2001/02 and by as much as 20% in 2003/04. For junior high school students, the coverage 
increased to 21% in 2001/02 although it decreased to around 16-18% in 2003 and 2004. For 
students at senior high school level, the coverage increased to more than 10% in 2001/02 
and the following years.  
 
In addition, the school grants, DBO, was targeted to cover around 60% of schools at all levels 
or some 1,094,968 primary schools, 18,282 junior high schools and 9,374 senior high schools. 
The BKS that lasted only one semester, which was in the first semester of the 2001/02 
academic year, provided grants to a very limited number of schools (3,500 or 11% of total SD) 
primary schools, 2,030 (1% of the total) junior high schools, and 685 (2%) senior high 
schools. These grants were distributed to all districts (kabupaten/kota), except 35 districts that 
already received assistance from School Improvement Grant Programs provided by Dutch 
Trust Funds.  
 
By allocating to a limited number of students, the scholarship programs, both those provided 
through SSN scholarships and BKM, was intended to be targeted to the needy, which were 
students from poor or low income families. To be able to reach the target group, both 
                                                 
12The argument for this split was because most Islamic schools under the supervision of MoRA need to be better 
captured by the program. 
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programs had developed a decentralized mechanism of allocation and selection using a 
combination of geographical targeting in defining regional allocations and individual targeting 
using certain criteria in selecting beneficiaries.  The process involves four levels of committees 
(central, district, sub-district and school levels) in the case of SSN and three levels of 
committees (central, district and school levels) in the case of BKM. It started with allocation at 
the central (national) level and ended at the selection of students at the school level by the 
school administration and school committees that in theory should include the participation of 
the wider community. The individual selection was based on a consideration of family socio-
economic backgrounds, such as families living in poverty, single parent and large households, 
orphan, or family welfare status according to BKKBN classifications. In addition, there were 
also other considerations such as distance of the house from school and the threat of dropout 
because of economic reason. In principle, both programs adopted similar mechanisms with 
slight differences in the use of criteria and the omission of the kecamatan (sub-district) 
selection team in the allocation of BKM program (details of the mechanism and criteria for 
selection are presented in Annex 1.).   
 
Looking at the performance in the early implementation of SSN scholarship, an analysis using 
data from the 1999 SUSENAS special module found that the scholarship program only 
covered approximately 4% of students at the primary school level, 8% at junior high school, 
and 4% at senior high school (Sumarto and Suryahadi, “Principles and Approaches..”). This 
figure is relatively low compared to the planned coverage, while another study by Cameron 
using the 100-villages survey data, found a more encouraging result that the scholarship was 
received by 8.4% of students at primary school level, 13.6% at junior high school, and 9.6% at 
senior high school (Cameron, “Did Social Safety…”). The low estimation produced by the 
1999 SUSENAS data might be due to the fact that it had not yet covered the whole program 
implementation. The 1999 SUSENAS covered only the previous six months of its 
implementation. On the other hand, the 100-villages is more limited in scope and focused 
more on poor villages so that it potentially gave an overestimation result (Perdana and 
Maxwell, 2004). Another estimation based on a nationwide survey by CIMU (“The 
Scholarship and Grant”) found that the scholarship coverage in the 1999/2000 academic year 
was 7%, 20% and 11% among students in primary, junior high, and senior high school 
respectively. The improvement over the previous academic year was claimed to be attributed 
to the refinement in information dissemination resulting in a better performance by the 
allocation committee. 
 
Using the 100-villages data set, Suryahadi, Suharso and Sumarto (1999) found that the 
coverage of the scholarship program varies greatly across districts included in the survey.13  
The scholarship coverage among primary school students ranged between 26.9% (in 
Banjarnegara) and 0.87% (in Sumedang), while among junior high school students ranged 
between 53.68% (in Banjarnegara) and 1.60% (in Sumedang). This might reflect the unequal 
distribution across districts, resulting from the allocation process done by the national 
committee.    
 
 
                                                 
13This survey covered 100 villages located in 10 districts that spread across 8 provinces. 
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Table 2. Coverage Plan of the Scholarship and BOS Programs 
Primary School Junior High School Senior High School 
Academic 
Year/ 
Semester 
SSN 
Scholar 
ship 
BKM 
MoNE 
BKM 
MoRA BOS Total 
SSN 
Scholar 
ship 
BKM 
MoNE 
BKM 
MoRA BOS Total 
SSN 
Scholar 
ship 
BKM 
MoNE Total 
I 6,20%    6,20% 17,00%    17,00% 9,30%  9,30% 
1998/99 
II 6,20%    6,20% 17,00%    17,00% 9,30%  9,30% 
I 6,20%    6,20% 17,00%    17,00% 9,30%  9,30% 
1999/00 
II 6,20%    6,20% 17,00%    17,00% 9,30%  9,30% 
I 6,20%    6,20% 17,00%    17,00% 9,30%  9,30% 
2000/01 
II 6,20%    6,20% 17,00%    17,00% 9,30%  9,30% 
I 4,10% 7,60%   11,70% 11,40% 10,32%   21,72% 6,20% 7,41% 13,61% 
2001/02 
II 4,10% 7,60%   11,70% 11,40% 10,32%   21,72% 6,20% 7,41% 13,61% 
I 2,10% 7,60% 0,35%  10,05% 5,70% 10,32% 4,13%  20,15% 3,10% 7,41% 10,51% 
2002/03 
II 2,10% 7,60% 0,55%  10,25% 5,70% 10,32% 0,83%  16,85% 3,10% 7,41% 10,51% 
I  19,87% 0,55%  20,42%  18,06% 0,83%  18,89%  11,12% 11,12% 
2003/04 
II     n.a.     n.a.   n.a. 
I     n.a.     n.a.   n.a. 
2004/05 
II  20,49%   20,49%  24,29%   24,29%  11,86% 11,86% 
2005/06 I    99,81% 99,81%    110,86% 110,86%  12,95% 12,95% 
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Using the 2002, 2003 and 2004 SUSENAS data set, Table 3 shows that the coverage of 
scholarships among households with children attending primary to senior high schools was 
around 9.5% in 2001, decreased to 5.9% in 2002, and rose again to 7.6% in 2003. Although it 
was significantly higher than the estimation produced from the 1999 SUSENAS, it was 
certainly not significantly different from, or even slightly lower than, the CIMU estimation for 
the 1999/2000 academic year. Indeed, the comparison with the 1999 estimation (from 
SUSENAS) indicates that the BKM had increased the scholarship coverage in general, 
although it had not achieved the targeted coverage as presented in Table 2. It should be noted, 
however, that the structure of the question in SUSENAS only allowed for analysis at the 
household level without detailed information on individual children.14 So, there is a possibility 
that a household received more than one scholarship if they have more than one child 
attending school.15 On the other hand, there is also the possibility that the parents did not 
know that their children received scholarships as they are not well informed about it. On the 
ground studies conducted by SMERU in 2000 and 2003 16  (SMERU, 2000), for example, 
discovered that some schools kept the scholarship money and deducted unpaid parents 
contributions directly from that money so that no money was physically given to the students 
and the parents. In a very limited number of cases, it was even used to pay incentives to 
contracted teachers or other school operational costs. This practice was found more 
frequently in Islamic primary schools managed by MoRA since the school and also the 
students were very poor. 
 
Table 3. Coverage and Targeting of Scholarship Programs, 2001-2003 
  
% HH received 
scholarship*) 
% Q1 received 
scholarship*) 
% of scholarship received 
by Q1 Targeting Ratio**) 
  
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
Indonesia 9.53 5.93 7.60 14.87 9.41 12.08 39.11 39.74 39.33 0.76 0.75 0.76 
Sumatra 8.05 5.02 6.54 12.37 7.20 8.99 38.67 35.38 35.10 0.77 0.81 0.81 
Java/Bali 9.38 5.64 6.74 15.04 9.51 11.45 38.11 40.46 39.25 0.77 0.74 0.76 
Kalimantan 11.36 8.61 9.00 14.50 11.32 9.85 25.18 24.05 19.52 0.94 0.95 1.01 
Sulawesi 8.14 4.10 7.38 11.90 5.98 11.51 43.6 41.0 47.8 0.71 0.74 0.65 
Maluku/NTT/
NTB 19.44 11.35 21.15 24.52 14.83 26.13 56.91 54.98 54.37 0.54 0.56 0.57 
Papua 1.75 14.58 13.86 4.15 20.90 14.68 39.85 46.91 22.23 0.75 0.66 0.97 
Source: Calculated from Susenas Kor, 2002, 2003, 2004 
Note: *) % out of HH with children attending school; **) 0-perfect targeting, 1-no targeting, 1.25-completely mis-targeting 
 
Further disaggregation across regions revealed that the coverage varies across regions with 
higher coverage in poorer regions such as Maluku/NTB/NTT, Papua and Kalimantan. The 
changes in coverage over time across regions also show a significant increase in scholarship 
coverage in Papua that had a very low coverage in 2001. This phenomenon indicates changes 
in district allocation that might have resulted from the use of different data for calculating the 
allocation. The allocation of scholarships for each district in 2001 and 2002 used the 1999 
                                                 
14It is also not possible to disaggregate the education level of the children involved. The 2002, 2003 and 2004 
SUSENAS did not ask questions on the scholarship received by each individual child in the household. Instead it 
only asked whether the household received a scholarship and this could be one or more scholarships. 
15It implies that the estimation potentially provides a lower estimation and can not be directly compared to data 
at the individual level. 
16The 2000 study was aimed at evaluating the DBO and scholarships programs, and it was carried out in 
Pontianak, Tangerang, Lombok Timur and Sleman. The 2003 study was aimed at analyzing the targeting and 
implementation of SSN scholarship and BKM program, particularly at primary and junior high school levels, and 
it was carried out in Blitar City, Kabupaten Pontianak, Kabupaten Blora and Kabupaten Lombok Timur. 
The SMERU Research Institute 30 
poverty index (Human Poverty Index) that was significantly different from the 2002 updated 
version of the poverty index being used for calculating the allocation for 2003 and 2004.  
 
The distribution of scholarship recipients across quintiles based on per capita expenditure 
revealed the targeting performance of the program. The analysis conducted by Sumarto and 
Suryahadi (2001) using the 1999 SUSENAS special module, estimated that at the primary 
school level, only 5.8% of the households at the lowest quintiles benefited from the program, 
while 2% of the highest quintiles also received scholarships. At the junior high school level, 
12% of the lowest quintiles received scholarships, while 4.8% of the highest quintiles also 
received it. At the senior high school level, only 5% of the lowest quintiles received it, while 
1.9% of the highest quintiles also received it. The analysis also revealed that the proportion of 
recipients in the second lowest expenditure quintile was higher for junior and senior high 
school students compared to those at the primary level.  
 
Responding to this phenomenon, CIMU (2000) argued that, apart from the data problem, one 
possible explanation for the mistargeting evident among the upper secondary students was the 
fact that, at this level, students who receive scholarships may be among the poorest at their 
school, but they are not always the poorest segment of society.17 In addition, another problem 
raised in the CIMU report was that by directing scholarships to students who were already in 
school, a substantial number of the poorest children of school age who have already dropped 
out of school and are no longer attending school were not eligible for the scholarship. The 
scholarship coverage among school age children is therefore lower than those figures. 
 
Compared to the 1999 targeting performance, the targeting performance in the 2001-2003 
period as presented in Table 3 seems better, in terms of relatively higher coverage of the 
lowest expenditure quintile. It reflected a tendency of better targeting compared to 1999. A 
similar trend is also presented by Sparrow (2003). Based on analysis using the 1999 and 2002 
SUSENAS data, he found that in the 2001/02 academic year, 70% of the scholarships went to 
the poorest two quintiles, based on per capita expenditure, and this was an increase from 60% 
in the first year of the program in 1999. Indeed, it could be said that the targeting performance 
during 2001-2003 was not good enough as the targeting ratios18 are still around 0.7, a value 
close to 1 that implies low or almost no targeting. Even if the households in the second lowest 
quintile is considered poor, the targeting ratio is still around 0.6, since only 10%, 6% and 8% 
of the households in the second lowest quintile got scholarships in 2001, 2002 and 2003, 
respectively.  
 
The targeting ratio in different regions has uncovered interesting features. The value of the 
targeting ratio shows that poverty targeting in the poor regions of Maluku/NTB/NTT is 
relatively better and stable compared to other regions during the 2001 to 2003 period. On the 
contrary, the targeting performance in Kalimantan is the worst and is tending to get worse 
over time. The targeting ratio of Kalimantan in 2003 showed that the proportion of 
scholarships received by non-poor is almost equal to the non-poor proportion in the 
population meaning that both poor and non-poor have similar opportunities to get 
                                                 
17This argument is rather weak, since the estimation based on SUSENAS data has calculated the beneficiaries in 
each quintile from the population of households that have children in school., and not from the total number of 
households. 
18Targeting Ratio (TR) is defined as; TR=Bn/Pn, where Bn is the proportion of beneficiaries who are non-poor 
(Q2-Q5), and Pn is the proportion of the non-poor out of total population (=80%). If all beneficiaries are poor 
or perfect targeting, TR=0 as Bn=0; if all beneficiaries are non-poor or completely mis-targeted, TR=1.25; and if 
TR=1 or the proportion of non-poor beneficiaries is equal to the proportion of the non-poor population, it 
means there is no targeting. 
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scholarships. Other regions that show a decrease in targeting performance are Sumatra and 
Papua. In the Papua case, it seems that a significant increase in scholarship coverage in 2002 
and 2003 was not supported by better targeting. The worsening targeting performance 
indicates that, despite the increase in program coverage in this island, the marginal benefit 
went more to the non-poor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The distribution of scholarship benefits across quintiles based on household per capita 
expenditure, compared to the benefit received by the household in the lowest quintiles are 
presented in Figure 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d. These figures provide a better picture of who got more 
benefit from the scholarship programs in each region, and it also uncovered the targeting 
problems in Kalimantan and Papua. Given the poor condition of infrastructure in these two 
big islands, this problem could have its roots in the difficulty in reaching the poor who live in 
remote areas, while the relatively poorer students selected in the school in an accessible 
location might not belong to the lowest expenditure quintile by island wide standards. This 
bias could also happen in the collection of SUSENAS data, because an under-representation 
of the remote regions in the sampling frame could lead to bias for higher portion of non-poor 
beneficiaries or under-recording of poor beneficiaries in the remote areas. 
 
In regard to the problems of low coverage and mistargeting revealed above, several qualitative 
studies and monitoring reports have identified various problems related to coverage and 
targeting issues. In the early implementation of the SSN program, the allocation of 
scholarships and grants to districts and to schools was intended to mitigate the impact of the 
crisis so it should have been based on the estimated impact of the crisis on poverty in each 
district. The original allocations to districts in 1998 were, however, based on school 
populations and the 1996 district poverty index.  These criteria proved to be only partially 
effective, and did not reflect the actual impact of the crisis, which affected some parts of the 
Figure 1a. Scholarship Targeting Performance, 1999
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Figure 1b. Scholarship Targeting Performance, 2001
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Figure 1d.  Scholarship Targeting Performance, 2003
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Figure 1c.  Scholarship Targeting Performance, 2002
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country far more seriously than others, such as urban areas of Java (CIMU, 2000). A similar 
problem was also observed in the SMERU rapid appraisal that found that the allocation was 
based mainly on poverty condition and less on the crisis impact mainly due to lack of data on 
crisis impact. In addition, this rapid appraisal also identified the problem in the application of 
IDT village criteria that tent to divert the target focus from the areas hit hardest by the crisis 
to the poorest districts and poorest regions within the district. This problem was then partly 
solved by the use of more updated poverty data in 1999.   
 
At the school level, the SMERU rapid appraisal on SSN scholarship and DBO (SMERU, 
2000) found that it was difficult for school committees to allocate scholarships among poor 
students because, in most cases, the scholarship quota was smaller than the number of 
students that are considered poor and in need of assistance. In some places this had led to the 
scholarship being awarded in rotation so that more students could be assisted, sharing of the 
scholarship money with poor students that did not receive scholarship, or even the use of 
scholarship money to pay all delayed school fees regardless of whether it belonged to the 
students who got scholarship or not. In some places, however, there were also students from 
well off families receiving scholarships, and this was mainly due to the limited involvement 
and control of the wider community. Sparrow et.al. (2003)  conducted a qualitative study in 
Kota Blitar, Kab. Blora, Kab. Lombok Timur and Kota Pontianak in 2003 and still found the 
same practices. In addition, this study also found that targeting seems to work better in the 
program under MoNE management than under MoRA, partly because the quota for MoRA 
was too small compared to the number of poor students and better dissemination of 
information in the MoNE operation. In general, however, most primary schools complained 
about the insufficient scholarship quota, a complaint that was less frequently mentioned in 
junior high schools. The targeting problem in junior high schools is more the result of the 
limited knowledge of the school and the school committee about the socio-economic 
background of the students and this made the selection process more difficult. 
  
Unlike scholarship programs that can be evaluated using a nationwide survey like SUSENAS, 
DBO targeting performance could not be captured from the existing nationwide data 
collection. It is, therefore, rather difficult to assess the coverage and targeting performance of 
DBO. A small study conducted by SMERU (2000) in 2000 discovered that in the four visited 
districts, DBO was given to relatively poor schools. There were, however, a large number of 
poor schools that did not receive DBO because of the limited DBO allocation. The use of 
IDT village criteria was widely criticized, especially in selecting junior high schools because 
students came from surrounding villages so that this criteria was difficult to apply. Complaints 
about insufficient quota was more prevalent within Islamic schools and poor private schools 
because they felt that they were poorer than the average public schools but they got less 
attention and more limited DBO quota. CIMU (2000) also highlighted that poor private 
schools received 10% less than public schools. In addition, a monitoring study conducted by 
the Demographic Institute of the University of Indonesia and SSN Work Force in 2000 found 
that one school reported as DBO recipient was not actually receiving it (Irawan et.al., 2001). 
 
BOS, which was introduced at the start of 2005/06 academic year, makes allocations to all 
students at primary and junior high school levels, including students in traditional Islamic 
boarding schools, Islamic schools, and non-Islamic religious schools so that in theory it will 
cover 100% of students at that level (Table 2). Meanwhile, the allocation of BKM for senior 
high school students only increased slightly compared to the allocation in the previous year.  
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Although it means to cover all students at primary and junior high schools, BOS is 
significantly different from the scholarship program as it does not provide direct transfers to 
individual students but rather to the school. This scheme is more like a new and bigger grant 
to schools, complemented with additional tasks for the school to provide special assistance to 
poor students. The guidelines state that the schools which agree (by signing a letter of 
agreement) to receive BOS should provide free education to all students if the school’s budget 
can be fully covered by the fund provided by BOS. In the case where the school budget could 
not be covered by BOS, the school should at least provide free education to poor students, 
and deduct student tuition fees in the amount that can be compensated by BOS. In addition, 
one of the costs that can be financed from BOS is a transport allowance for poor students. By 
signing the agreement, the schools that receive BOS also agree to a financial audit of the 
school financial reports, including the use of BOS and other funds.19  
 
So BOS is a form of across-the-board (non-targeted) subsidy to basic education at primary 
and junior high school, which is now considered as part of the 9 years of compulsory basic 
education program. In theory, there is no poverty targeting in the program, although in 
practice the task of poverty targeting is handed over to school level authorities consisting of 
school headmaster and school committee. By so doing, it has the potential to provide free 
education to a larger portion of students, particularly those located in rural or poor areas 
where the education cost can be covered by BOS funds. It indeed also solves the problem of 
too low a scholarships quota that has led to rotating practice found in some poor schools. The 
distribution of benefits across welfare levels, however, could be more dispersed. This will, 
however, be determined by the decision made at school level by school administrations (or the 
headmaster) and school committees, and how responsive they are to the need of poor 
students. A recent monitoring study conducted by the monitoring team of the PKPS BBM 
program revealed the fact that only a very limited number of schools have allocated BOS 
funds to pay for a transportation allowance for poor students, and this reflects a limited 
understanding by the school that BOS funds should be prioritized towards assisting poor 
students, and not merely to pay school operational costs (Tim Pemantau Penyerapan dan 
Pemanfaatan Dana PPK, 2005).   
 
 
3.3 Impact and Outcomes 
 
The SSN and PKPS BBM scholarship and grants programs were intended to provide direct 
and indirect transfers to increase the access of the poor to good quality education. As 
presented in Table 4, the scholarship scheme provided by SSN and BKM were the same until 
the end of the 2004/05 academic year. The new BKM scheme for senior high school students 
introduced in the 2005/06 academic year more than doubled the benefit from Rp25,000 per 
month to Rp65,000 per month for each student. The scholarship benefit for primary school 
students that was Rp10,000 per month only covered 70% of education expenses of the 
poorest expenditure quintile children at this level, while the Rp20,000 per month scholarship 
benefit for junior high school students covered 55% of the education spending of the poorest 
expenditure quintiles for the same level. Sparrow et. al. (2003) revealed that the people felt 
that the scholarship amount was adequate to cover school expenses for students in some 
regions especially in the outer islands, but was not sufficient for Java. There was also an 
argument that the education expenses were not the same for all levels. The costs of education 
for grades 1 and 6 in primary school are higher than for other grades of primary school, while 
the same also applies for grade 1 and 3 in junior and senior high school where the costs are 
                                                 
19A school with strong financial capacity that does not want to be audited financially is allowed to refuse BOS. 
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higher than those for grade 2. In addition, there was also criticism that the scholarship scheme 
did not guarantee that students would continue their study from primary to junior high and to 
senior high school, the transitional periods with a higher dropout probability for the poor.    
 
Despite this limitation, various studies generally found a positive impact of the scholarships 
and grant programs that had been provided through SSN and PKPS BBM. CIMU (2001b) 
highlighted that the scholarship and grants programs had initially contributed to preventing 
enrollment rates from declining sharply between the 1997/98 and 1998/99 academic years. It 
has also contributed to increasing enrollment rates in subsequent years, as the enrollment rate 
for all age groups increased in the 1999/2000 and 2000/01 academic years, with the largest 
increase enjoyed by students from the poorest expenditure quintile. Another study by 
Cameron (2002) applying regression analysis of the probability of students becoming school 
dropouts using the 100-villages survey data, argued that the scholarships significantly reduced 
the probability of dropout at the lower secondary level, but did not affect dropout rates in 
primary and upper secondary schools, at least during the first few months of the program’s 
operations. This study, however, has not provided a complete picture on the impact of the 
program. Daley and Fane (2002) argued that the scholarhip program might have a greater 
impact on re-enrollments at the start of a school year. The impact could not be captured from 
analysis using the data set, which has been used in Cameron study.  
 
Table 4. The Amount of Scholarship and Grant Benefit 
Program Unit Primary School 
Junior High 
School 
Senior High 
School 
SSN - Scholarship (1998-
2003) student/semester 60,000 120,000 150,000 
PKPS BBM - Scholarship  
(2001-2004) student/semester 60,000 120,000 150,000 
PKPS BBM - Scholarship 
(2005) student/semester - - 390,000 
SSN - DBO   (1998-2003) student/semester 12,000,000 24,000,000 60,000,000 
PKPS BBM - BKS (2001) student/semester 40,000,000 50,000,000 60,000,000 
PKPS BBM - BOS* (2005) student/semester 117,500 162,250 - 
 
Regarding DBO, surveys by CIMU revealed that it would be hard for many schools to survive 
and provide adequate education services without grant. Over 80% of schools used some of 
the block grant they had received to purchase teaching aids and stationary, and to fund 
essential maintenance of school buildings. Meanwhile, around 64% of them also used some of 
the grant to assist the students who had not been covered by the scholarships program, usually 
with a scholarship-style fee relief (CIMU, 2001b). By meeting the cost of some essential 
materials and some of the shortfall in income from outstanding student fees, the block grant 
has no doubt enabled some schools to keep fees lower than they would otherwise have been. 
This may in turn have enabled some more children to stay in school (Jones and Hagul, 2001). 
SMERU (2000) also discovered that for many Islamic primary and junior high schools that 
have very small budgets and have difficulty paying most of their semi-voluntary teachers, 
DBO contributed a lot and some of them even used scholarship money to support the overall 
school operation, as they considered it gave the benefit to all of the students that are all poor. 
Similar evidence also pointed by CIMU (2000). According to the CIMU study, in 1999/00 
about 18% of rural primary schools relied on grants for over 50% of school income, while on 
average the DBO contribution to primary school budgets in 1998/99 was 21% and in 
1999/00 and 2001/02 was around 17%. For junior and senior high schools in general, the 
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DBO contribution was 3% in 1998/99 and 2.5% in 1999/00. For Islamic junior school (MTs) 
the BOS contribution was more significant, which was 20%-30% of the school budget. Both 
SMERU (2000) and CIMU (2000) revealed an alarming point on the transparency in the use 
of DBO because some school did not have good book keeping or no book keeping at all.   
 
 
3.4 Efficiency and Administrative Costs 
 
The SSN education program that lasted for five years starting 1998 was funded jointly by the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Government of Indonesia (GoI). For the 
first three years, some Rp1.2 trillion was allocated to this program each year. The allocation 
for the fourth and fifth year of the program was decreased to Rp913 billion and Rp639 billion 
respectively. The PKPS BBM that began in 2001 was fully funded by GoI from the funds set 
aside from the reduction of fuel subsidy. In 2001, the real expenditure for the education sector 
amounted to almost Rp1.3 trillion, increased to Rp1.8 trillion in 2002 and increased again to 
Rp2.6 trillion in 2003 20 , but decreased to Rp563 billion in 2004 (Table 5). With the 
introduction of BOS in 2005, the allocation increased sharply to Rp 6.2 trillion in 2005 and 
Rp11 trillion in 2006, with around 80% to 90% going to BOS for 2005 and 2006 respectively 
(Table 6 and 7).  
 
Table 5. Budget Allocation for SSN and PKPS BBM Education Sector (Billion) 
PKPS BBM 
SSN - Education 
 
   Education 
(MoNE) 
   Education 
(MoRA) 
   Education 
(MoNE) 
Year Allocation  Actual Actual Plan 
1998/99 1,200         
1999/2000 1,200         
2000/01 1,200         
2001/02 913 2001 1,279   
2002/03 639 2002 1,495 335  
    2003 2,132 534  
    2004 0.28 563  
    2005   6,272 
    2006   11,076 
 
As can be seen from Table 7, the SSN program has allocated a relatively larger proportion for 
program administration and safeguarding, while the latest PKPS BBM program only allocated 
2% for administration and safeguarding. Although it gives an impression that the latter is 
more efficient, it could also raise a concern on the safeguarding, dissemination of information 
and monitoring of this huge program, as these will play a critical role in supporting the 
effectiveness of the overall program.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20According to PKPS BBM Monitoring manual, BKM for 2003 amounted to Rp1.395 trillion, and the rest was 
allocated for scholarships for university students, support to non-formal education (pendidikan luar sekolah), and 
training for skill improvement.  
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Table 6. PKPS BBM Budget for Fiscal Year 2005 and 2006 
2005 
No Activities Target (num. 
of students) 
Unit 
Cost Total Cost  
1 BKM (January-June)   734,184,000,000 11.71% 
 SD/MI/SDLB 5,930,000 60,000 355,800,000,000  
 SMP/MTs/SMPLB 2,353,200 120,000 282,384,000,000  
 SMA/SMK/MA/SMLB 640,000 150,000 96,000,000,000  
2 BKM (July-December)   272,398,620,000 4.34% 
 SMA/SMK/MA/SMLB 698,458 390,000 272,398,620,000  
3 BOS (July-December)   5,136,933,035,147 81.90% 
 SD/MI/SDLB 28,779,709 117,500 3,381,615,807,500  
 Salafiyah – SD 108,177 117,500 12,710,797,500  
 SMP/MTs/SMPLB 10,625,816 162,250 1,724,038,646,000  
 Salafiyah – SMP 114,433 162,259 18,567,784,147  
4 Safeguarding   128,423,300,131 2.05% 
 Total   6,271,938,955,278  
2006 
No Activities Target (num. 
of students) 
Unit 
Cost Total Cost  
1 BKM (Jan.-Dec.)   544,797,240,000 4.92% 
 SMA/SMK/MA/SMLB 698,458 780,000 544,797,240,000  
2 BOS (Jan.-Dec.)   10,273,864,010,500 92.76% 
 SD/MI/SDLB 28,779,709 235,000 6,763,231,615,000  
 Salafiyah – SD 108,177 235,000 25,421,595,000  
 SMP/MTs/SMPLB 10,625,816 324,500 3,448,077,292,000  
 Salafiyah – SMP 114,433 324,500 37,133,508,500  
3 Safeguarding   256,846,600,263 2.32% 
 Total   11,075,507,850,763  
Source: Ministry of National Education and Ministry of Religious Affairs 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Administration and Safeguarding Allocation in SSN and PKPS BBM 
Education Program  
Total Cost  Scholarship & School Grant 
Administration & 
Safeguarding Program Year 
(Rp million) (Rp million) % (Rp million) %  
1998/99 1,204,529 1,137,623 94% 66,906 6% 
1999/00 1,172,979 1,137,623 97% 35,356 3% 
2000/01 1,204,529 1,137,623 94% 66,906 6% 
2001/02 918,978 883,622 96% 35,356 4% 
SSN 
2002/03 664,978 629,622 95% 35,356 5% 
2005* 6,271,939 6,143,516 98% 128,423 2% PKPS 
BBM 2006** 11,075,508 10,818,661 98% 256,847 2% 
Note: * - transition from BKM to BOS; ** BOS for SD & SMP, BKM for SMA 
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Figure 2 displays the amount of budget allocations across regions in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 
2005. This shows a big jump in the BOS budget in all regions, while the budget for BKM for 
students in senior high schools has not significantly increased. As can also be seen from 
Figure 3a and 3b, the proportion of allocations across regions of the assistance directed to 
primary and junior high schools has not changed much, although the allocation for Java and 
Bali increased slightly mainly due to allocation based on number of students. For senior high 
school BKM, however, the proportion allocated to Sumatra increased significantly in 2005. 
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3.5 Institutional Structure and Incentive Effects 
 
The SSN programs made some innovations in their allocation and delivery systems. These 
include the establishment of various levels of committee with the task of determining 
allocations based on pre-defined criteria and channeling information as well as increased 
public awareness of the program, direct disbursement and channeling of funds through post 
offices, and the establishment of an independent monitoring unit. At the central level, the 
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Box 1. SSN Scholarships in Kota Blitar 
 
In general, the allocation process in Kota Blitar is transparent. Dissemination of information and 
monitoring seemed to be in accordance with the guideline. The district committee monitored the program 
in all sub-districts every six months. This consists of monitoring post offices on disbursement of funds, 
monitoring schools on disbursement to students, and checking the responsibility report. Schools also 
reported having been monitored by the district education office, sub-district education office, and district 
surveillance office (Bawasda) and NGOs.  
 
There is evidence that community participation did influence the selection of students by school 
committees. Village leaders were consulted on the poverty status of households, and community 
members were sometimes part of the allocation committee. Moreover, public knowledge of the program 
was reasonable, which benefited the transparency of the allocation and targeting process.  Students 
seemed well informed on why they or others had received scholarships. In public schools, in particular, 
there was communications on the use of funds between schools and parents. Information about the SSN 
program was disseminated to the public through radio programs (“Hallo OSIS” and “Hallo Sekolah”), 
which also served to facilitate the resolution of complaints. 
 
(Source: Sparrow, et.al., 2003, “Mechanism and Practices..”) 
allocation performance was dependent on the availability of basis data. The same also applied 
at the district and sub-district level. The weakness of data availability has been improved over 
time, especially at the central level. Basis data for allocations within districts was not, however, 
readily available, so that the performance of data collection and allocation relied heavily on the 
capacity and capability, as well as political willingness of district committees. From the four 
districts that had been visited in 2003, Sparrow et.al. (2003) found that in districts where the 
district team was well trained, active and had great concern over the program, the allocation 
performance and public awareness also tended to be better than in districts where the district 
committee was not active and the membership was only on paper without any real activities. 
In the districts with the second type of district committee, the local education office usually 
dominated decision making, and the transparency down to school level was also relatively 
weak.  On the other hand, there were some districts where the members of the district 
committee consisted of both government and non-government institutions, that were active, 
not only on determining allocations but also in monitoring the disbursement of funds. So the 
public awareness and transparency of the program tends to be better, even at school and 
community level (Box 1). 
 
Channeling of funds directly through the post office was considered a good innovation in the 
effort to reduce corruption and prevent non-recipients from misusing the funds. It seemed to 
be partly true; at least in ensuring that the scholarship recipients did sign the disbursement 
forms because in most cases the claims were made collectively by the school. There were 
various reasons for this practice, despite strong advice in the guidelines for direct collection by 
the students themselves. Among the reasons were: individual collection would be more time 
consuming as the withdrawal should be done during office hours when children have to 
attend school; it is also more expensive, especially where the location of the post office was 
beyond walking distance as post offices are only located in the sub-district capital; the post 
office also had limited staff so that they also prefer collective withdrawal; and it was of interest 
of the school to have some control over the money so that they can deduct, at the first 
instance, for all delayed school payments from the scholarships. In spite of this practice, the 
use of post office in fund disbursement and tight administrative control had limited 
corruption and misuse of scholarship benefits.  
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Another SSN initiative was the establishment of an independent monitoring unit, CIMU. 
CIMU stands for Central Independent Monitoring Unit, a body established and funded jointly 
by several international agencies exclusively to monitor the implementation of the school 
grant and scholarship program, as well as to investigate reported irregularities in the 
implementation of the program. The mission of this unit was to provide timely and accurate 
data with objective analysis to key stakeholders in government, lending agencies, donors, the 
media and the NGO community. CIMU was not a part of the program implementation and 
management teams but operated as an independent organization, separate from government 
agencies. It did, however, work closely with the central Program Management Unit (PMU) in 
helping identify ways to improve the programs. The concept and practice of this unit 
developed progressively throughout the program. It had expanded from a means of assessing 
compliance with program rules and to safeguard the investment, to include monitoring 
program management and providing advice to PMU, building monitoring capacity in districts, 
investing complaints, tracking complaint resolution, publicizing findings and managing a 
relationship with the press. Although the activities of such an independent unit were seen 
cautiously by program implementers in its early operation, it was widely accepted as it 
provides a real contribution to the operation of the program.  
 
SSN scholarship and grant programs had established a decentralized allocation mechanism, 
and BKM has followed a similar mechanism and used similar criteria for allocations 
particularly at the school level. There are some differences, however, between the SSN and 
BKM scholarship programs.  These include: 
● Allocation mechanism that bypassed sub-district committees; 
● A larger scale of BKM program and it reached all grades (SSN scholarship only targeted 
students at grade 4 primary school and above); 
● The management of BKM consisted of two separate ministries, instead of a single 
management unit. MoNE manages BKM for public and non-Islamic private schools, and 
has integrated BKM through the existing SSN program; while MoRA manages funds for 
Islamic schools, and implemented it in a different manner; 
● There is no built in extensive independent monitoring system such as CIMU of the SSN 
scholarship and grant program. Although there are monitoring teams supported by the 
Ministry of Finance to monitor the overall implementation of PKPS BBM programs, its 
scope of activities are smaller and less intensive than CIMU; and  
● BKM has no fixed time horizon and the amount of funds is more uncertain as it depends 
on the cuts in energy subsidy in the near future. 
 
A qualitative study on SSN scholarship and BKM implementation in four districts, namely 
Kabupaten Blitar, Blora, Lomok Timur and Pontianak, conducted in 2003 by Sparrow et.al. 
(2003) found that, in general, the SSN scholarship seems to work well and has provided good 
infrastructure for the implementation of BKM. Common people, however, did not distinguish 
between the two programs and saw them as the same scholarship. This study also revealed 
that the involvement of sub-district teams in the scholarship allocation had a positive impact 
on dissemination of information. The omission of this layer in BKM allocation had 
contributed to less accurate targeting, and weaker dissemination of information and public 
control. Regarding the BKM management, this study found that the program management of 
MoNE was better than MoRA in terms of allocation and compliance to the rules set in the 
guidelines. Because most madrasah (Islamic school) are relatively poorer than public schools, it 
is more common in madrasah to modify the rules set in the guidelines such as dividing the 
scholarships between more students (higher than the quota) so that the money can be used to 
settle unpaid school fees, and using scholarship money to pay other school operational costs.  
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BOS introduced a new and very different approach compared to the previous grants and 
scholarship programs, as there is no allocation decision to be made and no pre-determined 
selection of poor students to receive free education or scholarship-like assistance. In theory, 
all schools are eligible for BOS, as long as they are willing to follow the obligations required of 
BOS recipients. These include basically to use the money as set out in the guidelines, to 
provide free education for students from poor family backgrounds, to provide free education 
for all students or to reduce school fees depending on the size of the school budget, and to 
allow for financial audit on school budget and expenses of funds provided by BOS as well as 
other sources. So, elite (or rich) schools that do not want to be audited are not required to 
apply for BOS. 
 
The BOS allocation is only determined by data on the number of students in each school in 
each district and province that should be collected through a bottom up mechanism from the 
school to the PKPS BBM team at district, province and finally at the central level. The PKPS 
BBM team at central, provincial and district level then defines the allocation based on this 
data. The PKPS BBM team at each government level21 also holds the responsibility for cross 
checking all data/information, receiving complaints and monitoring complaint resolution as 
well as the overall implementation of the program. In addition, the program is also open for 
external monitoring and evaluation. The disbursement of BOS funds is channeled through 
post offices or state owned banks that transfer the fund directly to school accounts. The 
money is disbursed once in six months and the school headmaster, under the authority of the 
head of the school committee, can withdraw the money at any time as needed. In regard to 
assistance to poor students, the decisions to provide free education and special assistance to 
poor students are delegated to schools, with the expectation that the decision will be made by 
the school together with the school committee and involving wider community participation.   
 
Compared to the previous schemes of school grants and scholarships, the huge expansion of 
BOS has some advantages including:  
● Much wider school coverage, so that both private and public primary and junior high 
schools have the same opportunities. There is, however, criticism that it still discriminates 
against poor and small private schools that still have difficulty in fulfilling the 
administrative requirements to apply for BOS. 
● Allocation based on number of students, so that it does not discriminate against small 
schools - the schools that were not eligible for DBO because they did not pass the 
requirement on minimum number of students. BOS still applies the same benefits for all 
regions, which is a rather strange assumption as the unit cost will very likely vary across 
regions as well as urban/rural locations.   
 
On the other hand, there are some shortfalls that might impede program effectiveness, including: 
● Lack of transparency and capacity of most school managements in ensuring the proper use 
of funds and protecting them from corruption that should be supported by good book 
keeping and disclosure of school budgets. The experience of DBO, and other initiatives 
such as CLCC show that in most schools the school budget plan (RAPBS) does not exist 
and book keeping performance is very low. 
● Low community involvement in school management that is critical in supporting 
transparency and pro-poor school budget allocations. Various studies and monitoring 
activities of the previous programs have found that effective school committess exist in 
only a very limited number of schools. 
 
                                                 
21This team consists of government officials from the planning office, education office and Ministry of Religious 
Affairs office. 
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In its early implementation, several problems have been encountered. One of these is the slow 
disbursement of funds in some provinces. Up to 27 September 2005, the disbursement rate 
has reached 95%, but there are three provinces with very low rates, they were North Sulawesi 
(22.61%), West Irian Jaya (9.72%) and Papua (0%). In addition, there were three other 
provinces with relatively slow disbursement rates, namely North Sumatra (78.19%), Maluku 
(76.84%) and Aceh (76.08%). Among the factors that affect this delay were: incomplete data 
about schools, not all schools already have a bank account, very low access to transportation 
and communication that includes availability of post offices and banks in some regions, and 
low performance of local governments as well as other unexpected circumstances. Finally, the 
PKPS monitoring team has found that: 
● Only very limited numbers of schools have allocated some of the funds to provide 
transportation allowances for poor students; 
● The working team at the district level did not conduct verifications on school budget plans 
and the numbers of students provided by schools, so that school budget plans seem 
unreliable and data on numbers of students were inaccurate in some schools; 
● Most schools had withdrawn 50%-80% of the funds at the first disbursement, leading to 
potential misuse of the money; 
● Different districts applied different rules in regard to the need to have a letter of 
recommendation from the district education office for disbursement of funds; 
● There was no training for schools on the use and management of BOS, and the 
information was only disseminated through a meeting of school principals. This led to a 
limited understanding on the purpose of grants and a misunderstanding in the wider 
community that there will be free education for all after schools receive BOS. 
● Most schools do not have BOS guidelines and there was no strict rule from the central 
team about the use of BOS funds so that schools allocated it to almost all school expenses.  
(Tim Pemantauan Penyerapan dan Pemanfaatan Dana PPK,2005) 
 
Since BOS in practice has delegated almost full authority to schools and the schooling 
community in the use and poverty targeting of the funds, there is an urgent need to provide 
strong support to improve the capacity and performance at the school level.  Given the large 
numbers of primary and junior high schools nationwide, almost all of which are joining this 
program, this will be a huge exercise that needs good and persistent efforts that can be costly. 
An initiative like the school management and community participation components of CLCC 
could be one of the supporting models that need to be developed nationwide. This should 
also be complemented by capacity building at sub-district, district and provincial education 
offices, so that their routine activities could support the overall effectiveness of the program. 
The existing PKPS BBM teams at central, provincial and district levels seem to be too small to 
provide this support. While they could play a role in the overall program management, a 
special initiative, which can be larger than the previous CIMU and CLCC, will be of particular 
importance in developing proper program infrastructure to ensure its effectiveness and pro-
poor bias, at least for the first few years if BOS is continuously implemented. 
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Annex 1. Main Features of School Grants and Scholarship Programs under SSN and PKPS BBM 
SSN (1998-2003) PKPS BBM (2001-2004) PKPS BBM (2005) 
 
DBO Scholarship BKS (2001) BKM BOS (SD & SMP) BKM (SMA) 
Beneficiaries 60% of  schools 
(SD/SDLB/MI, 
SMP/SMPLB/MT
s, 
SMU/SMK/MA/S
MLB) that are 
considered in 
most need 
Students in public and 
private schools: 
• Grade 4,5,6 in SD, 
SDLB & MI 
• Grade 1-3 in SLTP, 
SLTPLB & MTs 
• Grade 1-3 in SMU, 
SMK, SMLB and MA 
All public and private schools: 
I. SD/SDLB/MI 
II. SMP/Open 
SMP/SMPLB/MTs/Open 
MTs 
III. SMU/SMK/MA 
Students in public and 
private schools: 
• Grade 1-6 in SD, SDLB 
& MI 
• Grade 1-3 in SLTP, 
SLTPLB & MTs 
• Grade 1-3 in SMU, 
SMK, SMLB and MA 
All public and private 
schools, but does not 
include Kejar Paket A, B 
and open junior high 
school (SMP)  
Students in senior high 
school level including 
SMA, SMK, MA, SMLB 
and Islamic boarding 
school and small/remote 
SMAs run by SMP. 
Who is eligible • Not a rich 
school. 
• Public 
school and 
private 
school that 
at least hold 
registered 
status.  
• Minimum 
number of 
students: SD 
– 90; SDLB 
– 60, 
SMP/MTs/S
MPLB – 60; 
SMU/SMK/M
A/SMLB – 
60. 
Student: 
From poor (low income) 
family  
 
 Not a rich school 
 School that managed open 
SMP/MTs 
 Have operation permit 
 Not in receipt of other 
grants in the past 2 years 
or already identified as 
grant recipient of a 
minimum amount of Rp30 
million 
 Minimum number of 
students: SD/MI – 90 for 
Java and 60 for outer 
island; SMP/MTs/SMU/MA 
– 60 for Java and 50 for 
outer island; SDLB/SMPLB 
– 30 for Java and outer 
island. 
Student: 
From poor (low income) 
family that are potential drop 
outs due to economic 
reason and not receiving 
other scholarship. 
School: 
Not a rich school and poses 
operational permit. 
• All schools that are 
willing to sign letter 
of agreement and 
follow rules stated 
in the guidelines.  
• Private schools 
should have 
operation permit. 
• Rich schools are 
allowed to not 
apply  
 
From poor (low income) 
family that are potential 
drop outs due to economic 
reason and not receiving 
other scholarship 
School: 
Not a rich school and 
poses operational permit 
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Allocation Process 
SSN (1998 2003) PKPS BBM (2001 2004) PKPS BBM (2005) 
 
DBO Scholarship BKS (2001) BKM BOS (SD & SMP) BKM (SMA) 
National National Committee 
allocates number of 
schools in each 
kabupaten/kota based 
on number of schools 
and poverty index. 
National Committee 
allocates number of 
students per 
kabupaten/ kota based 
on certain criteria. 
National Committee 
allocates number of 
school per kabupaten/ 
kota based on certain 
criteria. 
National Committee 
allocates number of 
students per kabupaten/ 
kota based on certain 
criteria. 
PKPS BBM team at the 
central level collected data 
on number of students in 
each school through 
provincial team, and based 
on this data define the 
draft allocation for each 
kabupaten/kota to be 
verified by provincial team 
and used by 
kabupaten/kota to define 
allocation for each school. 
National Committee 
allocates number of 
students per 
kabupaten/ kota based 
on certain criteria. 
Kabupaten/Ko
ta 
Kabupaten/Kota 
Committee selects 
SMP/MTs/SMPLB and 
SMU/SMK/MA/SMLB to 
receive DBO and 
allocates number of 
SD/MI/SDLB for each 
kecamatan. 
Kabupaten/kota 
committee allocates 
number of students per 
kecamatan (for SD/MI) 
and per schools (for 
SLTP and SMU) based 
on certain criteria 
(score). 
Kabupaten/kota 
Committee directly 
allocates number of 
school (BKM MoNE: 
SD, SLTP, SMU; BKM 
MoRA: MI, MTs, MA) 
based on certain 
criteria. 
Kabupaten/kota 
Committee directly 
allocates number of 
students per school 
(BKM MoNE: SD, SLTP, 
SMU; BKM MoRA: MI, 
MTs, MA) based on 
certain criteria. 
PKPS BBM team at 
kabupaten level 
determines the schools 
that are willing to accept 
BOS. 
The school that receives 
the grant sign a letter of 
agreement 
Kabupaten/kota 
Committee directly 
allocates number of 
students per school 
(BKM MoNE: SD, 
SLTP, SMU; BKM 
MoRA: MI, MTs, MA) 
based on certain 
criteria. 
Kecamatan Kecamatan Committee 
selects SD/MI/SDLM to 
receive DBO 
Kecamatan Committee 
allocates number of 
students per school 
(SD/MI) 
 
No Kecamatan 
Committee involved 
 
No Kecamatan 
Committee involved 
School  School Committee 
nominates/selects 
eligible students and 
distributes scholarship 
to eligible students. 
 School Committee 
nominates/selects eligible 
students and distributes 
scholarship to eligible 
students. 
 School Committee 
nominates/selects 
eligible students and 
distributes scholarship 
to eligible students. 
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Allocation Criteria 
SSN (1998 2003) PKPS BBM (2001 2004) PKPS BBM (2005) 
 
DBO Scholarship BKS (2001) BKM BOS (SD & SMP) BKM (SMA) 
National  • Poverty index and 
crisis impact 
• Number of schools 
and students per 
kab./kota. 
• Poverty Index • Poverty Index Allocation based on data 
on number of students in 
each school. 
• Number of 
students from poor 
families calculated 
based on Susenas 
2003 
• Poverty index 
Kabupaten/ 
Kota 
 • % Pre-KS and KS-
1 BKKBN 
• Average BP3, SPP 
and other fees 
• % of IDT villages 
per kecamatan 
• % Pre-KS and KS-1 
BKKBN 
• Average BP3, SPP 
and other fees 
• % of IDT villages 
per kecamatan 
• Other local 
indicators which 
indicate poverty of 
the 
school/madrasah 
• % Pre-KS and KS-1 
BKKBN 
• Average BP3, SPP 
and other fees 
• % of IDT villages per 
kecamatan 
• Other local indicators 
which indicate 
poverty of the 
school/madrasah 
Kecamatan 
 • % Pre-KS and KS-
1 BKKBN 
• Average BP3, SPP 
and other fees 
• IDT or non-IDT 
  
No allocation criteria. A 
school can receive grant 
as long as it agrees to 
follow the rules: 
1. For school that 
receive funding from 
students lower than 
BOS: 
• Should not collect 
money from students to 
pay for application form, 
books, teacher capacity 
building, maintenance 
cost, all forms of exams, 
teacher honorarium, and 
schooling activities, 
• Should provide 
assistance to students 
from poor family that 
could not afford to pay 
transportation cost to 
school, 
 
… (continue) 
• Data on students 
from poor families 
• Number of 
students in each 
school 
• Fees collected 
from parents 
• Distance from 
school to 
kabupaten/kota 
capital city 
• Other locally 
defined indicators 
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SSN (1998 2003) PKPS BBM (2001 2004) PKPS BBM (2005)  
DBO Scholarship BKS (2001) BKM BOS (SD & SMP) BKM (SMA) 
School  • From poor family, 
almost drop out 
• Distance to school 
• Has more than 3 
brothers/sisters 
below 18; 
• Orphans; 
At least 50% to girls 
 • From poor family, 
almost drop out 
• Distance to school 
• Has more than 3 
brothers/sisters 
below 18; 
• Orphans; 
At least 50% to girls 
… (continue) 
• Should not manipulate 
data to collect money 
from students. 
2. For school that 
receive funding from 
students higher than 
BOS: 
• Should not collect 
money from students 
from poor family 
• Should collect smaller 
amount of money 
from non-poor student 
(after subsidizing poor 
students) 
• For schools with no 
poor students, BOS 
can be used to 
subsidize all students. 
• From poor family, 
almost drop out 
• Distance to school 
• Has more than 3 
brothers/ sisters 
below 18; 
• Orphans; 
• Other 
consideration such 
as physically 
disabled,  victims 
of  long term 
disaster, parents 
loss their jobs, etc. 
 
Fund 
disbursement 
Collected by school 
headmaster and put in 
school account in post 
office or state owned 
bank.  
Collected directly by 
the student from local 
post office.  It can be 
collected by the school 
only if the location of 
post office is too far. 
Transferred to school 
account at post office or 
state owned bank 
Collected directly by the 
student from local post 
office. It can be collected 
by the school only if the 
location of post office is 
too far. 
Transferred to school 
account at post office or 
state owned bank 
Collected directly by the 
student from local post 
office.  It can be 
collected by the school 
only if the location of 
post office is too far. 
Disbursement 
period 
Every six months. Every six months Every six months Every six months Every six months Every six months 
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IV. SSN AND PKPS BBM FOR HEALTH SECTOR 
 
 
The SSN program for health sector was launched in mid-1998 with the support of Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and it lasted until 2003. However, the program was then continued 
by the government of Indonesia with some changes in its design as well as funding sources. 
The main objectives of this program was to assist poor families to cover the costs of basic 
health services and referrals scheme provided through community health centers (puskesmas), 
public hospitals and village midwives (bidan desa), and to provide nutritious supplement foods 
for children and pregnant mothers from poor families. Under this program, poor citizens 
received a card with which they were eligible for free health care services from public primary 
health service providers. The target beneficiaries of the program were Keluarga Pra-Sejahtera-
KPS (Pre-Prosperous Families) and Keluarga Sejahtera-KS I (Prosperous Families Level 1) due 
to economic reasons based on BKKBN (National family Planning Board) system, and other 
criteria as determined by Village Team.  
 
 
4.1 Program Development 
 
In an effort to protect the poor from the adverse impacts of various shocks, due to the 
economic crisis in late 1997 and then the increases in fuel prices, on access to health services 
and on nutrition levels of infants, children and pregnant women, the Government of 
Indonesia (GoI) initiated several programs under the schemes of social safety net – SSN 
(Jaring Pengaman Sosial Bidang Kesehatan, JPS-BK) and fuel subsidy compensation.  There were 
four sub-programs in the 1998/1999 SSN for health sector, namely (i) improvement of 
nutrition standards through the provision of supplementary foods (Pemberian Makanan 
Tambahan-PMT); (ii) midwifery services; (iii) operational assistance for Puskesmas (community 
health center) services; and (iv) Community Health Care Guarantee (Jaminan Pemeliharaan 
Kesehatan Masyarakat-JPKM). Apart from these sub-programs, there was also a hospital referral 
program.  The funds for referral program were distributed to general hospitals at the district 
and provincial levels, whereas the other SSN funds for health sector were sent directly to the 
accounts of the Head of Puskesmas and village midwife at local Post Office. Summary of the 
four 1998/1999 SSN health sector programs is presented in Table 1.   
 
The objectives of the health sector SSN programs in 1999/00 onwards were the same, but it 
contained several new initiatives such as support to posyandu (integrated health care post), 
supplementary feedings for children aged 24-59 months, and expansion of the control of 
communicable diseases, particularly tuberculosis and malaria, as well as mass-immunization.22 
In addition, the JPKM was advanced by stimulating potential community participation 
through payment of insurance premium.  In order to strengthen program implementation, 
various measures including mechanism to respond complaints, dissemination of information 
(socialization), monitoring and evaluation system, transparency and accountability had been 
strengthened.   
 
                                                 
22For the government’s programs on communicable diseases and its impacts or achievement, see the next chapter 
in this volume on communicable disease prevention. 
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Table 1. The 1998/1999 Social Safety Nets Programs for Health Sector 
Type of 
Package Target 
Funds 
Management Budget Allocation 
PMT 
(supplementary 
feeding) 
Infants 6-11 months, children 
12-23 months, pregnant 
mothers and post-natal 
mothers from poor and near-
poor families 
Head of the 
Puskesmas 
Local distribution of food for 
90 days. 
Rp.1,000/day/mother 
Rp.750/day/child. 
Midwifery 
services 
Pregnant mothers 
Mothers at birth 
Post-natal mothers 
Village Midwife (BDD) Treatment. 
Transportation for referrals to 
hospitals at district level 
Puskesmas 
health service 
All families 
Poor people with Health Care 
Cards 
Head of the 
Puskesmas 
Basic medication. 
Administering medicines. 
Assistance at birth, Family 
Planning, Immunization, 
Transportation for referrals. 
JPKM 
(community 
health care 
guarantee) 
Poor families 
General public 
JPKM participants 
Executing 
Agency (Bapel) 
JPKM 
Allocation of  
premium funds 
Rp.10.000/HH/year. 
Source : Sulaksono et. al., 1999, “SMERU Rapid Appraisal..”     
 
So, the health sector SSN programs in 1999/00 onwards consisted of five direct activities and 
six supporting activities (Departemen Kesehatan RI, 1999). The direct services consisted of:  
• Provision of basic health services by puskesmas, pustu (auxiliary community health center), 
and midwife. It included activities for prevention, improvement, medication and recovery, 
as well as in-patient and out-patient in health care; 
• Basic midwifery services provided through puskesmas, polindes (village birth delivery house) 
and midwife, and it included antenatal services (minimum 4 times during pregnancy 
period), birth delivery, postnatal services for baby and mother (minimum 3 times), and 
emergency services due to obstetric-neonatal and puskesmas or hospital referral; 
• Nutrition improvement through puskesmas, pustu and provision of supplementary feeding 
(PMT) in posyandu.  The PMT consisted of PMT recovery for pregnant and post-natal 
mother suffering deficiency of energy and protein, infant aged 6-11 months and children 
aged 12-23 months, and PMT extension for children aged 24-59 months; 
• Prevention from and control of communicable diseases.  It was provided through puskesmas 
with the highest priorities for pulmonary tuberculosis, malaria and immunization activities; 
• Referral services provided for both in-patient and out-patient for poor patients referred by 
puskesmas to public hospital in district level.    
 
In addition, the supporting activities included: 
• Strengthening food and nutritional surveillance system (SKPG – Sistem Kewaspadaan Pangan 
dan Gizi) in order to affirm the commitment of local governments and intersectoral 
cooperation in supporting the movement for resolving food and nutrition deficiency 
problem; 
•  Posyandu revitalization in order to empower the community in supporting efforts to maintain 
and increase nutritional status and health conditions of mother and children through 
increasing the capability of cadres and the functioning and management of posyandu; 
• JPKM that was implemented by incorporating, as much as possible, potential resources 
from the community; 
• Socialization program to increase community knowledge about their rights to get health 
services through SSN programs on health sector.  This was done through various means 
including radio, television, and indoor and outdoor printed materials. The material to be 
disseminated covered beneficiaries target, types of activity, delivery mechanism, budget 
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allocation, channeling of people's complaints, and the opportunities for community to 
participate in monitoring program implementation. 
• Training of health service providers to disseminate information about SSN programs so that 
they could deliver necessary services appropriately, and to improve their technical skills; 
• Program monitoring at all levels to provide information on the progress of program 
implementation, particularly regarding targeting performance, fund disbursement, 
transparency in targeting and the use of fund, community involvements in program 
planning and implementation, and program achievements in various indicators.        
 
Following government policy to cut subsidy on energy prices in 2001, the GoI launched 
another programs aimed also at helping the poor in maintaining their access to health services 
and improve nutritional levels, which was called PDPSE-BK - Penanggulangan Dampak 
Pengurangan Subsidi Energi – Bidang Kesehatan (mitigation of the reduction in energy subsidy for 
health sector).  This program lasted until 2003 and consisted of direct grant to referral public 
hospitals, provision of essential drugs based on the request from local governments, and 
Hepatitis-B vaccination for children under 5 years old.  In 2004, this program was renamed by 
PKPS BBM – Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (programs for 
compensating the reduction in fuel subsidy).  The activities covered by this program were the 
same as PDPSE-BK activities, plus basic health services in puskesmas, and posyandu 
revitalization.  This program is continued in 2005, with a new program in the form of national 
health insurance for the poor managed by PT Askes being added.  
 
Historically, the national health insurance for the poor was originated from JPKM, which was 
part of SSN program for health sector. After the implementation of regional autonomy in 
2001, the central government designated 15 districts in 2 provinces as pilot areas to implement 
locally based health-financing schemes based on health insurance principles, which was 
commonly known as JPK-Gakin (Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan untuk Keluarga Miskin). JPK-
Gakin is a health-financing scheme through which the poor can access health care in public 
facilities, including primary and secondary health care. By employing insurance principles, the 
problem of administration overload of the puskesmas would be solved and cost-containment 
was made possible. This trial was expanded to other regions in the following years. The 
provision of JPK-Gakin was, until the end of 2004, not limited to one specific health 
insurance provider and as a result health insurers with different backgrounds provide health 
insurance in different districts. Consequently, there were differences in the benefit package, 
the insurer and the reimbursement system (Arifianto et. al., 2005). 
 
In November 2004 GoI decided to expand JPK-Gakin to cover all districts in Indonesia, with a 
number of adaptations to the pilot projects. The main change was that from 1 January 2005, 
through a decree of the Minister of Health (Decree No. 1241/MENKES/SK/XI/2004), JPK-
Gakin has to be provided by PT. Askes, which will run it as a government monopoly, in 
compliance with the newly passed Law No. 40/2004 of the National Social Security System 
(Arifianto et. al., 2005). Through this new scheme, the poor will receive health card from PT 
Askes to access free health care services in puskesmas, pustu, village midwife, and referral public 
hospital. The transition from the previous JPK-Gakin managed by each district through Badan 
Pelaksana - Bapel (Implementing Agency) will be subsequently implemented in all districts 
throughout Indonesia. The summary of the evolution of these programs is presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2. The Evolution of SSN and PKPS BBM Programs for Health Sector 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
SSN for Health Sector:PMT (Supplementary feedings for infant, children 
under 2 years old, and pregnant mothers), midwifery services, basic health 
service in Puskesmas, JPKM (community health care guarantee). 
  
 
SSN for health (additional programs): posyandu revitalization, 
PMT for children 2-5 years old, control of communicable 
diseases, JPKM that incorporate potential community 
resources. 
  
 
JPKM (part of SSN) JPK-Gakin pilot program in several districts– 
managed by district level implementing agency 
(Bapel). Jointly financed by SSN program and 
local government. 
JPK-Gakin 
managed by PT 
Askes (also 
known as JPK-
MM) 
   
PDPSE-BK: block grant to referral 
public hospitals, provision of 
essential drugs, and vaccination for 
Hepatitis-B for children under 5 
years old. 
PKPS-BBM for Health 
Sector:  block grant to 
referral public hospitals, 
provision of essential drugs, 
vaccination for Hepatitis-B for 
children under 5 years old, 
basic health services in 
puskesmas, and posyandu 
revitalization.  (and other 
small programs) 
 
 
4.2 Coverage and Targeting Performances 
 
The health programs provided through SSN, PDPSE and PKPS-BBM schemes have a nation-
wide coverage.  It was intended to target the poor, as reflected by the way regional allocation 
was calculated, which was based on the proportion of poor people that was determined as the 
numbers of KPS (pre-prosperous families) and KS1 (prosperous families level-1) due to 
economic factors according to BKKBN criteria. Despite the stated objectives that the poor 
were the main focus of these programs, the health sector SSN, PDPSE and PKPS BBM 
programs consisted of several components that were channeled through health service 
providers and activities that can be utilized by both poor and non-poor. So it is rather 
problematic to measure the real benefit of the programs accrued to the poor.  
 
Theoretically, one way to measure the benefit for the poor is by calculating the proportion of the 
poor who benefited from the program, compared with the non-poor.  However, in reality not all 
programs made desegregation in recording the beneficiaries or no record was taken in program 
implementation, such as in the control of communicable diseases and in posyandu.  Meanwhile 
some of the funds provided for puskesmas and hospitals were used for building maintenance and 
refurbishment, and buying equipments that gave indirect benefit to all users of the services.  
 
The most direct assistance to the poor was provided through the distribution of health cards 
that can be used to obtain free medical services in puskesmas, pustu, village midwife, and public 
hospital under the referral scheme. The selection of households that were eligible for receiving 
health cards should be done by village team that consisted of LKMD (Village Community 
Resilience Board) or other community leaders, village midwife, PLKB (Family Planning Field 
Worker), and PKK (Family Welfare Improvement) cadre.  This selection should be done 
based on BKKBN criteria and other local specific criteria as determined by district authority. 
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Another component of JPS-BK focusing on nutritional improvement was intended to target 
babies, children under five years and pregnant women from poor households. This was delivered 
by providing packages of supplementary foods. The selection criteria for this sub-program were 
similar to health card scheme, which was drawn from BKKBN list of recipients, but the delivery 
of the packages was channel through posyandu, under the supervision of the village midwife.  
 
To assess the implementation of the program, an independent monitoring unit, known as 
CIMU HNSDP (Central Independent Monitoring Unit – Health and Nutrition Sector 
Development Program) was established and it operated during the period of September 1999 
to May 2002.  This unit reported that for the period of January-October 2000, the coverage of 
health cards reached around 10 million poor households, which was 92 percent of the target.  
Out of this number, almost 39 percent utilized health services with accumulative visit rate of 
nearly 20 percent.  It also pointed that the coverage of pregnant mothers, birth-delivering 
mothers and post-natal mothers receiving basic midwifery services was 71 percent, 49 percent, 
and 44 percent of the targets respectively (Irawan et. al., 2001).   
 
Other published reports of CIMU HNSDP (2002a; 2002c; and 2002d) generally claimed for good 
program coverage and targeting. The final report of the monthly monitoring activities stated that 
the coverage achieved was satisfactory.  The monthly monitoring based on health center reports 
indicated that health card coverage reached 80 percent of poor people, as defined by the health 
center. Antenatal and delivery care was utilized by approximately 80 percent of poor women.  
General utilization of basic health services was around 15 percent of the poor population, 
mirroring the level for population as a whole. Coverage of the complementary and supplementary 
feeding components average only 50 percent of those eligible for assistance. Other components of 
the program were also monitored although with less clear results.  The communicable disease 
control was not well understood and its impact low.  The revitalization of integrated health post 
was undertaken, but its impact was hard to verify due to intermittent nature of activities at this 
level.  Monitoring of the adequacy of drug and contraceptive supplies revealed that supplies were 
commonly only sufficient for 85 percent of the need. Contraceptive and emergency obstetric drug 
supply among village midwives was even lower, averaging only 50 percent of the monthly 
requirement CIMU HNSDP (2002a).  
 
The nation wide survey, carried out in November 2000 to July 2001 found that according to 
health center data, health card ownership as a percentage of the number of poor families was 
91.5 percent.  In 5 randomly selected provinces, in total 60.4 percent of families received 
educational scholarship and 64.8 percent receiving rice subsidy also held a health card. The 
possession of a health card was seen as a positive benefit by all, and good levels of utilization 
were achieved in these provinces.  In addition, high levels of satisfaction with the attitudes of 
community health center staff and with health center facilities were recorded by health card 
owners in exit interviews. This survey also found that birth attendance by a health provider for 
health card owners was more than 83 percent and exceeded that of non card holders. 
Regarding the communicable disease control allocated for the examination and treatment of 
pulmonary tuberculosis and malaria, this survey revealed that less than 70 percent of TB or 
malaria patients had sputum or blood examination with 80 percent treated for TB and with 70 
percent of malaria patients followed up (CIMU HNSDP, 2002c).   
 
The sentinel sites survey also made the point that the identification of the correct target group 
for health card ownership was generally successful.  The precise criteria used varied due to 
differing local conditions between provinces, although all began by using the BKKBN data.  
Some mis-targeting occurred early in the program but this was reduced over time as staff 
became more astute at identifying the correct beneficiaries. One effect of the delay in 
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disbursement of funds was that staff faced difficulty in providing health cards to all those 
people qualifying for them, although most found ways to cover this. In some provinces abuse 
of the cards occurred. However, most problems arose due to the extreme difficulty of 
identifying the poor in a precise manner.  In addition, no specific funds had been allocated to 
cover the costs involved in doing this (CIMU HNSDP, 2002d). 
 
The assessment based on SUSENAS data, however, provides different and less successful figures 
both on the coverage and targeting performance of the health program, although the analysis that 
can be done was limited only to the health card holders, and nutritional improvement only for 
1999.  The proportion of households reported to have health card was around 1.7 million in 1999, 
around 2.9 million in 2001, 6.8 million in 2002, and 7.9 million in 2003, which was significantly 
lower than CIMU HNSDP report of around 10 million in 1999 based on puskesmas reports.  
 
Based on the 1999 SUSENAS special module that had been added specifically to assess SSN 
programs, Sumarto et al. (2001) estimated that around 6.3 percent of all households in Indonesia 
received the health cards, and 10.6 percent of households in the poorest 20 percent of the 
population hold the cards. Meanwhile, around 3 percent of the richest 20 percent of the 
population, and in total around 5.28 percent of all households in the richest 80 percent received 
health cards. This reflected relatively low program coverage and targeting performance. As the 
non-poor beneficiaries accounted for around 67 percent of all beneficiaries, the targeting ratio of 
this program was 0.83, indicating near random targeting.23  Indeed, this analysis also revealed 
variations in targeting performance across districts. There were 37 districts with targeting ratio of 
1.25 that implied all beneficiaries were non-poor, but 10 districts with zero targeting ratio that 
implied all cardholders were poor households. This cross districts variation in targeting 
performance was also reported from the analysis using the data collected in 100 village survey in 
1999 (Suryahadi, Suharso and Sumarto, 1999). 
 
Another program that can be assessed using the 1999 special module of SUSENAS was the 
nutrition improvement component of the program. Concerning this sub-program, the analysis 
found that the coverage among the poor appeared to be higher than the health cards. The analysis 
uncovered that around 15.9 percent of all households participated in the nutrition improvement 
program, and around 16.4 percent of the households in the poorest quintile participated in the 
program. Meanwhile, the participation of the richest 80 percent of the population was 15.79 
percent. However, as the participation among the non-poor households was almost equal to the 
participation among the poor households, with targeting ration of 0.99, this program could be 
considered performing nearly random targeting, rather than a pro-poor program.   
 
SUSENAS for the years after 1999 still contain data regarding health card holders and the 
utilization of the card, but don not contain information regarding the participation in nutrition 
improvement sub-program. Table 3 shows the coverage of health cards by expenditure 
quintiles calculated from the 2002, 2003 and 2004 SUSENAS data set. These data sets indicate 
that the overall coverage of health cards has increased overtime, and the increase took place in 
all regions with Papua experienced the highest increase. In 2001, in total only around 5 
percent households in Indonesia received the cards and it increased to around 14 percent in 
2003.  The program coverage in Papua was very small in 2001 of only 1.74 percent, reflecting 
the difficulties of program implementation in this region. However, it significantly jumps to 
around 20 percent in 2002 and 2003.  
                                                 
23Targeting ratio (TR) is defined as TR=Bn/Pn, where Bn is the proportion of beneficiaries who are non-poor, 
and Pn is the proportion of overall non-poor in the population (in this case is 80%). If all beneficiaries are poor, 
indicating perfect targeting, TR will be zero (0).  But if all beneficiaries are non-poor, indicating mis-targeting 
completely, the TR will be 1.25.  If TR is equal to one (1), the program has no targeting.  
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Table 3. The Coverage of Health Cards Distribution by Expenditure Quintiles 
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
 
% Cardholders of Total 
Households (Hhs) 
% Cardholders of Households in 
Quintile I 
Indonesia 5.49 13.14 14.33 9.05 20.14 22.21 
Sumatera 4.29 10.62 12.80 6.25 15.08 18.37 
Java/Bali 5.55 12.93 14.02 9.33 19.95 21.95 
Sulawesi 4.79 9.36 10.48 8.74 13.68 16.15 
Kalimantan 5.07 12.79 12.80 8.66 19.28 18.41 
Maluku/NTB/NTT 12.20 30.62 31.27 14.44 38.37 40.19 
Papua 1.74 20.21 20.79 1.65 18.64 22.78 
 
% Health Cards Held by Q1 % Health Cards Held by Q1&2 
Indonesia 32.89 30.60 30.97 56.05 53.32 53.70 
Sumatera 28.63 27.79 28.75 49.82 50.01 49.86 
Java/Bali 32.14 29.72 29.42 56.20 52.48 52.82 
Sulawesi 27.30 20.06 21.65 45.39 37.37 41.38 
Kalimantan 40.82 34.06 35.85 64.19 56.94 58.43 
Maluku/NTB/NTT 43.24 42.91 47.82 65.60 68.64 71.43 
Papua 9.88 23.32 20.63 19.75 41.47 38.36 
Source: calculated from 2002, 2003 and 2004 SUSENAS  
 
The increase in the overall health cards coverage was followed with the increase of program 
coverage among the households in the lowest expenditure quintiles.  The 2002 SUSENAS 
revealed very limited health card coverage of around 9 percent of the households in the lowest 
expenditure quintile, slightly lower than the coverage in 1999 calculated based on the 1999 
SUSENAS special module. This coverage has significantly increased to 20 percent and 22 percent 
in 2002 and 2003 respectively. Despite the improvement in program coverage among the poor, 
the proportion of cards held by the households in the first and second lowest expenditure quintiles 
was decreasing over time.  As only around 30 percent of total health cards was held by the 
households in the lowest expenditure quintile, and only around 54 per cent was held by 
households in the first and second poorest quintiles in 2003, the targeting ratio increased from 
0.80 in 1999 to 0.84 in 2001 and 0.86 in 2003.  As shown in Table 4 and Figure 1, the targeting 
performance of the program seems slightly deteriorating during the period of 1999 to 2004, since 
larger proportion of the cards were received by non-poor households.   
 
Table 4. Targeting Ratio of Health Cards 
Targeting Ratio 
 
2001 2002 2003 
Indonesia 0.84 0.87 0.86 
Sumatera 0.89 0.90 0.89 
Java/Bali 0.85 0.88 0.88 
Sulawesi 0.91 1.00 0.98 
Kalimantan 0.74 0.82 0.80 
Maluku/NTB/NTT 0.71 0.71 0.65 
Papua 1.13 0.96 0.99 
Source: calculated from 2002, 2003 and 2004 SUSENAS 
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Several qualitative studies in the early implementation of the health cards program uncovered 
various factors underlying the relatively low coverage and miss-targeting of the program. The 
micro study involving 455 families along the Purwakarta-Cirebon route carried out in 1999 
showed that health cards were very rarely used and some communities had never heard of them. 
Most respondents went to the puskesmas only if they were not seriously ill, preferred to visit a 
private practitioner for the treatment of more serious illnesses. Despite the rise in the cost of 
treatment, medicines, and transportation, some respondent felt that their effort to go to hospital 
was useless since they were treated by nurses or midwives, not by doctors. Furthermore, despite 
holding health cards, they were still required to pay for the medicines (Hardjono, 1999). 
 
Another rapid study conducted in Kabupaten Gowa, Kabupaten Malang, Kabupaten Pasaman 
and Kabupaten Purworejo found that the selection of health cards recipients was 
inconsistence and potentially led to miss-targeting. It has been pointed out in the previous 
section that the allocation of health cards was determined based on the number of KPS and 
KS1 based on BKKBN criteria. Indeed, the program manual stated that the selection of health 
card recipients should be done based on BKKBN criteria of KPS and KS1, plus other local 
criteria determined by local team. Because the guideline did not specify the types or 
characteristics of local indicators, it allowed for variations of criteria used in different regions.   
 
SMERU rapid appraisal during the early implementation of SSN program uncovered these 
variations. In Kabupaten Pasaman, the local criteria were : (i) termination of employment; (ii) 
does not own land; (iii) is a victim of natural disaster; (iv) suffer a social problem; (v) disability; 
(vi) has a record of chronic illness; (vii) owns less than 2 hectares; (viii) has a large family; and 
(ix) has no other income source. In Kabupaten Gowa, the local criteria were only 
unemployment and termination of employment. While in Kabupaten Malang, the local criteria 
included: (i) unemployment or termination of employment; (ii) does not own land; (iii) old age; 
and (iv) suffers from chronic illness (Sulaksono, et al., 1999).   
 
So it is obvious that some of the criteria, such as the accident of chronic illness, is not always 
directly correlated with the characteristic of poor families, despite the potential adverse impact of 
chronic illness to the welfare level of the family. Consequently, not all poor families have been 
given a Health Care Card. Indeed, there were some cardholders discovered who did not qualify for 
the Health Care Card. They were given Health Care Cards for a number of reasons such as a 
member of the family suffers from a serious disease and must be treated by hospital, the patient 
has a record of chronic illness or as an incentive for posyandu cadres (Sulaksono, et al., 1999). 
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Regarding the definition of poor, there is another problem in relation to the comparison 
between the poor as determine according to BKKBN system and the poor as determined 
based on family's expenditure calculated from SUSENAS dataset. A study using data collected 
in 100 villages survey shows that there is a quite large degree of mismatch between the KPS 
and KS1 classification from BKKBN with household's welfare measured by consumption 
level (Suryahadi, et al., 1999).  On one hand, this raised a concern over the appropriateness in 
the use of BKKBN system as the basis for selection of beneficiaries.  On the other hand, one 
can argue that as the selection was done based on BKKBN system, the expenditure approach 
might not be an appropriate measure in targeting assessment. 
 
Another problem found in the SMERU rapid assessment of the program in 1999 was 
regarding the physical distribution of the health cards.  This study found that the health cards 
distributed in the three districts were lower than the estimated target. The gaps were 35 
percent in Kabupaten Pasaman and Kabupaten Malang, and 25 percent in Kabupaten Gowa. 
These gaps could be attributed to: (i) most data collections were carried out by village 
midwives who might not understand the criteria or has limited knowledge of the intended 
beneficiaries; (ii) villages cadre who had better knowledge of the welfare level of the 
community did not involved in the selection process, whilst the village leaders tent to be not 
transparent in selecting the beneficiaries; (iii) since there were a direct correlation between the 
number of health card holders and the reduction on the income of the village midwives, they 
were less enthusiastic in maximizing the distribution of health cards; and (iv) the criteria 
related to types of floor in BKKBN system did not fit with local condition. 
 
In addition to the above problems, Perdana and Maxwell (2004), based on various studies, also 
listed other factors contributing to the relatively weak coverage of the poor and the miss-
targeting in health card program.  These include: 
• There were reports from a number of areas of recipients who sold their health card to others 
who were not eligible to receive cards but who were in urgent need of health care. There were 
also cases in Papua that some village head sold the cards to their local community. 
• Problem in physical distribution of cards in some localities, as the cards were suppose to 
be delivered directly to the recipients.  Because no specific funds to support this process, it 
was not always worked smoothly. In many instances, the head of Puskesmas allocated the 
health cards only when poor patients arrived at Puskesmas seeking treatment.   
• System of providing compensation for the workload arising from patients using health 
card when seeking treatment.  This was by lump sum transfer based on the number of 
health cards allocated to the district, not on the actual use of the health cards by recipients.  
So the doctors and midwife had a certain financial disincentive to worked to discourage 
them from distributing the maximum number of health cards in their area.  Since most 
doctors and village midwives also operated a private practice, the more health cards that 
they distributed, the greater the numbers of patients looking for free medical treatment, 
thus reducing demand for their own private health service.   
 
With the introduction of new health insurance for the poor, managed by PT Askes, the 
allocation at the national level is no longer using the BKKBN data, instead it uses BPS data. 
However, most recent monitoring carried out by the monitoring team of the absorption and 
utilization of the funds for poverty reduction programs of the Ministry of Finance, found that 
the data used for selecting beneficiaries and the criteria being used varied across districts and 
even across villages. In Kabupaten North Bengkulu, Kabupaten Rejang Lebong, Kabupaten 
Kolaka and Kabupaten Kowane, the disbursement of new health cards was based on the 
previous health cards distribution. In Kabupaten Belitung, the 2003 BKKBN data was used as 
the basis, while in Kabupaten Bangka, the results of poverty census carried out by local 
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government was used as the basis. As a result, district governments have come up with the 
total number of beneficiaries of around 54 million people, which is higher than the allocation 
of 36.1 million people based on BPS data. However, since there is no improvement in the 
selection system of the beneficiaries, the potential leverage persists.  
 
 
4.3 Impacts and Outcomes 
 
Despite the relatively low health card coverage in its early implementation, there were some 
evidences on the positive impacts of the program. Using 1999 SUSENAS data, Pradhan, 
Saadah and Sparrow (2002) revealed that on average, the health card recipients were not only 
poorer, but also had lower level of education. There were a high proportion of female-headed 
households among health card recipients and a higher probability that recipients were working 
in the agriculture sector compared to non-recipients. There was evidence that the distribution 
of health cards played important role in maintaining the use of health services. It was 
estimated that without the introduction of health card scheme the use of public health services 
might had declined below 10 percent in 1999. The proportion of households using public 
health care providers increased slightly during 1998-1999, while the attendance at private 
health care services declined. This suggests a substitution from private to public health care 
induced by the introduction of the health card.   
 
Other studies carried out in 1999 also found similar evidents. The rapid appraisal study carried 
out by SMERU uncovered that in general the health sector SSN program in the four assessed 
districts had shown positive benefits for the target group. Following the issuance of health 
cards, the number of visits to Puskesmas (Pustu and Polindes) had increased. However, the 
benefits resulting from this intervention seemed to be directly proportional to the particular 
geographical aspects and available infrastructure of a certain area. The more urban 
characteristics a region and the better the quality of the local infrastructure, the greater was the 
benefits. In other words, the benefits of the health card program in rural areas, particularly in 
remote areas, tend to be less evident in comparison to those benefits accrued in urban areas 
(Sulaksono et.al., 1999). 
 
Another rapid assessment conducted in 1999 by the SMERU Team at Kelurahan Cipinang 
Besar Utara, Kecamatan Jatinegara, indicated that because of the onset of the monetary crisis 
and particularly due to the distribution of health cards, the number of visits to the puskesmas 
had increased. This study also noted that the location of the puskesmas influenced the 
frequency with which community members visit these health centers. The number of 
puskesmas and pustu existing within a certain area happened to be crucial and distribution of 
health care facilities varies greatly across regions. East Jakarta, which consisted of 10 kecamatan 
(sub-district) and 65 kelurahan (urban village administrative area) had 87 puskesmas. This meant 
that there was at least one puskesmas in every kelurahan. By comparison, West Kalimantan, 
which consisted of 109 kecamatan, 1,033 desa, and 81 kelurahan had only 187 puskesmas and 688 
pustu (Budiyati, 1999). 
 
However, the benefits enjoyed by health card holders were also restricted by their real access 
to the health care facilities. According to the SMERU rapid appraisal in 1999, the public had 
faced various obstacles in the use of health cards, and these included: (i) limited time allocated 
for health card services, (ii) the distance from the patients' houses to the puskesmas, pustu and 
polindes, (iii) hospital referrals, and (iv) ineffective medicines. On the other hand, the health 
care staff were also faced some obstacle in delivering the program due to the administrative 
procedures of the program that they must carry out which take up a lot of time, and the 
The SMERU Research Institute 58 
requirement to pay the same amount of retribution to local government as targeted despite 
there being less receipts because they had to provide free medication (Sulaksono et. al., 1999). 
 
The case study on the effectiveness of JPK-Gakin also identified a number of formal and 
informal barriers that discourage some program members (the poor) from using the services 
to which they were entitled. These barriers included high transportation costs, and the delay in 
the distribution of their membership card. Such barriers might discourage the poor from using 
JPK-Gakin services and could make many JPK-Gakin members reluctant to seek treatment in 
health care facilities (Arifianto et. al., 2005). 
 
Another obstacle faced during the implementation of health sector SSN program was the 
restrictions on the use of JPS funds for the purchase of medicines at the puskesmas level.  This 
restriction was put forward by the Director General of Drugs, and had influenced the 
availability of medicines at the puskesmas, pustu, and polindes which indirectly influences the 
quality of medication and treatment provided. The health services are quite good and there 
appears to be no indication that health card holders were not treated properly by the health 
providers. At one of the puskesmas in the Purworejo Regency, a special counted was operated 
for health card holders. The patients who register at this counter did not feel awkward even 
though the counter was separated from the other counters (Sulaksono et. al., 1999). 
 
Regarding the utilization of health cards by cardholders, based on the 1999 JPS Module in 
SUSENAS, Sumarto, Suryahadi and Widyanti (2001) estimated that of all those who 
underwent medical treatment, 6.3 percent used their health cards to obtain free services.  
Among the poor only, the proportion of those who used health cards is 10.6 percent, while 
among the non-poor 5.3 percent also used health cards to obtain the benefits of this program. 
The utilization rate of health cards by cardholders in 2000, 2001 and 2002, based on 
SUSENAS data is presented in Table 5. The utilization rate presented in this table is different 
from the calculation using 1999 SSN special module. The estimate from 1999 special module 
was calculated from cardholders that seeking health treatment, while the data structure in the 
2002, 2003 and 2004 SUSENAS did not allowed for such determination, so that the utilization 
rate was calculated out of total cardholders regardless of their experienced of illness or not.  
 
As presented in Table 5, on average, 
around 70 percent of health card 
holders in Indonesia used their cards 
to seek free medication. The 
utilization rate was particularly high in 
Papua (around 90 percent) and 
relatively low in Java/Bali (around 65 
percent).  Similar evidence was also 
revealed in the utilization rate among 
the population in the first and second 
lowest expenditure quintiles, which 
can be considered as the poor and the 
near poor. The proportion of health 
cards used by each expenditure 
quintile, as also presented in Figure 2, 
however, uncovered the high evidence of the use of health cards by non-poor population.  
The people in the lowest quintile only accounted for around 30 percent of all health cards 
used nationwide, and the two lowest quintiles only accounted for around 55 percent. The 
lowest proportion of cards used by the poor took place in Papua, followed by Kalimantan and 
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Sumatera, and this might indicate the adverse impact of low infrastructure that might limit 
physical access and the preference of poor households towards modern health facilities. 
Although of limited time frame, the 2001 to 2003 data seems to indicate the tendency of 
higher proportion of benefits enjoyed by the non-poor households.  
 
Table 5. The Utilization Rate of Health Cards by Cardholders 
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
 
Number of Hhs Used Health Cards Card Utilization Rate – Total 
Indonesia   2,040,779 4,647,672 5,479,201 70.44 68.86 69.69 
Sumatera 311,938 756,192 1,067,150 75.17 71.55 78.42 
Java/Bali  1,285,120 2,700,072 3,104,551 67.29 64.17 63.87 
Kalimantan 113,630 187,917 234,066 80.22 75.42 76.90 
Sulawesi 149,831 332,169 368,334 80.18 76.51 78.14 
Maluku/NTT/NTB 179,540 584,931 584,073 73.88 83.98 79.40 
Papua 720 86,391 121,027 90.00 82.21 93.67 
 
Card Utilization Rate among Q1 (%) Card Utilization Rate among Q2 (%) 
Indonesia   72.54 70.29 72.51 70.18 67.90 68.78 
Sumatera 70.73 71.59 79.34 78.97 68.67 76.52 
Java/Bali  69.74 64.96 66.91 67.55 63.30 63.77 
Kalimantan 82.07 75.89 75.46 73.58 73.48 76.75 
Sulawesi 80.43 78.56 76.93 77.99 76.44 79.37 
Maluku/NTT/NTB 81.70 85.62 83.18 70.26 83.55 76.24 
Papua 100.00 77.94 97.10 100.00 85.41 93.42 
 
% Utilization by Q1 (out of Total) % Utilization by Q1&2 (out of Total) 
Indonesia   33.87 31.23 31.23 56.95 53.63 53.63 
Sumatera 26.94 27.81 27.81 49.20 49.13 49.13 
Java/Bali  33.31 30.08 30.08 57.46 52.53 52.53 
Kalimantan 27.92 20.19 20.19 44.52 37.04 37.04 
Sulawesi 40.95 34.97 34.97 63.67 57.83 57.83 
Maluku/NTT/NTB 47.82 43.75 43.75 69.08 69.35 69.35 
Papua 10.97 22.11 22.11 21.94 40.97 40.97 
Source: Calculated from SUSENAS 2002, 2003 and 2004 
 
 
4.4 Budget and Efficiency 
 
The Ministry of Health introduced the health sector SSN Program on 7 August 1998. The 
program for the Fiscal Year 1998/99 was valued at Rp1.04 trillion and was funded by the 
ADB and the APBN/National Budget (through the IMF). The ADB provided funding for 8 
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provinces and the RABN funded 19 provinces. This means that all provinces were entitled to 
become recipients of health sector SSN program. The funds from the ADB were distributed 
in 4 phases, beginning in August 1998, whereas the APBN funds were given out in 2 phases, 
beginning October 1998.  This fund was allocated for various sub-programs, with the biggest 
parts went to puskesmas (22%), JPKM (17%), and supplementary and complementary feedings 
for children and infant (16%).  
 
As presented in Table 6, budget for health sector component of the SSN for FY 1999/00 was 
slightly decreased to 1.03 trillion, but the biggest parts still allocated to nutrition improvement 
(26.8%), basic health services in puskesmas (22%) and posyandu revitalization (12.9%), all of them 
disbursed to puskesmas. Hospital operation and referrals scheme got an allocation of around 13% 
of the budget; while the remaining was allocated to various sub-components of the program (see 
Appendix 1). The budgets for the three following years were significantly drop to less than 
Rp500 billion, and increased again to more than Rp900 billion in 2003 and 2004.   
 
Table 6. Budget for Health Sector SSN and PKPS BBM Programs 
Year Scheme  Billion Rp  
1998/99 SSN  Plan  1,040  
1999/00 SSN  Plan  1,030  
2000 SSN  Plan  456  
2001 SSN  ?  
2002 PKPS BBM  Actual  496  
2003 PKPS BBM  Actual  941  
2004 PKPS BBM  Actual  986  
2005 PKPS BBM & JPK MM  Plan  1,574 MoH 
2005 JPK MM  Plan 2,300 JPK MM  
 
Following the significant removal of subsidy for fuel prices, the 2005 budget of PKPS BBM 
for health sector was jumped to more than Rp1.5 trillion allocated for sub-programs under the 
management of the Ministry of Health, and another Rp2.3 trillion allocated for JPK MM 
managed by PT Askes. At the beginning of the 2005 FY, some Rp1 trillion of the state budget 
has been allocated for PT Askes, and an additional Rp1.3 trillion was added through additional 
fund (Anggaran Biaya Tambahan-ABT) due to significant increased of targeted beneficiaries by 
almost 50% of the first estimate based on BPS data on the number of poor population. Out 
of the budget managed by MoH, the majority still being allocated to basic health services in 
puskesmas (27%), followed by the provision of essential drugs (10%), supply of utensils for 
basic health care and birth delivery in puskesmas. Unlike the health sector SSN in FY 1999/00, 
the budget for posyandu revitalization was very small of only 0.48%.  
 
Most of the program funds were directly transferred to puskesmas and village midwives 
through their account in local post office.  To overcome imbalances in the allocation of funds 
that may take place between one post and another, and to prevent any misuse of funds, the 
Department of Health, through the Directorate General for Promotion of Community Health 
issued a letter No. 537/BM/DJ/JPS-BK/IV/1999 on April 8th, 1999. This letter states in 
point 4: ".... that re-allocation of the use of funds for the inter-activities in the puskesmas can be 
done as necessary according to the needs towards provision of good services for the poor.” 
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Various studies and monitoring by CIMU HNSDP found that the system of releasing funds 
for puskesmas and village midwife was already satisfactory (CIMU HNSDP 2002a and 2002c; 
and Sulaksono, et al., 1999). However, these studies had identified several problems that might 
hinder the program implementation and led to ineffectiveness in the use of fund. The CIMU 
HNSDP monitoring highlighted the problem of late fund disbursement along the SSN 
program implementation as one of the factors adversely impacted the delivery of several sub-
program, particularly the posyandu revitalization and supplementary feeding. 
 
Another problem raised in both CIMU HNSDP monitoring and SMERU rapid appraisal was 
regarding the transparency in the use of funds at the puskesmas level. It was noted that the 
doctor/Head of Puskesmas plays a dominant role regarding the usage of funds, and there is 
also a lack of control regarding this usage (Sulaksono, et al., 1999). The head of health center, 
usually the individual named in the fund allocation decree, was often responsible for both 
expenditure and reporting. Difficulties were aggravated by the high mobility of the heads of 
health centers, many of whom were contract staff (PTT). To reduce this problem a policy was 
introduced to separate these functions. It was recommended that the fund allocation decree 
was made in the name of a senior administrative member of health center staff who held 
responsibility for accounting, while the head of health center maintained responsibility for 
expenditure (CIMU HNSDP, 2002a). In addition, the CIMU HNSDP national survey also 
found that some heads of puskesmas operated in an air of secrecy and failed to show the 
allocation decrees to their staff or to share information of the implementation of the program.   
 
The CIMU monitoring also revealed a problem in the management of hospital referrals of 
the poor. The funding mechanisms for referrals differ between the community level and the 
hospital. The current system limits the flexibility of hospitals in responding to poor referred 
patients. There is also a lack of agreed criteria as to which case may be referred for 
free/reduced cost care CIMU HNSDP (2002a). Similar problem was also pointed by the 
case study on JPK-Gakin. This study found an indication of a lack of efficiency in the 
management of JPK-Gakin funds by health providers, especially at local public hospital 
(Rumah Sakit Umum Daerah – RSUD). In this hospital, claims were approved with little 
verification and inspection to ensure that they were accurate and there are indications that 
most of the funds were used to subsidize the care of non-poor patients rather than the poor 
ones who were supposed to benefit. It was also found that the unit cost per patient for each 
JPK-Gakin member treated at hospital in the districts being studies was quite high, ranging 
from Rp 480,505 in East Sumba to Rp 7,122,559 in Purbalingga. It was inconceivable that 
the patient’s costs reflected in this calculation were all expended on the treatment of JPK-
Gakin members and it was quite possible that a significant proportion of funds were 
“leaked” and resulted in the treatment of non-poor patients in these hospitals (Arifianto 
et.al., 2005).  
 
The JPK-Gakin case study also indicated that the low utilization rate of JPK-Gakin members 
using the services they were entitled to, has potentially resulted in the miss-allocation of Gakin 
subsidies to the supposedly better-off members, who can actually afford to pay some of their 
own health care costs. It was likely that most of these funds were used instead to upgrade the 
buildings and medical equipment of the hospital and to subsidize other hospital patients, 
especially those from the upper income brackets. For instance, in Purbalingga it was estimated 
that 79% of the JPK-Gakin funds subsidized the health care services of non-poor patients at 
puskesmas and at the RSUD with 87.63% of overall JPK-Gakin funds went to non-poor 
patients (Arifianto et. al., 2005). 
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The SMERU rapid appraisal study conducted in 1999 also revealed a potential surplus in the 
allocation of funds by SSS in health sector in each assessment area as a result of a discrepancy 
between the initial data used to request funds and the actual number of health card holders. 
The surplus in the allocation of the yankesar (basic health services) funds in Kabupaten Malang, 
was in the range between 40,000 to 68,000 families, and in the case of Kabupaten Gowa, the 
gap was around 6,870 families. The number of patients who had just received health cards also 
indicated a surplus in funds. Consequently, the opportunity to use the available funds 
appropriately to meet the objectives of the program had been limited (Sulaksono et. al., 1999). 
Contrary, the CIMU national survey revealed the opposite case of an inadequate allocation of 
health cards beneficiaries, particularly in provinces where conflict had occurred (CIMU 
HNSDP, 2002c). 
 
On the other hand, the amount of SSN funds allocated to hospitals in second-level regions 
was still felt to be inadequate, as hospitals did not only treat referred cases but also many 
cardholders who came directly to the public hospitals for treatment without referral from 
puskesmas. Yet part of the SSN funds allocated for referrals was allocated at the puskesmas level. 
The problems of referral were experienced by the public hospitals, cardholders, and non-
cardholders of health cards. Compared to the expensive cost of medication and treatment at 
hospitals for serious disease and illness, the non-holders of health cards felt that they could 
not afford the cost, and consider themselves entitled to receive subsidy. 
 
Finally, the most prominent problem is regarding budgeting of SSN program for health 
sectors was the issue of sustainability, as many basic services, particularly for the poor, would 
likely to be disrupted without the support from SSN (CIMU HNSDP, 2002c) and PKPS BBM 
schemes. The innovation of JPK-Gakin was not resolved this problem yet. JPK-Gakin 
funding largely depends on subsidies from the fuel subsidy compensation (PKPS-BBM) 
scheme and from the general block grant (Dana Alokasi Umum – DAU) given by the central 
government to district/local governments that largely funds the local government budget 
(APBD). Funding from other sources, such as member’s premiums, only forms a small part of 
the program’s overall funds. In the long run, this might make the scheme unsustainable as 
PKPS BBM and DAU grants are reduced, creating potential disruptions in the delivery of 
services (Arifianto et. al., 2005). 
 
 
4.5 Institution and Incentive Effects 
 
There were several institutions involved in the implementation of SSN in health, and the same 
institutional set up has been maintained during the PKPS BBM period. So, both programs 
adopt the same structure of program administration and implementation as well as monitoring 
and evaluation, with the exception in the establishment of the independent monitoring unit, 
CIMU HNSDP, which existed only during the live of the SSN program. According to the 
program's guideline, at the central level, the program is managed by program secretariat within 
the Ministry of Health (MoH), assisted by technical advisory team and program advisory team 
consisted of bureaucrats at MoH. While the overall SSN program is coordinated by the SSN 
advisory team consisted of various ministries lead by BPPENAS. At the provincial level, the 
governor establishes provincial coordination team consisted of representatives from health 
office, BKKBN, Office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, education office, office of social 
affairs, and headed by BAPPEDA.  This team should develop local policy; carry out assistance 
and coordination at provincial level, as well as monitoring and controlling the implementation 
at district level.   
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At the district level, program is managed by district coordination team (Tim Koordinasi 
Kabupaten – TKK) formed by the head of district (Bupati/Walikota). This team consists of 
representatives from health office, BKKBN office, education office, office of religious affairs, 
office of social affairs, and headed by BAPPEDA.  Similar form of coordination team is also 
established at kecamatan (sub-district) level, headed by Camat (head of sub-district) and 
consisted of the head of puskesmas, head of sub-district education office, head of sub-district 
religious office, and other relevant institutions including all heads of villages.  The TKK at 
district level plays important roles in determining local policy, allocations for puskesmas and 
village midwives, delivering the allocation to post office and other related agencies (puskesmas, 
midwives, provincial coordination team, SSN secretariat in BAPPENAS, and SSN health 
sector secretariat in MoH), as well as carry out monitoring, providing technical assistance, and 
controlling program implementation in all regions within their jurisdiction.  Meanwhile the 
coordination team at sub-district level was to coordinate, monitor and control program 
implementation, and assisting in handling complaints at village level.    
 
In the implementation level, local public hospital, puskesmas along with pustu and polindes, and 
midwives are at the forefront of service provision, and post office acts as the means of funds 
disbursement channel. CIMU HNSDP (2002a) claimed that program innovations regarding 
disbursement of funds through post office, and the allocation of block grant to puskesmas and 
village midwives attached with responsibility for planning and reporting on the use of this 
fund were the most successful steps, despite some minor difficulties. Indeed other report 
pointed some alarming evidences of the lack of transparency on the use of funds as 
mentioned in the cost section above. In addition, there were complaints from these service 
providers that the program had put too much administrative burdens and provide less income 
(Sulaksono et. al., 1999). A sentinel site survey, however, revealed relatively good compliance 
in completing book reports among village midwives as around 80 percent of them had 
completed the reports. In addition, only small fraction of puskesmas (around 19 percent) and 
slightly larger proportion of midwives (34 percent) did not update their monthly financial 
reports on time (CIMU HNSDP, 2002d).   
 
Regarding the overall program implementation, the sentinel site survey also found several 
problems, including the difficulties in intersectoral program coordination at district as well as 
sub-district level, the lack of communication between TKK and service providers, and 
identifying target groups and distribution of health cards (CIMU HNSDP, 2002d). Meanwhile, 
Sulaksono et. al. (1999) observed that the monitoring of the implementation of the JPS-BK 
program was rather slack. Much tighter monitoring was required, so that the proposal to grant 
more freedom to the local program executors was not misappropriated.  
 
Other study also highlighted two primary issues relating to public health services (Budiyati, 
1999). Firstly, the issues related to the existence and the administering of the Puskesmas. It 
appears that the roles and responsibilities of this formal health institution are very significant. 
This was found to be particularly true in the Puskesmas located in remote areas, especially 
considering the geographical factors and physical infrastructures. One internal factor that has a 
strong influence is the health service policies applied by the Puskesmas. Some Puskesmas have 
applied a policy of ‘early anticipation’ in carrying out their services by optimizing the roles of 
all available staff and health providers. There is a strong indication that pro-active measures on 
the part of the Puskesmas have a positive influence, encouraging an increase in the number of 
visits to the Puskesmas. Other internal policies, for example, the strategy for determining fees, 
costs and management of the JPS-BK funds, are also influential in optimizing health services, 
particularly for the poorest.  
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Secondly, from the point of view of the community, it appears that the interaction between 
the community and the Puskesmas was influenced by several factors, in particular: 1) the 
cultural values underpinning local perceptions towards the Puskesmas and health providers; 2) 
the role of traditional health providers and the degree of trust held by the community towards 
them; 3) the level of knowledge within the community about health matters; 4) the distance 
between the patient’s home and the Puskesmas; 5) the character of health providers and the 
quality of the services they provide; 6) the quality of the medicines; and, 7) the availability of 
other health facilities such as Polindes and Pustu. 
 
Other component of the program, the JPK-Gakin have different institutional set up. In most 
districts, JPK-Gakin is managed by Bapel (Badan Pengelola: Management Unit), an independent 
body separate from the Regional Health Agency (DinKes: Dinas Kesehatan) that often consists 
partially of officials who were working for the DinKes prior to the establishment of the Bapel. In 
some other cases JPK-Gakin is provided by PT. Askes, which is a state-owned health insurance 
enterprise established by the Ministry of Health in 1968, which has an independent board of 
directors but is under the supervision of the Health Ministry. PT. Askes is a for-profit state-
owned company that provides a number of different benefit packages in Indonesia. Benefit 
packages (including those for the poor) provided by PT. Askes are nationally set, so districts do 
not have the authority to make changes to accommodate local needs. 
 
Study on the JPK-Gakin found that there was little involvement by non-government 
stakeholders, in particular, JPK-Gakin members/clients, in the design, implementation and 
monitoring of the scheme. JPK-Gakin members are just passive clients. Because they do not 
participate in the scheme’s decision-making processes, the management of the program is less 
transparent and accountable to its stakeholders, especially its members. With the exception of 
East Sumba, there was no involvement by private health providers in the provision of health 
services for JPK-Gakin members. They were only able to seek health services in publicly 
managed health facilities (Puskesmas and RSUD). The fact that most private providers did not 
participate in the scheme results in a more limited choice of health providers available for its 
members, and, therefore, in restricted access to better quality services (Arifianto et. al., 2005). 
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Appendix 1. The Allocation of SSN for Health Sector Budget in FY 1999/00 
(Billion Rupiah) 
 
Community Health to Puskesmas (from ADB) 
 Basic Health Services 230.60 22.39% 
 Nutritional Improvement 276.60 26.85% 
 Eradication of Communicable Diseases 32.70 3.17% 
 
Posyandu Revitalization 133.30 12.94% 
 Midwifery Services (to Midwives) 70.60 6.85% 
Allocation for Hospital (APBN) 
 Basic Health Services – Referral 48.00 4.66% 
 Operation 85.70 8.32% 
District Health Office (APBN) 
 
Strengthening Food and Nutrition Surveillance 
System 15.70 1.52% 
Supporting Activities (ADB) 
 Unexpected Circumstances 10.35 1.00% 
 
Socialization and Training for Medical 
Personnel 23.40 2.27% 
 Program Monitoring 53.90 5.23% 
 Central Management 49.30 4.79% 
Total 1,030.15 
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Appendix 2. The Allocation of PKPS BBM Program Budget in 2005 
  Billion Rp   
January- July    
 
Basic Health Service in Puskesmas 36.0 2.29% of MoH 
 Hospital Referral (PT Askes) 64.0 4.07% of MoH 
July – December    
 
Basic Health Services in Puskesmas 395.0 25.10% of MoH 
 Hospital Referral (PT Askes) 1.3 0.08% of MoH 
Supporting Activities (July-Dec.)    
 
Posyandu Revitalization 7.5 0.48% of MoH 
 Remote Islands 18.0 1.14% of MoH 
 Supply of essential drugs 171.0 10.87% of MoH 
 Purchase of cars 61.0 3.88% of MoH 
 Purchase of motorbike 108.0 6.86% of MoH 
 Supply of vaccine (hepatitis) 40.0 2.54% of MoH 
 Renovation of Pharmacy Storehouses 66.0 4.19% of MoH 
Others:    
 Supply of utensils for basic health care 157.0 9.98% of MoH 
 Red Cross Funding 100.0 6.35% of MoH 
 Monitoring and Evaluation 25.0 1.59% of MoH 
 Management and Operational 79.0 5.02% of MoH 
 Reserve for Hospital Claims 110.0 6.99% of MoH 
 
Child Delivery in Puskesmas 135.0 8.58% of MoH 
Total MoH 1,573.8 40.6% of Total Health  
JPK MM (PT Askes)    
 Social Assistance 1,000.0   
  Operational Cost  0.1   
  Additional Budget (Revision)  1,300.0   
Total JPK MM 2,300.1 59.4%  of Total Health  
Total PKPS BBM for Health Sector 3,873.90 
  
Source: Calculated from Ministry of Health 
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V. COMMUNICABLE DISEASES PREVENTION: 
POLIO, TUBERCULOSIS AND HIV/AIDS PREVENTION 
PROGRAMS 
 
 
Other than socio-economic problems, Indonesia’s burden to alleviate poverty increases with 
the prevalence of some communicable diseases. Even though illness does not belong 
exclusively to poor people, yet more than ample evidence suggests some correlations between 
health and poverty. The data shows that globally, most of tuberculosis patients, for instance, 
are from poor countries, with the majority of them are from poor families and other 
vulnerable groups like homeless (Nhlema et al.; 2003). It is also found that the disease may 
cause or worsen poverty.24 Its impact is more severe on poor patients than rich ones. While 
the latter may get medical treatment quite easily, either from his own pocket or medical 
insurance he participates, the poor often has no resource to cure his illness. The occurrence of 
such diseases thus may lead to impoverishment of poor patients and their households. At 
national level, it may increase the number of people living under poverty.  
 
For Indonesia, the newest report states that the tuberculosis alone adds to the country 485.000 
new patients every year. This is not to account the impacts of many other communicable or 
infectious diseases like malaria, polio or HIV/AIDS. Epidemical data clearly shows, for 
example, that the spread of HIV in Indonesia since 1995 has become increasingly serious, with 
a drastic increase in the number of new cases of people infected with HIV. Therefore, in order 
to eradicate the high incident of poverty in the country, it is necessary for the country to 
combat such diseases. Focusing on polio, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, this paper will analyze 
as how far such effort has been done and its impact on the reduction of the prevalence of the 
diseases in the country in general.  
 
 
5.1 Background and Brief Details of the Programs 
 
The threat of communicable diseases in Indonesia is still alarming. Other than ‘old’ diseases 
like malaria or tuberculosis, the country also has to combat the spread of new diseases like 
HIV/AIDS or avian influenza. For the HIV/AIDS, for instance, the UNGASS report 2006 
2007 states that even though the aggregate prevalence of the disease is as low as 0.16 percent, 
and the incidence is concentrated in certain regions, but the spread of the disease in the 
country is categorized the fastest in Asia region (UNGASS report, 2006 2007: 10). Other than 
that, there is also possible threat from diseases from which the country had been previously 
free like polio. The second outbreak of polio disease in 2005, as well as other threats, warns 
the country to strengthen the existing programs on communicable diseases. 
 
Polio and its prevention program  
 
Polio (Poliomyelitis anterior acuta) is caused by the wild poliovirus infection. There are various 
symptoms of polio disease, from a light symptom to paralysis. Usually infecting young 
children by attacking the nervous system, the disease causes paralysis and muscular atrophy. 
Unfortunately, there is no cure for the disease. Therefore, since it will cause permanent 
physical disablement to individuals and have a significant socio-economic impact on society, 
the poliovirus has to be eradicated. Data shows that Indonesia is still subject to polio threat. 
                                                 
24B. Nhlema et al., 2003, A Systematic Analysis of TB and Poverty, available on …. 
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Even though it was declared that Indonesia had been free from polio virus since the last case 
was reported in 1995, wild polio virus attack was found again in the country in 2005. 
Indonesia was even ranked number two after Yemen in terms of the number of new cases 
found (p. 4).  
  
Before this outbreak, based on AFP (Acute Flaccid Paralysis=Lumpuh Layuh Mendadak) 
surveillance to monitor paralysis, there were indications that cases of wild poliovirus no longer 
existed in Indonesia since the last wild poliovirus case was reported in Magelang, Central Java 
Province in 1995. Through an extensive and systematic polio immunization program, the 
number of polio cases in Indonesia had been reduced by 97% in 7 years from 773 cases in 
1988 to only 30 cases in 1993.   
 
In 6 May 2005, however, the World Health Organization reported a total of four new 
confirmed cases of poliomyelitis in Indonesia. The first case was confirmed on 2 May 2005 in 
Giri Jaya Village, Sukabumi District, West Java. Two further cases have occurred in the same 
village as the index case and a third from a neighboring village. All cases have occurred in 
previously unvaccinated children (Nathnac, 2006). These are the first cases of wild type polio 
in Indonesia since 1995. This has attracted attention and was reported as a second polio 
outbreak in Indonesia. By mid-June 2005, the number of polio cases was reported to have 
reached 46 and by September to have grown to a total of 236 people. While most of the initial 
cases occurred in West Java (newsVOAcom, 2005) cases have been reported in Central Java, 
Lampung, Banten, DKI Jakarta, and North Sumatra. In November, ten days after the second 
round of 2006 PIN25), 9 polio cases were still found in 6 provinces (MoH, 13 September 
2006). When the fourth round of the 2005/2006 PIN was conducted on 27 February 2006, 
the cumulative total of polio cases was reported to have reached 304 cases in 10 provinces and 
40 districts (MoH, 27 February 2006). 
 
In order to prevent and eradicate wild poliovirus, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) has 
taken several steps as follows: (1) Conducting high dosage routine immunization with a 
minimum of 3 rounds of polio immunization vaccine; (2) Conducting ‘Pekan Imunisasi Nasional 
(PIN)’ (the National Immunization Week) over three consecutive rounds; (3) Conducting 
AFP Surveillance with laboratories check-up; Conducting mopping-up; and (4) Polio Free 
Certification.  
 
In practice, the Government of Indonesia regulates that all infants under 5 (bawah lima tahun or 
‘balita’), including newborn babies, who live in Indonesia have to take certain immunizations, 
including polio. This systematic routine immunization has been in place for a long time. The 
vaccine includes BCG, polio, DPT, measles, hepatitis B, and influenza. The vaccine is 
available from all health providers, hospitals, Puskesmas 26  as well as private medical 
practitioners and midwives. Even though it is regulated and obligatory, access to the vaccine is 
voluntary and not free. The socialization of these systematic immunizations is conducted 
through doctors, midwives, nurses, Posyandu27, health cadres, families and other members of 
the community. It has been so effective that most community members acknowledge the 
importance of the immunizations and the negative impact of not taking the immunizations. A 
few community members are, however, sometimes reluctant to access the vaccine for 3 main 
reasons; the cost, lack of access to the vaccine, and afraid of being ill after the immunizations. 
 
                                                 
25PIN: Pekan Imunisasi Nasional: National Immunization Week. 
26Puskesmas: Pusat kesehatan masyarakat: Community healthcare centers. 
27Posyandu: Pos pelayanan terpadu: Integrated health posts. 
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More specifically, the GoI conducted what is called Pekan Immunisasi Nasional (PIN, 
National Immunization Week). It is a special week when all balita, including newborn babies, 
who live in Indonesia, are given a free polio immunization, irrespective of their previous 
immunization status. The immunization was given twice with 2 drops of vaccine on each of 2 
occasions at an interval of 2 months. It is hoped that a mass polio immunization for target 
groups (balita) will speed up the disruption to the wild poliovirus lifecycle since it is believed 
that poliovirus can live for only 48 hours in open air. PINs are conducted because of 
indications of the existence of wild poliovirus and to strengthen systematic routine 
immunization activities that might not effectively reach all members of the community.  
 
The program was successfully conducted in the months of September and October in the 
consecutive years of 1995, 1996 and 1997. As recommended in the New Delhi meeting,28 
Indonesia conducted another PIN in 2002 with support from WHO, UNICEF, Rotary 
International and UNDP. Finally, because of the second polio outbreak that broke out in May 
2005 (even though the poliovirus comeback was recorded in year 2003), the government took 
action by conducting another PIN in 2005 and 2006 over 5 rounds, (August 2005, September 
2005, November 2005, February 2006, and round 5 will be in April 2006). Additionally, as 
there are areas at high-risk to polio and the fact that the targeting performance of the 2005 
PIN rounds 1, 2 and 3 were not optimum (90%), another Sub-PIN was conducted on 30 
January 2006 in 57 districts in the province of NAD, North Sumatra, South Sumatra, 
Lampung, Banten and East Java. Sub-PINS were also undertaken in the aftermath of the 
economic and political crisis in 1997 as the crisis was thought to have weakened the routine 
immunization program performance, and thus has created opportunity for the re-emergence 
of wild poliovirus, which potentially enters Indonesia from neighboring countries like India, 
Bangladesh and Myanmar.  
 
Tuberculosis and its prevention program 
 
Tuberculosis (TBC/TB) is caused by the mycobacterium tuberculosis. The bacterium, which mostly 
attacks the lung, is spread by a positive BTA TBC29 carrier who coughs and spills the droplet 
into open air. People can be infected if the droplet is inhaled into their lung. According to the 
WHO, around 3 million people in the world die annually because of tuberculosis or around 
5,000 people every day with Indonesia has the third highest incidence of TB after India and 
China. The WHO Global Surveillance and Monitoring Project 1999 estimated the incidence in 
Indonesia to be around 583,000 new cases and 262,000 new smear positive cases per year. The 
prevalence of smear positive cases is estimated to be 715,000, with 140,000 patients dying 
annually of TB. Based on the National Household Health Survey (NHHS) (Survei Kesehatan 
Rumah Tangga/SKRT) 1995, tuberculosis is the third major cause of mortality in Indonesia, 
accounting for 10 per cent of the total mortality rate, after cardiovascular disease (19 per cent) 
and respiratory system illnesses (16 per cent). The Annual Risk of Tuberculosis Infection 
(ARTI), which measures the number of people infected by TBC annually per 1,000 people, is 
considered high for Indonesia. The NHHS 1995 also indicated that tuberculosis is ranked 7th 
in morbidity with a rate of 4.2 per 1,000 people.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28The Eight Technical Consultative Group on Vaccine Preventable Diseases in SouthEast Asia Regional Office 
(SEARO), 22-25 October 2001 which identified SEARO areas were vulnerable to polio.  
29BTA: Basil tahan asam: Acid-fast (tuberculosis) bacillus (AFB). 
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Table 1. Tuberculosis Cases in Indonesia (1997-2006) 
Pulmonary Tuberculosis 
Smear-Positive Year 
New Relapse 
Smear 
Negative 
Extra Pulmonary 
Tuberculosis Total 
1997       25,420          497        3,125          4,174        33,216 
1998       29,781       1,177        8,217             382        39,557  
1999       49,333       2,205      20,792          1,105        73,435 
2000       52,338       2,478      28,225          1,550        84,591  
2001       53,965       2,708      34,547          1,818        93,038 
2002       76,230       3,731      72,219          3,008      155,188  
2003       92,566       4,086     77,561         4,047     178,260  
2004     128,981      4,429     76,981         4,267     214,658 
2005     158,640      4,446     85,373         6,142     254,601 
2006     175,320      4,227     91,029         7,013     277,586 
Source: Ministry of Health and Bakti Husada and Stop TB Partnership (2007), Report of the Joint External TB 
Monitoring Mission 
 
 
Figure 1. Tuberculosis cases in Indonesia 1997 - 2006 
 
The National TB Control Program has been in place since 1969.  Initially the program was 
based in the health centers (Puskesmas) using standard drug regimens with a treatment duration 
of 1-2 years. The objective of NTP is to decrease the TB morbidity and mortality rate through 
interrupting the transmission of TB infection until the tuberculosis is no longer a public health 
problem. The short-term goals of the NTP are to: (1) cure at least 85 per cent of all new 
smear-positive cases detected in each year from 2002 until 2006; and (2) detect at least 40 per 
cent of all new smear positive cases by the year 2002, with 50 per cent detection by 2003, 60 
per cent (2004) and 70 per cent (2005). 
 
The program is aiming to achieve a conversion rate of at least 80 per cent at the end of 
intensive treatment, a cure rate of at least 85 per cent of the AFB (+) patient, and an error rate 
of slide cross check at a maximum of 5 per cent. The program activities include: (1) 
conducting high level advocacy at provincial and district levels; (2) conducting training of 
related staff and sectors; (3) improving the quality control of laboratory examination by 
creating a laboratory network at all levels; (4) conducting routine and problem solving 
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meetings and regular coordination to improve surveillance data and program management; 
and (5) providing better community-based services through COMBI (Community Based 
Initiatives).  
 
In 1993, the DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course chemotherapy) strategy was 
adopted with a pilot project in 4 provinces of Sulawesi. DOTS consists of five (5) 
components:  political commitments, microscopic diagnosis, short-term drug treatment with 
direct drug intake monitoring (Pengawasan Menelan Obat=PMO), guarantee on drug availability, 
and an effective and uniform recording and reporting system. The DOTS strategy piloting 
proves that the strategy has contributed to a high cure rate. The World Bank also claims that 
the DOTS strategy is cost effective and a WHO study showed that every US$1 used for a TB 
prevention program will save around US$55 in 20 years references. Due to the success of the 
pilot program, DOTS was expanded to two other provinces in 1995. Since then the DOTS 
strategy has been expanded to all provinces in the country (DG CDC EH30?, 2004). 
 
The Government of Indonesia considers TB control to be a high priority within the health 
system and it is not only the responsibility of the public sector but also the private sector and 
others. For that reason, in March 1999 the Minister of Health established “Gerdunas TB” 
(Gerakan Terpadu National Penanggulangan TB/A National Integrated Movement for TB 
Control) with the objective of strengthening the partnerships among these sectors and the 
NTP (DG CDC EH, 2004). To rapidly scale up the DOTS program, the government has 
involved donors, including among others, the Dutch Government, the Global Fund for 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM)31, Tuberculosis Coalition for Technical Assistance 
(TBCTA), KNCV, and CIDA (Canadian Development Aid).  
 
HIV/AIDS and its prevention program 
 
Since 1987, there have been worrying developments in HIV (Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus)/AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome) in Indonesia in terms of numbers and 
mode of transmission. Epidemiological data clearly shows that the spread of HIV in Indonesia 
since 1995 has become increasingly serious, with a drastic increase in the number of new cases 
of people infected with HIV. There were three distinct periods that can be identified: 1985-
1989, 1989-1994, and 1994-2002 (NAC, 2003). Looking at the way the patients are infected, 
currently, the two most common modes of transmission are unsafe sex and intravenous drug 
use. Table 1 and 2 and Figure 1 and 2 below (as well as Annex 1) show data on the 
HIV/AIDS cases in Indonesia until June 2004. 
 
In response to the outbreak of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Indonesia, a number of steps 
have been taken. In 1985, the National Institute for Research and Development, Ministry of 
Health formed a working group to monitor the global development of HIV/AIDS, 
particularly its progression in Southeast Asia and to gather information on the epidemiology 
of HIV/AIDS. In 1988 the Minister of Health established a Working Group (WG) of 
HIV/AIDS Prevention.32 The primary task of the WG was to manage communication and 
coordination, as well as to gather and disseminate information to alert all sectors to the 
                                                 
30DG CDC EH: Directorate-General for Communicable Disease Control and Environmental Health. 
31The GFATM is an independent public-private partnership working to increase funding to fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria in countries with the greatest need and contributing to poverty reduction as part of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG).  The fund will support efforts in prevention, treatment, care, and 
support of those infected and directly affected by complementing existing programs and/or activities. 
32Later, in 1989, this WG was reorganized and expanded to bring multi-sectoral and NGO representatives as 
members. 
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problem of HIV/AIDS. In the same year, the Ministry of Health issued a regulation making it 
mandatory to report all cases of AIDS, and appointing certain laboratories to carry out HIV 
testing. 
 
Table 2. Cumulative HIV/AIDS Cases in Indonesia by Region (until June 2004) 
HIV AIDS Total 
Region 
No of Cases % No of cases % No of cases % 
Sumatra 369 12.9 175 11.5 544 12.4 
Java/Bali 1,655 57.8 824 54.0 2,479 56.5 
Kalimantan 141 4.9 50 3.3 191 4.4 
Sulawesi 36 1.3 30 2.0 66 1.5 
NTB/NTT/Maluku 30 1.0 42 2.8 72 1.6 
Papua 632 22.1 404 26.5 1,036 23.6 
Indonesia 2,863 100.0 1,525 100.0 4,388 100.0 
Source: Ditjen PPM & PL Ministry of Health: Statistik Kasus HIV/AIDS di Indonesia, 2004 
 
More developed than the previous period, the government responses in 1989-1994 included: 
(1) HIV surveillance in certain sub-populations such as sex workers and screening by the 
Blood Transfusion Unit of the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI); (2) increasing the number of 
laboratories with HIV testing facilities to enable all provincial health laboratories to participate 
in HIV/AIDS surveillance; (3) capacity building for health workers on HIV/AIDS through 
education and training programs and sending several officials from both health and non-
health sectors for further training and experience; (4) Intensifying information, education, and 
communication (IEC) on HIV/AIDS through seminars for journalists, medical faculty staffs, 
the private sector and business community; (5) publishing, reproducing, and distributing a 
range of IEC aids including books, brochures, and leaflets; and (6) establishing the National 
AIDS Commission (KPA/Komisi Penanggulangan AIDS) by virtue of  Presidential Decree 
No.36/1994 chaired by the Coordinating Minister of People’s Welfare which later published 
the 1994 National HIV/AIDS Strategy as well as various other edicts.   
 
In the 1994-2002 period, the government further continued the previous efforts by: (1) the 
establishment of Regional AIDS Commission (KPAD/Komisi Penanggulangan AIDS Daerah); (2) 
the formation of working groups on AIDS prevention at both the AIDS Commission and a 
number of Ministries and related sectors; (3) bilateral, regional, and international cooperation 
efforts; and (4) adoption of the output of the international meetings on HIV/AIDS 
prevention in which Indonesia participated. In 2002, the MoH, with support from 
international experts, created a national estimation method for HIV infection in Indonesia. 
This process resulted in an estimate of between 90,000 and 130,000 people living with 
HIV/AIDS in Indonesia (NAC, 2006). 
 
Recently, a number of initiatives have also been taken in the area of HIV/AIDS Prevention. 
These include: (1) Cabinet Meeting – Special Session on HIV/AIDS which was held in March 
2002 with the objective of increasing the commitment of national leaders to HIV/AIDS 
Prevention and to improve and to decide policy strategies on HIV/AIDS Prevention in 
Indonesia; (2) ‘Gerakan Nasional Stop AIDS’ to prevent the national HIV/AIDS disaster in 
Indonesia; and (3) the National Strategy on HIV/AIDS 2003-2007 which was formulated by 
the National AIDS Commission with the support of UNDP, AusAID, and UNAIDS.   
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The National Strategy HIV/AIDS 2003-2007 identifies seven priority programs: (1) 
HIV/AIDS Prevention; (2) Care, Treatment and Support for people living with HIV/AIDS 
(PLHA); (3) HIV/AIDS and STI Surveillance; (4) Operational Studies and Research; (5) 
Enabling Environments; (6) Multi-stakeholder Coordination; and (7) A Sustainable Response. 
Additionally, as follow up to the National Strategy, the National AIDS Commission also 
formulated The National Action Framework 2005-2007. The goals of the action framework 
are to prevent and limit the spread of HIV and improve the quality of life for people living 
with HIV/AIDS so as to alleviate the socio-economic and health impact of the epidemic on 
the people in Indonesia. The purpose of the 3-year National Action Framework is to increase 
capacity to halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS infection among core 
transmitters and in areas of concentrated epidemic transmission (NAC, 2005). 
 
The five priority areas of the Action Framework are to: (1) reduce the individual risk of sexual 
transmission of HIV; (2) reduce the individual risk of HIV transmission among injecting drug 
users and sexual transmission to their partners; (3) increase the awareness of the general 
population, particularly young people, of their vulnerability to HIV/AIDS infection and 
discriminatory behaviors toward PLWHA (People Living With HIV/AIDS); (4) improve 
access and quality of care, treatment, and support for PLWHA with a focus on increasing 
Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT), treatment for Opportunistic Infections (OI) and 
community based care and support; and (5) strengthen the capacity to prioritize and allocate 
resources for HIV/AIDS at national, province, and district levels. 
 
The goal of all prevention programs is to ensure that everyone can protect her/himself against 
HIV infection, avoid transmitting the virus to others, and reduce the socio-economic impact 
caused by HIV/AIDS. Program activities include: (1) intensifying IEC (Information, 
Education and Communication); (2) reducing vulnerability; (3) increasing condom use; (4) 
increasing the supply of safe blood; (5) stepping up efforts to reduce the prevalence of 
sexually transmissible infections; (6) improving measures to prevent mother-to-child 
transmission; (7) improving the application of universal precautions; and (8) stepping up 
efforts to prevent HIV transmission among the IDU. In line with the program, the cost of 
ART (Anti Retroviral Therapy) has been subsidized since 2004 and 25 hospitals have been 
appointed to provide ART. Schools and teachers also received training on life skills-based 
HIV/AIDS education (LSE).  Each school has two trained teachers who taught the subject 
during the academic year. 
 
To anticipate the negative effects of HIV/AIDS in the workplace, the government passed 
Ministerial Decree of Manpower and Transmigration No.Kep.68/Men/IV/2004 on 
HIV/AIDS prevention in the workplace. The Decree stipulates, inter alia, that: (1) the 
company (management and/or owners) should conduct HIV/AIDS prevention activities at 
work places; (2) workers living with HIV/AIDS have the right to receive health services equal 
to other workers; (3) the government provide guidance about HIV/AIDS prevention 
programs at work places; (4) the government, the company, and workers, individual or 
together, should support the HIV/AIDS prevention in work places; (5) the company should 
not demand an HIV test as a requirement of job recruitment or routine health check-up; and 
(6) the test is only conducted on a voluntary basis and the test should be conducted by 
medical doctors with certain expertise. 
 
Other than the government program, donors and many NGOs are also working hand in hand 
on the HIV prevention program. Between January and July 2004, UNICEF, in collaboration 
with the Ministry of National Education trained master trainers, teachers and peer educators 
for LSE and peer education in Papua. Teaching and learning materials in the form of a 
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teacher’s manual, student booklets, flipcharts, and two sets of posters on LSE for HIV/AIDS 
were printed and distributed to 123 schools in Biak, Jayapura, Manokwari and Sorong districts.    
 
 
5.2 Coverage and Targeting Performance 
 
Different targeting systems are applied to reach the target group of every health program. 
While the polio eradication program targeted all the children eligible for the immunization, 
that zero case must be achieved for a country to be declared free from polio, TB and 
HIV/AIDS programs are assessed on the bases of either the percentage of standard or 
minimum treatment should be received by those infected, might be infected or affected by the 
diseases, or the minimum percentage of people or patients covered by the programs.   
 
As for the polio eradication program, it appears that except for the period of 2000 and 2002, 
the target of PINs increased year by year (see Table 1). While the program targeted 17.9 
million children in the first round of the PIN 1995, the number of children targeted increased 
by 4 million in October 1997, which is the second round of the PIN 1997. After decreasing 
significantly in the late nineties, due to the economic crisis faced by the country, the program 
targeted nearly 21 million children in 2002. The second outbreak of wild poliovirus in the 
country in 2005 increased the target of the program rather significantly to 23.6 million infants 
under 5 for every round of the 2005 and 2006 PINs.  
 
Table 3. PIN (and Sub PIN) 1995-2006 and the Target 
Date/month conducted and Target (infants under 5/balita) 
Year Program 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
1995 PIN September 17.9 million 
October 
19.2 million    
1996 PIN September 21.1 million 
October 
21.7 million    
1997 PIN September 21.3 million 
October 
21.9 million    
1998       
1999 BIAS Polio In Schools n.a     
2000 Sub PIN (5 provinces) 
August to November 
1.3 million    
2001       
2002 PIN 12 Sept 20.8 million 
9 Oct 
20.8 million    
2003       
2004       
2005 PIN 30 August 23.6 million 
27 Sept 
23.6 million 
30 Nov 
23.6 million   
PIN    27 February 23.6 million 
12 April 
23.6 million 
2006 
Sub PIN 
(6 provinces) 
30 January 
4.5 million     
Source:  Subdit Imunisasi, Ministry of Health 
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However, despite the increase in the number of children targeted after the second outbreak of 
the disease in 2005, it is apparent that the implementation of the program was not as good as 
before. While before 2005 the program could reach more children than targeted, ranging from 
101.8 percent in the first round of 1995 to 107.7 percent or the highest in the second round of 
1996, since 2005 the achievement of the PIN program was on average below the target. At 
best, it reached 98.1 percent of the target in the third round of the 2005 PIN.    
 
Table 4. Targeting Performance of 1995-2006 PIN and Sub PIN 
Targeting performance 
Year Program 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
1995 PIN 101.8% 106.4%    
1996 PIN 105.5% 107.7%    
1997 PIN 104.9% 106.8%    
1999 BIAS Polio In schools      
2000 Sub PIN (5 provinces) 94.2% 92.8%    
2002 PIN 107.0% na    
2005 PIN 95.0% 97.4% 98.1%   
PIN    97.1% (preliminary) 
Will be con-
ducted in April 2006 
Sub PIN (6 provinces) 95.8%     
Source:  Subdit Imunisasi, Ministry of Health 
 
A closer look at the intra-region differences in the program implementation reveals, however, 
that the performance of the targeting varied from region to region. For the first and second 
rounds of the 2005 PIN, for instance, many regions could reach the target and even more, but 
many others could not. As a result, the target performance of these two rounds could only 
achieve 95.0 and 97.4 percent respectively. As shown in the tables 3 and 4 below, Papua had 
the worst performance in terms of target achievement despite its tiny target compared even to 
Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara-Maluku islands. Most of the target was certainly in Java and 
Sumatra where most of Indonesian populations live. However, for the 2005 PINs, in terms of 
targeting performance, Sulawesi and Nusa Tenggara-Maluku islands performed better than 
Java and Sumatra (see Annex 1 for more detailed picture of target coverage of PIN 2005). 
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Figure 2. The target group of PIN 2005 and its performance by regions 
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Unlike polio prevention program, in order to overcome TB, WHO requires a detection rate of 
at least 70 per cent and a cure rate of 85 per cent. As of 2005, data shows that the Indonesian 
TB cure rate is 85 per cent33 but the coverage is still less than 70 per cent, with an estimated 
coverage of only around 47 per cent even though some provinces have reached the WHO 
recommended level.  
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Figure 3. Case-Detection Rate and Treatment Success Rate 1997 - 2005 
 
In the period 2001-2003, the population coverage of DOTS was 98 per cent and the case 
detection rates were 21 per cent, 29 per cent, and 41.6 per cent respectively.34  It was claimed 
that the success rate was 86 per cent. USAID reported (USAID, 2004) that the DOTS 
population coverage in 2002 was 70 per cent with a detection rate in the same year of 73 per 
cent, and a DOTS treatment success rate in 2001 of 83 per cent. However, despite the positive 
performance, the TBC Prevention Program with DOTS Strategy has not reached all 
Puskesmas, hospitals and other health providers.  
 
For the HIV/AIDS programs, not until recently has the GoI (through the NAC) set up the 
target to be achieved so that performance of the targeting in the previous years was not well 
known or documented. Furthermore, it also became very difficult to assess the targeting 
performance of that period. Previously, they only state their goals and target qualitatively that 
they would like to address the problem by both preventing the spread of the disease and 
curing those already infected. There are three target groups of these programs:  
1. Vulnerable groups. These are people who, because of the nature of work, their 
environment, low level of family support and welfare or health status, are vulnerable to 
HIV. These groups may include highly mobile people, women, youth, street children, 
poor people, pregnant women and blood transfusion recipients; 
2. Infection-risk groups. These are people who are linked to high-risk behavior, such as sex 
workers and their clients, injecting drug users, and people detained in 
correction/detention centers; and  
3. Infected groups. These are people who are already infected with the HIV (PLWHA) who 
need a special approach because of their potential to transmit disease to others. 
 
                                                 
33WHO defines the cure rate as the proportion of new cases of smear-positive TB that were cured through 
treatment; this rate is routinely measured by treatment registers. 
34The case detection rate is the number of reported cases per 100,000 persons per year divided by the estimated 
incidence rate per 100,000 per year or the proportion of incident smear-positive TB cases detected through a TB 
program. TB incidence is uncertain and not measured but estimated; therefore, the case detection rate is 
uncertain. The case detection rate is defined as the notification rate of new cases of smear-positive TB divided by 
the estimated incidence rate. 
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It is only in the updated version of the HIV/AIDS National Strategy 2007-2010 that the 
government stated clearly target to be met year by year. Focusing on three key issues, which 
are (1) prevention and reduction of the number of new HIV/AIDS infections, (2) the quality 
of life of those already infected, and (3) social and economic impacts for those with 
HIV/AIDS, their families and societies,35 the government states some key targets to be met by 
2010. These targets include: 
1. 80% of most-at-risk-populations (MARPs) have access to a comprehensive prevention program 
2. 60% of MARPs reached with behavior change intervention 
3. 80% of those who are eligible can access ARV and CST as needed 
4. 60% pregnant women who are HIV positive can get ARV prophylaxis 
5. 50% reduction in new infections, or 35,000 new infections instead of the 70,000 new 
infections projected in 2010 if program coverage remains at current level. 
 
Unfortunately, data of the program implementation is still rarely available that it is difficult to 
state quite precisely as how these targets have been fulfilled so far. So far, there are only two 
reports that could be used to evaluate the performance of this targeting, namely the UNGASS 
reports and the KPA annual report. Yet both of these two reports are not free from their own 
weaknesses. While the former is produced on occasional bases, which is not available every 
year, the latter is not complete either. Not all points stated as target to be met in the National 
Strategy are reported in the KPA annual report. On certain points, it seems that the 2007 KPA 
Annual Report only reproduced the same data used by the UNGASS report so that it is quite 
difficult to asses the all the targets mentioned above.  
 
From both of these reports, it appears that while Indonesia could make a quite significant 
progress in the prevention programs, on the curative aspect the country should work harder to 
reach its target in stopping the spread of HIV/AIDS. On the prevention side, the KPA’s data 
reveals that the total number of IDUs, female sex workers, MSM and other target groups 
reached by the prevention program was higher that the targeted in the 2007 National Strategy. 
Yet on the curative aspects, some indicators show that many problems are still persistent. 
While the 2007 National Strategy mandated that 80% of those who are eligible can access 
ARV and CST as needed, the UNGASS report reveals that drugs are available only in big 
cities. As of December 2006, only 24.8 percent of people with advanced HIV infection 
received ART. Other than that, still related to ARV, laboratory tests and medications for those 
possibly infected, in which most patients have to pay themselves as such tests and medication 
are not covered by insurance, are quite expensive. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
many staffs in health service location are not well informed with the services needed by these 
people.36 The picture is even worse if we look at the program for pregnant women who are 
positive HIV. Far below the target, 60 percent of pregnant women who are positive HIV 
could get ARV, data per December 2006 show that the program performance could reach not 
more than 3.5 percent.37  
 
 
5.3 Impact and Outcomes 
 
Of the three diseases discussed here, it is apparent that polio program shows the most 
significant result. Despite the emergence of a number of new cases during the implementation 
of PINs, yet after several years of the program implementation, the emergence of new cases 
                                                 
35UNGASS Report 2006, p. 24. 
36UNGASS report, 34-35. 
37UNGASS report, 35. 
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could be eradicated gradually and finally no longer found. As previously mentioned the 
incidence of polio cases continued until the fourth round of the 2005/2006 PIN on 27 
February 2006.  However the number of cases is expected to decrease. Before the second 
round of 2005 PIN conducted in September 2005, the number of recorded polio cases had 
reached a total of 236 people or an average of around 60 new cases per month. In November, 
ten days after the second round of 2006 PIN, 9 polio cases were found. Until February 2006 
the cumulative total of polio cases was reported to have reached 304 cases or an additional 12 
cases per month since October 2005. Yet 2006 also marked the period when the last polio 
case was reported with the province of Nangroe Aceh Darussalam as the region reporting the 
case. Finally, Indonesia was declared free from polio after a year reporting no new polio cases 
since the last case was reported in 2006. 
 
With different standard of achievement, DOT system in TB program is considered successful 
as well. Other than high rate of treatment success also continuously decreases. Yet it is also 
worth noticing that the implementation of the NTP program is not free from some problems 
either, namely the weak management capacity in some provinces, insufficient commitment at 
some provincial and district levels for the contribution of local resources, and only 60 per cent 
of staff has been trained at the health unit level. At present, DOTS are implemented only at 
health center level. Other health care providers (lung clinic) have been included in the DOTS 
system very recently.  Hospital and public private clinics are not fully on board as yet. TB 
patients do not always go to the Puskesmas where the DOTS program is mostly based.  It is 
necessary for the service to be expanded to the hospitals and private medical practices to 
cover wider TB patients.  
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Figure 4 TB incidence rate per 100 thousand people 
Source: Program nasional penanggulangan TBC Indonesia 
 
Unlike the polio eradication and the TB programs, the impact and outcomes of the 
government HIV Prevention Program alone is not easily detected. To respond to the 
HIV/AIDS problem, many programs have been conducted, not only by the government but 
also by donor funded projects, such as IHPCP/AusAID, FHI/USAID, and GFATM, and 
many NGOs, with or without support from international initiatives and communities. 
Collectively, they have improved the program performance as well as those reached by the 
program. UNGASS report 2006 2007 notes that other than the provision of ART freely since 
2004, by the end of 2007 there were 267 VCT clinics, plus 153 hospitals that provide free 
ART, and 19 hospitals that had Prevention of Mother to Child Transmission (PMTC) 
programs. Other than that, there have developed 20 referral networks for Integrated 
Management Adult Illness (UNGASS report 2006-2007, 34) 
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As for the program implemented, data from various sources cited by UNGASS reports 2004 
and 2006-2007 indicate that the programs have increased significantly the number of those 
vulnerable to the infection of HIV/AIDS receiving prevention programs. While it has 
doubled the number of sex workers covered by the prevention programs, rising from 18.3 
percent in 2004 to 39.6 percent in 2007, the impacts of the program on men having sex with 
men (MSM) and injecting drug users (IDUs) were even more significantly higher. As the table 
shows, the points for these two indicators rose drastically from 1.9 and 5.7 percent in 2004 to 
40.1 and 44.7 respectively in 2007. Similarly, significant improvement also takes place in the 
percentage of female and male sex workers reporting the use of condom with their most 
recent clients. While in the female group the percentage rose by 11.5 points, from 56.2 percent 
in 2004 to 67.7 percent in 2006/2007, the percentage in the male group rose even more highly 
from 47.5 percent in 2004 to 72.0 percent in 2006/2007. Yet unfortunately, this improvement 
is not followed by the rise of knowledge about the disease, especially the transmission of the 
disease among the vulnerable group. Data shows that knowledge indicator rose by only 4.5 
percent among sex workers, and even slightly dropped from around 43 percent in 2004 to 
41.6 percent in 2006/2007 among MSMs.  
 
Other indicators show that generally the impact of the programs on the ‘curative’ side has not 
been as significant as those on the prevention or prevention-led activities. Even though the 
programs could double the number MARPs having received HIV test, yet still the 
achievement is generally lower than the above mentioned indicators. At best, it raised the 
number of IDUs having received HIV test from 18 percent in 2004 to 35.9 percent in 2007. 
Other indicator even shows a slight drop in the program performance. While there were 35 
percent patients receiving ART in 2004, the number decreased quite significantly to 24.8 
percent in 2007.  
 
Table 5. Program Impact Indicators 
Indicators 2004* 2006/ 2007** 
Percentage of MARPs reached with HIV Prevention Programs 
a. Sex Workers 
b. MSM 
c. IDUs 
 
18.3 
1.9 
5.7 
 
39.6 
40.1 
44.7 
Percentage of MARPs that have received HIV test 
d. Sex Workers 
e. MSM 
f. IDUs 
 
14.0 
15.0 
18.0 
 
30.8 
31.9 
35.9 
Percentage of HIV positive pregnant women who received ARV to reduce the risk of 
MTCT  n.a 3.5 
Percentage of patients receiving ART 35.0 24.8 
Percentage of MARPs could correctly identify ways of preventing sexual transmission 
of HIV  
g. Sex Workers 
h. MSM 
i. IDUs 
 
24.0 
43.0 
na 
 
28.5 
41.6 
58.3 
Percentage of female and male sex workers reporting the use of a condom with their 
most recent client 
a. Males 
b. Females 
c. All 
 
 
47.5 
56.2 
n.a 
 
 
72.0 
67.7 
68.6 
* UNGASS Indicators Country Draft Report 2003 2004 
*** UNGASS country report 2006 2007 
 
 
 
The SMERU Research Institute 81 
5.4 Efficiency and Administrative Costs 
 
The budget for the 2005 PIN was Rp227 billion from APBN and international support 
(WHO, UNICEF, Rotary International). The Government of Japan decided to support the 
PIN 2005 by providing an Emergency Grant (Bantuan Hibah Darurat) to the GoI through the 
UN International Children Fund (UNICEF) for an amount of US$ 1.8 million or around 
Rp18.6 billion. This grant was based on a request from the GOI via UNICEF to support the 
availability of polio vaccine and the dissemination process. In general, the budget for the PIN 
2005 increased considerably from the previous budgets. For the PIN 2000, it spent 104 
billion. The 2000 Sub-PIN budget for the 5 provinces covered was Rp26.5 billion. 
Approximately Rp11.3 billion of this came from the APBN, another Rp11.5 billion was a 
grant from UNICEF, and Rp3.6 a grant from USAID through WHO. The 2002 PIN Budget 
for 2 rounds was Rp104 billion, Rp43 billion of which was from the APBN and APBD and 
the balance were grants from WHO and international donors. Table 3 below shows the overall 
PIN and Sub PIN budget of 1995-2006. 
 
Table 6. PIN and Sub-PIN Budget 1995-2006 
Budget in rupiah (Rp) 
Year Program 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5 
1995 PIN Na Na    
1996 PIN Na Na    
1997 PIN Na Na    
1999 BIAS Polio In schools Na     
2000 Sub PIN (5 provinces) 26.5 billion    
2002 PIN 104 billion    
2005 PIN 225 billion International Aid + APBN 
120 billion 
Intl Aid+ APBN   
PIN    230 billion APBN 
2006 
Sub PIN 
(6 provinces) 
14.5 billion 
UNICEF     
Source:  Subdit Imunisasi, Ministry of Health; Note: data is not available 
 
Similar to polio prevention program, funding for TB control has also improved substantially 
since 2002, when the NTP reported a funding gap exceeding 50 per cent of the total budget 
requirement and expenditure amounting to US$18 million. The total budget for 2002 was 
US$34 million with an available government budget of less than US$10 million. A small 
funding gap remained in 2003 when the total budget was US$32 million. Around US$20 
million was covered by the government and US$10 million came from grants.  The available 
funding in 2004 was doubled and the budget of around US38 million was fully funded, around 
US$22 million from the government, US$3 million in grants, and US$13 million from 
GFATM. The 2005 NTP budget was estimated at US$43 million (WHO, 2005). The budget is 
mainly used for first-line drugs, dedicated NTP staff, buildings/equipment, initiatives to 
increase case detection and cure rates, second-line drugs, TB/HIV, and others.  
 
Around 34 per cent of the 2005 NTP budget is funded by GFATM. The additional funds 
from GFATM allow for increases in the anti-TB drug budget, as well as more spending on 
initiatives to improve detection and cure rates (WHO, 2005). The first GFATM grant 
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agreement was signed for 2 years. Activities commenced in 8 provinces in the 2nd quarter of 
2003. Meanwhile, between 2000 and 2004, USAID funds for TB programming in Indonesia 
averaged US$1.7 million per year (USAID, 2004). Figure 2 below shows total TB control 
costs, budgets, available funding and expenditures. 
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Figure 5. Total TB Control Costs, Budgets, Available Funding and Expenditures 
(2002-2005) 
 
Table 7. Estimated HIV/AIDS International Funding for 2003-2005 (in US$) 
Agency 2003 2004 2005 
Total government 6,315,000 8,766,990 13,000,000 
DFID - - 18,000,000 
USAID 9,600,000 8,800,000 9,000,000 
AusAID 4,760,000 4,760,000 4,760,000 
GFATM 1,000,000 1,000,000 12,000,000 
DKT/KFW 1,000,000 3,000,000 3,500,000 
UNICEF 800,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 
UNFPA 665,555 638,032 654,250 
UNDP 146,518 746,518 555,000 
WHO - 400,125 233,375 
ILO - 200,000 150,000 
UNESCO - 12,000 4,000 
UNV - 216,000 309,000 
World Bank - 50,000 75,000 
UNHCR - 65,000 - 
UNAIDS 329,000 588,000 685,000 
MSF Belgium - 150,000 150,000 
Cordaid 239,835 206,657 75,000 
Church World Service  - - 100,000 
Save the Children US 35,000 35,000 35,000 
Save the Children UK - - 100,000 
Total 24,890,908 30,634,332 64,885,625 
Source: NAC, 2006 and NAC, 2005 
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For the HIV/AIDS, the government allocated US$13 million to respond to the epidemic of 
the disease in 2005. Around US$11.4 million was from the central government and US$1.6 
million from local government. This 2005 budget was a 40% increase over the amount 
disbursed in 2004, which was around US$9.3 million (NAC, 2006). 38  The 2005 local 
government budget was an increase of 100% from the 2004 budget of US$0.8 million. This 
indicates a high commitment of local government to respond to the HIV/AIDS problems. 
Table 3 below shows the government budget for 2003 and 2004. 
 
More than all of these, the budget for the National AIDS Commission in 2003 was around 
Rp700 million and Rp800 million in 2004. The highest proportion of 2004 government budget 
funds was used for program development and coordination (44.6%) and prevention programs 
(41.7%). Other proportions of the 2004 budget were used for treatment and care (12.5%), 
incentives of human resources (0.1%) and vulnerability reduction (women), around 0.3% 
(NAC, 2006). Recently the government has promoted ‘Gerakan Nasional Stop AIDS’ to prevent 
a national HIV/AIDS disaster in Indonesia with an annual budget around Rp200 billion (look 
at annexes). 
 
In addition to the budget provided by the government, donors also provide funds for the 
HIV/AIDS program, delivered through their own programs or with the government and 
NGOs. Table 4 below shows the budget of all donors involved in HIV/AIDS programs. 
Current funding from programmable sources available for the HIV/AIDS response over the 
period of the Framework (2005-2007) is about US$45 million per year.  Household and 
private sector expenditure is estimated to add about 50% more, giving a total estimate of 
US$65-70 million per year for HIV/AIDS services. The funding gap for the National 
HIV/AIDS Action Framework is estimated to range from US$50 million in 2005 to US$150 
million in 2007. Table 5 is the estimated budget/funding required for the National 
HIV/AIDS Action Framework 2005-2007 (NAC, 2005). 
 
Table 8. Estimated funding for the National HIV/AIDS Action Framework,  2005-2007 
(US$) 
 2005 2006 2007 
Total need 120,000,000  150,000,000  210,000,000  
Total Government and Donor Resources  44,000,000   47,000,000   45,000,000  
Estimated Household and Private expenditure (50%)  22,000,000   24,000,000   23,000,000  
Estimated funding gap  54,000,000   79,000,000  142,000,000  
 Source: NAC, 2005 
 
 
5.5 Institutional Structure and Incentive Effects 
 
Even though all of these programs are focused on the same sector, namely health, the 
government uses different institutional structures to deliver the programs. The polio vaccine is 
given at ‘Pos PINs’ located in Posyandu, Puskesmas, Puskesmas Pembantu, hospitals and other 
health providers, including private services. Other strategic public facilities are also used for 
‘Pos PIN’, for example airports, seaports, bus terminal, train station, market, kindergarten, 
playgrounds, orphan services, and others to capture a wider target and those who are traveling. 
                                                 
38This information is based on Baseline Survey of National Response to HIV/AIDS 2003-2004 (IHPCP-
NAC/Indonesia HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project - National AIDS Commission). 
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Every Pos PIN services around 60-100 infants (2002) and 100-150 infants (2005/2006) under 
5 depending on the population. 
 
The PIN operational staff are medical and non-medical staff  (cadre, teacher, squad, youth 
group, youth red cross, and others). Every Pos PIN requires around 3-4 staff including 1 staff 
member responsible for immunization, 1 note-taker, and 1 line-manager.  
 
The PIN institutional structure starts from the center and goes down to village level.   The 
PIN program at the national level is headed by the Director General of Communicable 
Disease Eradication (Pemberantasan Penyakit Menular) and Community Sanitation (Penyehatan 
Lingkungan), Ministry of Health. The operational responsibility is held by the Head of 
Immunization, under the same institution. Similarly, Bupati/Walikota and the Health Agency 
Head are the persons responsible for the implementation of PIN at the district level. The head 
of the sub-district (kecamatan) working with the head of Puskesmas coordinates the 
implementation of PIN in villages under the sub-districts. The village head, village midwives 
(and midwives) and Puskesmas staff play the most important roles in the implementation of 
PIN and are fully responsible for its success.  
 
Unlike PIN, the National Tuberculosis Program (NTP) uses all health facilities within the 
national health care structure. Health centers have been clustered into a Health Center Group 
(Kelompok Pusat P/KPP) consisting of 1 Microscopic Health Center and 3-4 Satellite Health 
Centers.  The group covers 50,000 to 150,000 people. The district level health services can be 
regarded as the “basic unit” for TB control in Indonesia. The organization of the NTP at the 
district level is shown in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
DHO =  District Health Officer: supervision-recording-reporting 
PRM = Puskesmas Rujukan Mikroskopis (Microscopic Reference Puskesmas): diagnosis-treatment-referral 
PS =  Puskesmas Satellite (Satellite Puskesmas): smear preparation-treatment 
PPM = Puskesmas Pelaksana Mandiri (Independent Implementing Puskesmas): diagnosis-treatment 
 
Figure 6. Organization of National Tuberculosis Program (NTP) 
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The role of NTP Staff is as follows: 
Facility Staff Role 
Doctor To conduct diagnosis and Treatment. 
Staff 
To maintain the registration. 
To fill out patient treatment card. 
To inform WASOR. 
District Hospital 
Laboratory technician To conduct sputum smear test. 
District Health 
Services 
District TB Coordinator 
(WASOR) 
To supervise HC’s and hospitals. 
To maintain district TB register. 
To report and update TB status and condition. 
Doctor To conduct diagnosis and treatment. 
Staff 
To maintain patient register. 
To fill out patient treatment card. 
To inform WASOR. 
Health Center 
Laboratory technician To conduct sputum smear test. 
Community Family members 
To ensure and monitor the drug intake by patient 
under supervision. 
To monitor the side effects.  
To record the patient’s condition. 
 
According to the structure, TB control is decentralized to the district level in accordance with 
the policy of the Minister of Health. It is implemented in health center units, government and 
private hospitals, lung clinics, and is fully integrated with community participation. 
Unfortunately, it has had a negative effect on human resource capacity and development. The 
links between TB laboratories and the NTP remains weak. Based on the analysis result 
conducted by a graduate student on the implementation of TB Treatment with DOTS in 10 
Puskesmas in Medan (Sawaluddin, 2004), the impact of decentralization was considered ‘good’ 
by 6 Puskesmas and ‘poor’ by the remainder. The indicators to measure the performance of the 
Puskesmas are human resources, equipment, infrastructure, combination of medicines 
adherence to the prescribed medication and support of a supervisor in taking the medication. 
Based on multivariate test, the most significant variable in the success of TB treatment is 
equipment. 
 
The tasks of Komnas, which is responsible to the Minister of Health is to provide input to the 
Ministry of Health in formulating TB control policy in Indonesia and provide input in 
developing method and technology of TB control. Meanwhile, Komli’s function is to provide 
input to the DG of CDC and EH in deciding policy and strategy and developing program 
implementation of the TB control program.   
 
In 2001, Gerdunas TB also established a forum called ‘TB Partnership Forum Indonesia’, 
which tries to gather those local NGOs, international NGOs, donor agencies and individuals 
who are working in the TB field. Currently around 48 institutions and individuals have 
become members of the forum.    
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The institutional structure of the Gerdunas TB program at the national level is as follows: 
 
National Committee 
(Komite Nasional/Komnas) 
 
Ministry of Health 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
Technical Advisory 
(Komite Ahli/Komli) 
 DG of CDC and EH/ 
Director of Gerdunas TB  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
TB Partnership Forum 
 Director DTDC/Deputy 
Director of Gerdunas TB  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
MO-WHO, STC, Domestic 
 NTP Manager/Executive 
Secretary of Gerdunas TB  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Technical 
Officer  I  
Technical 
Officer  I  
Supporting 
Officer  
Supporting 
Officer 
 
Different institutional structure is also built for the national HIV/AIDS program. At national 
level, the National AIDS Commission (NAC/KPA/Komisi Penanggulangan AIDS), as a multi-
sectoral coordinating authority, has been established by virtue of Presidential Decree 
No.36/1994 and is chaired by the Coordinating Minister of People’s Welfare. The principal 
functions and tasks of the commission are: 
1. To formulate a national HIV/AIDS policy and strategy;  
2. Policy advocacy to the executive and legislative branches of government to gain support 
for the HIV/AIDS program; 
3. To coordinate the HIV/AIDS prevention efforts nationally; 
4. To draft and/or make a study of the regulations, guidelines, and other legal aspects needed;  
5. To develop an information center on HIV/AIDS prevention program; 
6. To collaborate with the UN system, donor agencies and other international agencies; 
7. To raise funds from various sources; 
8. To provide technical guidance to related agencies at the central level and regional AIDS 
commissions; and 
9. To monitor and evaluate the implementation of the National HIV/AIDS Strategy. 
 
Starting in 2002 and in line with the decentralization process, Regional AIDS Commissions 
(KPAD/Komisi Penanggulangan AIDS Daerah) were also established in all provinces and many 
districts, especially in areas with a high incidence of HIV/AIDS. While at the provincial level 
the KPADS are led by the governor, at the district level they are led by the Bupati/Walikota. 
The main tasks and functions of KPADs are: 
1. To lead, manage and coordinate the HIV/AIDS prevention efforts in the regions; 
2. To identify locations/areas where there is potential for HIV/AIDS to spread; 
3. To collect, mobilize and/or exploit the resources from central, local, community, and 
international organizations; 
4. To develop an information center on HIV/AIDS prevention program; 
5. To encourage the establishment of local AIDS NGOs; 
6. To provide technical guidance on HIV/AIDS prevention to related agencies and NGOs 
at the regions; and 
7. To monitor and evaluate the implementation of the National HIV/AIDS prevention program. 
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Other institutions who also play important roles in the HIV/AIDS efforts are (1) NGOs that 
play a key role by reaching people or groups; (2) private sector/business community in 
accelerating and expanding the coverage in the work environment and providing funds, 
facilities, specialists; (3) professionals for their input into policy formulation, research and 
evaluation; (4) the general community by supporting the HIV/AIDS efforts; (5) PLWHA for 
doing outreach through peer education, mentoring others, or becoming role models, and to 
prevent the transmission of HIV to their partners or other people; and (6) international 
cooperation. 
 
Since 1989, a number of NGOs concerned with AIDS have been established in recognition of 
the growing awareness within the community of the part they could play in HIV/AIDS 
prevention. AIDS NGOs are now established in every province in Indonesia. Working groups 
on AIDS prevention have also been formed by both the National AIDS Commission and a 
number of Ministries and related sectors (please see Table 3 above which shows the related 
Ministries). Based on the budget allocation (85% in 2004), it seems that the Ministry of Health 
plays the biggest role in controlling the HIV/AIDS in Indonesia. The main technical focus of 
the Ministry of Health is care, support and treatment. Other ministries focus more on 
prevention. 
 
Besides those related sector Ministries, the National HIV/AIDS strategy also nominates 
several Ministries which can play important roles, those being the State Ministry of 
Information and Communication, Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry 
of Finance, Ministry of Industry and Trade, and Ministry of Agriculture. The National Strategy 
explains the roles and responsibilities of each Ministry in controlling HIV/AIDS.  
 
All of the HIV/AIDS management efforts being made that have been mentioned above have 
resulted in the National Composite Policy Index increasing from 65% in 2003 to 75% in 
2005.39 
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Annex 1: HIV/AIDS Cases in Indonesia (Until June 2004) 
Province HIV AIDS Total AIDS IDU Deaths 
 NAD   1   -     1   -     -    
 North Sumatra   35   51   86   17   18  
 West Sumatra   9   2   11   1   1  
 Riau   204   87   291   2   41  
 Jambi   17   5   22   1   3  
 South Sumatra   74   21   95   9   11  
 Bangka Belitung   -     3   3   1   1  
 Bengkulu   10   3   13   2   1  
 Lampung   19   3   22   3   1  
 DKI Jakarta   861   358   1,219   167   102  
 West Java   131   117   248   60   30  
 Banten   12   4   16   2   1  
 Central Java   76   25   101   4   15  
 Yogyakarta   30   18   48   7   7  
 East Java   282   213   495   79   66  
 West Kalimantan   75   43   118   14   12  
 Central Kalimantan   27   -     27   -     -    
 South Kalimantan   4   3   7   2   2  
 East Kalimantan   35   4   39   3   3  
 Bali   263   89   352   32   25  
 West Nusa Tenggara   6   7   13   5   2  
 East Nusa Tenggara   8   20   28   3   4  
 North Sulawesi   1   26   27   1   11  
 Central Sulawesi   3   2   5   1   1  
 South Sulawesi   32   2   34   -     1  
 Southeast Sulawesi     -      
 Maluku   16   15   31   5   11  
 Papua   632   404   1,036   2   149  
 Not mentioned   1   -     1   -     -    
 Total  2,864   1,525   4,389   423   519  
Source: National Aids Commission. National HIV/AIDS Strategy, 2003-2007. Office of Coordinating Minister of 
People’s Welfare. 2003 
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Annex 2.  Target Coverage of PIN 2005 as of 17 Oktober 2005 at 12:00 
Under Five Received Polio Immunization 
Target 
1st Round 2nd Round Province 
1st Round 2nd Round ABS % ABS % 
NAD  548,699   536,699   475,835   86.7   495,623   92.3  
North Sumatra  1,478,620   1,478,620   1,386,679   93.8   1,464,773   99.1  
West Sumatra  480,390   480,390   477,438   99.4   492,016  102.4 
Riau  599,992   617,800   617,800   103.0   635,920  102.9  
Kepri  160,744   149,164   149,045   92.7   149,233  100.0  
Jambi  328,453   320,857   298,967   91.0   305,228   95.1  
South Sumatra  845,501   846,331   846,331   100.1   861,052  101.7  
Bangka Belitung  124,952   111,789   110,716   88.6   118,827  106.3  
Bengkulu  170,220   170,220   166,717   97.9   167,319   98.3  
Lampung  856,386   825,594   781,660   91.3   815,429   98.8  
DKI Jakarta  757,197   922,963   852,669   112.6   880,084   95.4  
West Java  4,337,474   4,494,725   4,100,337   94.5   4,261,746   94.8  
Banten  1,176,113   1,176,113   1,023,290   87.0   1,078,597   91.7  
Central Java  3,103,478   3,103,478   2,816,731   90.8   2,864,189   92.3  
Yogjakarta  229,543   228,240   227,207   99.0   234,916  102.9  
East Java  3,164,679   3,059,019   3,059,019   96.7   3,153,700  103.1  
West Kalimantan  513,422   489,250   455,733   88.8   475,644   97.2  
Central Kalimantan  232,213   232,213   214,586   92.4   229,798   99.0  
South Kalimantan  357,404   352,182   332,612   93.1   343,355   97.5  
East Kalimantan  313,552   313,552   313,404   100.0   316,043  100.8  
Bali  297,604   305,607   305,607   102.7   321,456  105.2  
West Nusa Tenggara  428,833   470,609   470,609   109.7   495,149  105.2  
East Nusa Tenggara  502,545   522,117   522,117   93.6   534,918  102.5  
North Sulawesi  198,338   221,331   221,754   111.8   223,852  101.1  
Gorontalo  110,650   110,650   102,133   92.3   105,051   94.9  
Central Sulawesi  274,107   278,925   278,925   101.8   287,980  103.2  
South Sulawesi  805,769   805,769   751,128   93.2   792,000   98.3  
West Sulawesi  112,363   112,363   109,144   97.1   115,126  102.5  
Southeast Sulawesi  264,662   241,470   237,680   89.8   249,649  103.4  
Maluku  181,122   171,256   170,445   94.1   153,476   89.6  
North Maluku  97,406   97,406   102,874   105.6   85,970   88.3  
Papua  286,151   286,151   197,168   68.9   214,045   74.8  
West Papua  87,574   87,574   85,212  97.3  74,818   85.4  
Total  23,426,156  23,620,427  22,261,572   95.0  22,996,982   97.4  
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Annex 3. Indonesian Government HIV/AIDS Budget 2003-2004 (US$) 
Agency 2003 2004 2006 
Ministry of Health  4,951,538 7,479,062 12,543,092 
Ministry of National Education 827,777 800,000 116,206 
Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare 110,979 109,065  
Ministry of Religious Affairs 111,045 99,423  
National Narcotics Board 100,000 90,000  
Ministry of Social Affairs 49,399 71,600 188,490 
National Family Planning Board 47,019 47,604 23,033 
Ministry of Defense 75,182 13,121 162,645 
Armed Forces   48,478 
Ministry of Home Affairs 21,380 13,418 25,992 
Ministry of Law and Human Right   9,626 
Ministry of Women’s Empowerment 8,333 21,800 19,651 
Ministry of Transport 8,333 9,402 24,457 
Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration 4,444 12,495 17,793 
Total 6,315,429 8,766,990 13,179,462 
Source: NAC, 2006 
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VI. PKPS-BBM FOR RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
CLEAN WATER 
 
 
As a complement to the Government of Indonesia (GoI) policy to reduce subsidy of oil-based 
fuel (bahan bakar minyak – BBM), GoI has created several programs to compensate this subsidy 
removal, called PKPS-BBM (Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak). These 
programs were primarily aiming at reducing the burdens of the community, particularly the poor, 
by providing basic services and employment opportunities. Infrastructure development program is 
one of these PKPS-BBM programs. The first infrastructure type program under PKPS BBM was 
implemented in the end of 2000. This was followed by the provision of clean water that last from 
2001 to 2004. Later, in 2005 the government modified the programs to PKPS-BBM Infrastruktur 
Perdesaan (Rural Infrastructure). Focusing on the PKPS BBM rural infrastructure and clean water 
this paper would like to analyse the performance of the program as well as its impact on the 
infrastructure development.  
 
 
6.1 Program Evolution in Brief  
 
The first infrastructure type program was a community empowerment programs generating 
employment opportunities by supporting the development of infrastructure projects or was 
known as PPM Prasarana. The three programs under the 2000 fuel subsidy removal programs41 
were implemented over a 3-month period, between October and December, including 
planning, execution and evaluation. However, due to some delay in the execution process, the 
implementation of the PPM Prasarana program was extended until March 2001. 
 
PPM-Prasarana, aimed to generate employment opportunities through a community empowerment 
program and the development of general infrastructure in rural and urban areas. The program 
targeted rural communities with low levels of income and gave priority to communities outside Jawa, 
especially the eastern Indonesian provinces. The recipients of the funding were various community 
groups, including those with existing project proposals for local infrastructure development which 
had previously been discussed at village meetings, those who had been assisted by existing 
community empowerment programs (for example the Kecamatan Development Program), other 
working groups who had not yet been targeted by poverty alleviation programs, and those regions 
classified as “special territories”.  The allocation of funding per kecamatan could be used for projects 
with unrestricted or ‘open menus’, within a framework of maintaining, rehabilitating, and developing 
local infrastructure development. The wages paid to the workers involved in the program were set at 
a level that did not exceed the official minimum wage in each locality. The PPM-Prasarana program 
was managed by Department of Settlements and Regional Infrastructure. 
 
The PPM-Prasarana was only implemented once and the government decided to focus the 
infrastructure type programs to the provision of clean water. According to BPS data, there 
were 2,808 kelurahan and 5,910 desa that did not have adequate clean and save water. The 
primary objective of this program was to reduce the burden of the poor who live in areas 
where clean and save water is scarce by assisting the development of adequate, usable and 
healthy water provision. This program was managed by Ministry of Public Works, 42 
complemented with central coordination team and teams at regional level.  
                                                 
41There were three programs implemented: cash transfer, revolving funds, and the PPM-Prasarana. 
42 Previously was the Department of Settlements and Regional Infrastructure which also managed the PPM 
Prasarana program in year 2000 
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In 2005, the government of Indonesia modified the programs that are included in the PKPS-
BBM, and the clean water program is expanded to include other rural infrastructure called 
PKPS-BBM Infrastruktur Perdesaan (Rural Infrastructure) or was also known as PKPS BBM IP. 
The primary objective of the PKPS BBM IP is to reduce the burden of living costs of the 
poor community in rural areas, specifically in the fulfillment of needs for transportation, 
drinking water, and irrigation through community empowerment approaches which are 
expected to increase the growth and development of economics, social, and cultural activities 
in the rural areas. The implementation of rural infrastructure development in 
isolated/backward rural areas covers the following:  
• Infrastructure and facilities that support accessibility and reduce isolation, such as: village 
roads, village bridges, and boat mooring, boat and titian; 
• Infrastructure that supports activities in increase of food production, namely rural 
irrigation, such as artesian well, irrigation canals, and dams. 
• Other infrastructures that fulfill basic needs of the community, namely rural clean water. 
 
This program is also managed by the Ministry of Public Works and the central coordination 
team consisted of Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Works, Bappenas, Ministry of Home 
Affairs, and State Ministry for the Acceleration of Development in Left-Behind Regions.   
 
 
6.2 Targeting Performance 
 
The estimated target for the 2000 PKPS BBM rural infrastructure program of  PPM-Prasarana 
was 14,685,000 working days across 5,097 villages, 250 kecamatan (sub district), 55 kabupaten 
(district), and 14 provinces. The program was meant to help accelerate infrastructure 
development in some least developed regions, especially those outside Java. The official 
guidance states that there are two main criteria as to which sub-district the budget would be 
disbursed. Other than the proportion of the poor in the sub-district, the condition of local 
infrastructure or the remoteness of the area became the main indicator as how eligible a 
certain sub-district was. Nevertheless, due to the time constraint, it appeared that some sub-
districts were chosen not because they really needed infrastructure development, i.e. in remote 
areas or physical isolation, but often because the national coordinating team saw them 
institutionally ready to implement the program. In many cases, the national coordinating team 
simply chose those regions that had been included in the PPK program.  
 
The allocation of funding per sub-district ranged from Rp750 million to Rp1.1 billion. (Look 
as Table 1 below for rough picture of how the budget was disbursed in every villages/sub-
districts). This difference, however, does not necessarily indicate that a bigger amount a village 
received more or bigger projects that the village developed. Presumably, the allocation of 
funding was dependent upon not only the number and the size of projects being proposed, 
but also on the proportion of the poor people living in the area. But in practice, SMERU 
study in two districts in Kalimantan in 2001 revealed that the final decision on the amount of 
money disbursed and which districts given the programs appeared to be the authority of the 
central government. In two districts in Central and South Kalimantan, 10 of 24 kecamatan in 
Kabupaten Kapuas and 5 from 16 kecamatan in Barito Kuala received the programs. Most of 
management team member at both districts was not sure about the criteria used by the Tim 
Pusat (National team) to select the kecamatan and budget allocation per kecamatan. They 
assumed that the criteria used to select the kecamatan and to allocate the budget was the 
proportion of poor people in the areas. In fact Kabupaten Kapuas had actually been selected 
because it categorized as a “special region” due to the problems resulting from the 
Development of Peat Soil Lands (PLG) project, which is still unresolved. However, although 
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it was widely perceived that this program was planned to curb social unrest, the PPM-
Prasarana program was not intended as a substitute for the PLG compensation being 
demanded by the local community.  Meanwhile, the 5 kecamatan in Kabupaten barito Kuala 
also received Kecamatan Development Program (out of 8 kecamatan which received KDP).  
 
Table 1. The Allocation of Funding in Three Kecamatan in Kabupaten Kapuas 
Kec. Kapuan Murung*) Kec. Selat*) Kec. Barambai**) 
Village Budget (Rp) Village Budget (Rp) Village Budget (Rp) 
Palangkau Baru 140.500.000 Pulau Kupang 168.500.000 Karya Baru 105.366.268 
Palangkau 
Lama 140.500.000 
Murung 
Keramat 198.500.000 Karya Tani 149.748.866 
Talekung Punei 140.500.000 Sei Lunuk 168.500.000 Kolam Kiri 120.180.415 
Belawang 140.500.000 Terusan Raya 214.500.000 Kolam Kanan 45.791.207 
Dadahup 162.000.000 Pendalaman 118.787.589 
Tambak Bajai 125.000.000 Pendalaman Baru 143.923.695 
Palingkau Baru 110.000.000 Handil Barabai 118.181.717 
Palingkau Lama 141.000.000 Sungai Kali 121.244.499 
Bagagap 106.940.326 
  
 
Barambai 69.205.500 
Total 1.100.000.000  750.000.000  1.099.370.082 
Sources:  *) Report of budget realization of PPM Prasarana Kabupaten Kapuas 
 **) Report of UPK Kecamatan Barambai 
Note: This amount does not include ‘dana gotong royong Rp 5 juta’ collected in every village. 
 
Unfortunately, a more comprehensive study of the implementation of the program is not 
available yet. National survey conducted to evaluate the distribution of Social Safety Nets as the 
model of such a program had been taken one year earlier, so that there is no information 
available on the targeting of the 2000 PKBS BBM rural infrastructure program. Yet as the 
program was modeled after the Social Safety Nets program, especially those of the employment 
creation program (program padat karya) conducted in the previous year, the evaluation of the later 
program may provide some insights as how successful the targeting performance of the 2000 
PKPS BBM rural infrastructure program was. Later in the sub-section of the 2005 PKPS BBM 
rural infrastructure program, it is evident that in terms of targeting performance, the trend 
shown in the Social Safety Nets program has not undergone any significant changes. 
 
Based on the 100 Village Survey (Survei Seratus Desa, SSD) conducted by Indonesian Central 
Agency of Statistics (Biro Pusat Statistics, BPS) in 1998, Suryahadi et. al., found that in terms of 
targeting, i.e. what fraction of the program went to the poor, most of the districts surveyed had 
the value of the targeting ratio quite close to one. With the targeting ratio defined as the 
proportion of the participants in the program who are non-poor divided by the overall non-
poor population, the targeting ratio 1 indicates that the program has no targeting. It might be 
distributed randomly across income groups. As could be seen more clearly in the coverage rate, 
i.e. how many of the poor participated in the program, the highest coverage was found in 
Kupang where 49 percent of the poor were involved in some padat karya programs. In most of 
the districts, the coverage rate ranged from 6 percent to less than 30 percent. Meanwhile, out of 
ten sampled districts, 3 districts reported no significant participation of the poor with less than 1 
percent of the poor having participated in the program (Suryahadi, et, al., 1999: 12-4). 
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As for the PPM-Prasarana in particular, though the exact data on the targeting ratio of the 
program is not available, SMERU qualitative study in 2002 in two districts in Central 
Kalimantan revealed quite similar story, and to some degree explained some problems faced 
by program implementers in reaching the poor. Despite the official guidance given by the 
Ministry of Public Works (PU) in identifying the target area or executing the program, it was 
evident that local variations could influence the implementation of the program. Even though 
the official guidance states that one of the main goals of PPM Prasarana was to create 
employment opportunities for poor or low-income households, SMERU study in two villages 
in district Kapuas found that not all of those working for the projects under the program 
came from poor families. Many of them were from middle or even high-income households 
(Rahayu, et, al., 2001: 81). The problem here was that due to the scarcity of people around the 
project site, or difficulty in accessing it, the village coordinator had to involve all the people in 
the area, regardless their economic condition, to complete the works. This could be clearly 
seen, for instance, in village Terusan Raya in which people are scattered in many different 
parts of the village. Another case indicated that the opportunity to work was evenly distributed 
among the villagers. In one village in Kabupaten Kapuas, SMERU team found each 
neighborhood association (RT) received a quota for workers that resulted in most of workers 
only being able to work no more than 3 out of 15 working days. Meanwhile, in other villages, 
including those officially classified as “disadvantaged” (IDT) areas, community groups were 
formed and they used a contract system to carry out the projects.  
 
Apart from this, the GoI decided to replace the PPM Prasarana with the Clean Water Program 
since 2001. The program was planned to be completed in 4 years period with the estimated 
target 3,258 villages across the country. According to BPS data, there were approximately 8000 
villages that did not have clean water facilities in 2001. Partly because of this, the provision of 
clean water was prioritized by the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.43 For the first year, 
the program targeted 859 kalurahan in 249 kabupaten/kota in 30 provinces and would serve 
approximately one million people (Dept. Kimpraswil, 2001). The number of villages targeted 
for the program increased in the next years as the funding allocated also developed bigger. In 
2004, which was also the final year of the program, 1250 villages in 347 kabupaten/kota were 
targeted to receive the benefits of the program. 
 
Village status, i.e. poor or very poor, and the condition of clean water facilities as well as the clean 
water project already received became the criteria on which a village was chosen as beneficiary of 
the program. Other than that, the program also considered the number of poor people that would 
receive the benefits of the program. The 2003 clean water program, for instance, targeted 
1,250,000 poor people. The number decreased slightly in 2004 when the program targeted 
1,000,000 people. Yet a study by Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare in cooperation with 35 
universities revealed that the coverage rate of the program was only 72,60 percent (in Purna, 2005). 
 
In 2005, the GoI proposed another program focusing primarily on the development of rural 
infrastructure (Infrastruktur Perdesaan). The estimated target of the program was 12,834 poor 
villages in 427 districts in 33 provinces that still had bad infrastructure facilities. Based on the 
‘indeks ketertinggalan desa’ set up by the BPS, those scoring below the average would be 
chosen as the beneficiaries of the program. Presumably, most of these villages would be 
chosen from eastern part of Indonesia, as many part of this region was still isolated and really 
needed infrastructure development. They would receive Rp 250 million per villages for 
funding the proposed projects, including for hiring the workers. As stated in the official 
guideline, the project aimed not only to improve the quality of rural infrastructure, but also to 
streghthen people’s purchasing power, especially those of poor people.  
                                                 
43http://www.pu.go.id/index.asp?link=Humas/news2003/PPW2906041.htm (8 February 2008) 
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As such, there are two criteria that can be used to assess the accuracy of the targeting, namely 
the condition of the village beneficiaries and the number of poor living in the village. 
According to survey conducted by the LP3ES Jakarta in 2006, 71.1 percent of targeted villages 
were correctly matched with the index of ‘ketertinggalan desa’, while the rest was 
unfortunately not. The study reveals that out of 930 villages in 21 districts surveyed, 250 
villages or 29.9 percent scored over the average. Similar assessment, and even worse, was also 
given by the monitoring team from the Ministry of Finance. According to the evaluation of 
this team, which monitored the implementation of the program in 7 different districts, the 
2005 PKPS BBM rural infrastructure had bad targeting performance. The village beneficiaries 
of the program often showed no characteristic ‘least developed’ villages, such as in poor 
condition, located in remote areas, or had bad local infrastructure as specified in the official 
guideline of the program.  
 
Table 2. Estimated Target Villages for the 2005 PKPS BBM Rural Infrastructure 
Area and Targeted Village Number of Village in Remote Areas 
Number of Village in 
Non-remote Areas Targeted Village 
Western part 2,925 2,907 5,832 
Eastern part 5,821 1,181 7,002 
Total 
8,746 
(68.2%) 
4,088 
(31.8%) 
       12,834 
(100.0%) 
 
Why could be mistargeted? According to LP3ES study, some evidence indicates that it 
resulted from elit’s intervention in deciding which villages might receive the grants. Even 
though the district is allowed to nominate villages matched with the criteria of the program, in 
practice it was the central administration at national level that finally decided to which villages 
the grants would be allocated. It happened that villages chosen by the central government 
were not those nominated by the district officials. Some times these villages chosen by the 
central administration were under the category of ‘least developed villages’ –district 
government nominated wrong villages?--, but could be also the case that these villages were 
categorized as the least developed ones. In every district surveyed, the LP3ES team found 
various mistargeting practices, which, put in percentage point, ranges from 10 percent until 
nearly 50 percent at worts. The choosing of village recipients was best undertaken in district 
TTU, East Nusa Tenggara in which only 10.3 percent receiving villages were not categorized 
least developed ones. In contrast, the worst performance was shown by district East Lampung 
as 48.1 percent recipient villages were mistargeted. 
 
Other than misselecting recipient villages, LP3ES study also indicates another weakness in 
targeting workers to be involved in the construction projects. According to the main goal of 
the project, which was to create employment opportunities for poor people, the chances 
generated by the program should be prioritized for those people. However, LP3ES survey 
indicates that poverty was not always used as the main criteria in recruiting the potential 
workers. Out of 100 villages surveyed, it was only 10 villages that used poor people as the 
main criteria in choosing those to be employed in the project. Similarly neglected was 
‘unemployment’ category as only 7 percent local implementers prioritized those without jobs 
to work in the project. Instead of poor or unemployed people, fellow villagers or those living 
surrounding the site became the main criteria in recruiting the potential workers. According to 
local administrators, this resulted from the fact that they had difficulty refuting the interest or 
request of fellow villagers to work in the project that would be or was being undertaken.  
 
The SMERU Research Institute 98 
6.2 Impact and Outcome 
 
The direct impact of the program of the 2000 PKPS BBM PPM Prasarana for the community 
member is wages received during the construction of the infrastructures, even though there 
were variation on the wage system and the level of wages in different locations. The system 
applied was either daily hire or contract arrangements with no difference in wages for men and 
women. Despite the stipulations in the project guidelines, the wages paid were higher than the 
official minimum wage for the region and the wage rates that were usually being paid in any 
particular village. For example, the wage paid for road maintenance work on a PPM-Prasarana 
project in one village was (in 2000) Rp19,400 per day (from 7am to 12pm), while skilled 
construction workers in the same village only received Rp 35,000 for a full working day of 
eight hours, and for contract work the rate was Rp 60,000 per square meter of completed 
construction. In another village, the rate for contract workers on a PPM-Prasarana was Rp 
40,000 a day, while the local daily wage rate was Rp 20,000.  
 
According to the Department of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure report, nearly half of 
development projects undertaken by societies was road construction or rehabilitation 
(45.57%). The rest of the grants were spent on irrigation system (24.85%0, clean water 
facilities (13.62%) and public toiletes (MCK) (10.60%). Besides these four main projects, 
however, other infrastruture projects were also found, particulalry in South and Southeast 
Sulawesi (to exclude Maluku and Papua due to data availability). 
 
Nevertheless, as to what extent the implementation of this program has met its objective of 
alleviating poverty is still questionable. Many found that not all poor people could participate 
in the work. In contrast, many non-poor people were involved. Perhaps, the fact that the lump 
sum offered by the project was quite high became one of the factors that attracted not only 
the poor but also non-poor people to also participate in the project (Maxwell and Perdana). In 
addition, SMERU study in two districts in Kalimantan in 2005 also revealed that not all the 
projects carried out by the program were basic infrastructure needed to break the remoteness 
of the village or to improve local production. Other than village roads and bridges, some 
communities used the money to rehabilitate religious buildings such as mosques or churches.   
 
For the clean water program, it is reported that by 2003, the program had built clean water 
facilities that served around 2.75 million people in 1509 villages. The number of villages 
supported by the program increased significantly in the following year, the fourth year, which 
is also the final year of the implementation of the program. The government claimed that it 
had build clean water facilities in 3500 villages across the country in 2004.44 Unfortunately, 
detailed information or evaluation of the program is not available yet so that it is very difficult 
to measure the impact of the program precisely. So far, assessment or evaluation of the 
program could only be read in fragmented reports from different regions. Some evidence 
indicate that even though the program was aimed at helping urban poor, in certain urban 
areas, not all poor people in the area could have access to the facilities built. In practice, village 
people could not insist that they were provided particularly for poor people. Many non-poor 
people also used the facilities. Yet as how far such practices happened cross-regionally, or 
affect the perfoemance of the program in general, or conversely how significant the program 
helped or even reduced the number of poor people, more comprehensive study is still needed.  
 
 
 
                                                 
44http://www.pu.go.id/index.asp?link=Humas/news2003/PPW2906041.htm (8 February 2008) 
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From the central government, Department of ‘Permukiman dan Regional Infrastructure’ as 
the program implementor has only once published a report of the implementation and the 
monitoring of the clean water program, namely that of fiscal year 2003. Even though the 
report clearly explained the budget allocation and the achievement of the program in every 
region, it was generally limited to the budget absoprment and spending. Issues like social 
dimension of the program, especially as how far the project and the facilities built were really 
for the poor, or help them reduce their difficulties and vulnerabilities are of little concern. 
 
Nevertheless, in spite of these weaknesses, still the report provides some valuable information 
of the program. Generally speaking, there were four main components concerned in 
developing clean water facilities. First was public hydrant. This facility was built by using the 
existing PDAM pipe line. It was meant to provide clean water for those living within 3 km 
distance from the nearest PDAM pipe line. For 2003, the project provided 3.233 water tanks 
distributed in all 30 provinces that received the grant. Out of this number, Kalimantan and 
eastern part of Indonesia (Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, Maluku and Papua) built 1581 water 
tanks. While the rest was shared between Java and Sumatra with each developed 773 and 869 
tanks respectively. 
 
Especially for houses under the reach of PDAM services, the 2003 clean water project also 
successfully built 15.622 ‘Saluran Rumah Langsung Murah’. Unlike the development of public 
hydrants, most of ‘Saluran Rumah Langsung Murah’ developed were located in Java and 
Sumatra. While the latter could build not less than 5.136, the former could develop even more 
Saluran Langsung Rumah (6.545). In Kalimantan, the project could build 2.235 ‘Saluran 
Langsung Rumah’, and the rest was shared by Bali, Maluku (including Maluku and North 
Maluku) and Papua with each region built 160, 501 and 200 Saluran Langsung Rumah 
respectively. 
 
Other than public hydrants and saluran langsung rumah, which used the existing PDAM pipe 
line, the 2003 clean water program also developed ‘Sistem Penyediaan Air Bersih Sederhana’ 
(SIPAS). This project was particularly designed for those living far from the reach of PDAM 
pipe line. Through the project, the government developed or rehabilitated water facilities like 
deep well (25 – 100 m), natural spring and other simple clean water facilities in accordance 
with the local condition or agreement. For 2003, there had developed 384 new SIPAS units. 
Out of this total number, Java and Sumatra received the most, 123 and 111 units for each 
island respectively. Some other 41 units were built in Kalimantan. For eastern part of 
Indonesia, Sulawesi was the region to build the most. While the island developed 48 SIPAS 
units, other islands namely Nusa Tenggara, Bali, Maluku and Papua built 20, 7, 17 and 14 units 
respectively.  
 
Finally, included in the clean water program was the provision of ‘truck tanki air’, especially 
for those living in the areas more than 3 km away from the existing PDAM pipe line. 
Interestingly, data for the implementation of this project is quite abundant. For 2001 – 2003, 
through the clean water project the government of Indonesia bought 594 trucks. Out of this 
number, 228 units were bought in 2001, while the rest was bought the next two years, 128 
trucks in 2003 and 228 ones in the next fiscal year. Seen from its distribution, as could be seen 
from the table below, most of the trucks went to urban poor of Sumatra (230 units or 38.7 
percent). Even though the number of trucks provided for central part of Indonesia was 
greater (261 units or 43.9 percent), on the average the urban poor in this region received less 
as the region, consisting of Java and Kalimantan, is considerably larger than Sumatra. For 
2003, Kalimantan alone received 50 trucks out of 103 trucks provided for the central region. 
Meanwhile, for eastern region, which consists of Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, Maluku and 
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Papua, by the end of 2003 there had been bought 103 trucks. Looking at the 2003 data, it 
seems that Sulawesi received the most. Out of 45 trucks provided for the eastern region, 
nearly ¾ went to Sulawesi.  
 
Table 3. Number of Trucks Tangki Provided by the Clean Water Program 
Number of Trucks  
No Region 
2001 2002 2003 Total Percentage 
1 Western (Sumatera) 100 40 90 230 38.7 
2 Middle (Java and Kalimantan) 94 64 103 261 43.9 
3 Eastern (Bali, NTT, NTB, Sulawesi, Maluku, Papua) 34 24 45 103 17.3 
Total 228 128 238 594 100.0 
Sources: Departemen Permukiman dan Prasarana Wilayah dan PT. Indah Karya, 2003, Laporan Monitoring 
Pelaksanaan PKPS-BBM untuk Penyediaan Prasarana Air Bersih (Program SB-AB) TA. 2003. 
 
Seen from the ratios of poor people (in urban areas) and its distribution, it is apparent that the 
government has paid serious attention for the development of outer region (outside Java). 
Except for cheap Saluran Langsung Rumah, the existing data indicates that the majority of 
clean water facilities developed by the program were located outside Java in which the 
proportion of urban poor did not exceed the half number of urban poor in Java. As could be 
seen from the table, out of 12.26 million urban poor, Sumatera accommodated ‘only’ 19 
percent. Considerably lower percentage lived in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and other eastern 
islands (Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Maluku dan Papua) with 3.10, 3.02 and 5.95 percent respectively. 
In contrast, 68.92 percent of urban poor lived in Java. Meanwhile, by the end of 2003, out of 
3.233 public hydrants that had been completed, 2.460 units or 76.1 percent was developed out 
of Java. While Kalimantan and eastern part (Bali, Nusa Tenggara, Sulawesi, Maluku and 
Papua) built 1.581 units, Sumatra could add 869 public hydrants. In total, only 773 units (24 
percent) were built in Java. Similarly, most of SIPAS and truk tanki air were also provided for 
outer islands (out of Java). However, in order to further assess the program implementation, 
especially in terms its regional distribution, we also need to look at the budget allocation per 
region as explained in the next sub-section.  
 
Table 4. Number of Poor People in Urban Areas in 2003 
No Island Number of Population below the Poverty Line (Million) Percentage 
1. Sumatera 2.33 19.00 
2. Java and Bali 8.45 68.92 
3. Kalimantan 0.38 3.10 
4. Sulawesi 0.37 3.02 
5. Pulau Lain 0.73 5.95 
Total 12.26 100.00 
Source: BPS, Statistik Indonesia Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 2005/2006. Jakarta: BPS. 
 
After four years of its implementation, the Clean Water Program was discontinued by the GoI 
and replaced with another project named PKPS BBM Rural Infrastructure since 2005. Unlike 
the previous program that covered urban societies, Rural Infrastructure Support Program was 
concentrated on rural areas with more than Rp 3 trillion was allocated for the program. 
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According to an evaluation study carried out by LP3ES Jakarta in 2006, most of this funding 
was used to develop village roads and clean water facilities. As can be seen from the Table 5 
below, out of 441 projects in 100 villages surveyed in this study, --even though not all of them 
had been completed by time this study was conducted-- 293 projects (66,4 %) were village 
roads construction and 62 projects (14,1 %) were clean water facilities. Other facilities also 
developed by this program included 51 bridges (11,6 %) and 26 dams or irrigation systems (5,9 
%). Finally, 2 percent of the program, or 9 projects were consisted of boat moorings.  
 
Table 5. Types and Number of Infrastructure Projects Developed in the Surveyed 
Regions 
Road Bridge Clean Water Irrigation/ Drainage 
Boat 
Mooring Total Province 
Num % Num % Num % Num % Num % Num % 
Sumut 17 60.7 1 3.6 8 28.6 2 7.1 0 0.0 28 100 
Jateng 26 84.0 3 9.7 0 0.0 2 6.5 0 0.0 31 100 
Kalbar 12 21.1 30 52.6 0 0.0 6 10.5 9 15.8 57 100 
NTT 10 76.9 0 0.0 2 15.4 1 7.7 0 0.0 13 100 
Jatim 149 86.6 9 5.2 6 3.5 8 4.7 0 0.0 172 100 
Sulsel 37 41.6 5 5.6 42 47.2 5 5.6 0 0.0 89 100 
B. Lampung 42 82.4 3 5.9 4 7.8 2 3.9 0 0.0 51 100 
Total 293 66.4 51 11.6 62 14.1 26 5.9 9 2.0 441 100 
Source : Erfan Maryono, et al., 2007, Studi Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan 
Bakar Minyak Bidang Infrastruktur Perdesaan. Jakarta: LP3ES, p. 50 
 
These differences or the choosing of the projects to be carried out in every village reflected 
the need as well as the condition of local infrastructure. In West Kalimantan, bridges 
dominated the implementation of Rural Infrastructure Support Program following the 
domination of river in the region. Out of 57 construction projects carried out in the province, 
there were only 12 road construction projects, or approximately 21.1 percent. In contrats, 
there were 30 briges developed in the province (52.6 percent). The dominant influence of river 
could be seen more clearly if we also take into account the number of boot moorings that 
amounted 9 projects of 15.8 percent. Different pictures were shown by North Sumatra or 
South Sulawesi. In the last province, nearly half of the infrastructural projects undertaken 
(47.2 percent) were devoted to the development of clean water facilities. This was due to the 
fact that local people, like those in Palopo village for instance, badly needed clean water. 
Similar problem was also faced by many people in North Sumatra, NTT and Bandar Lampung 
in which the development of clean water facilities absorbed 28.6, 15.4 and 7.8 percent 
respectively of the projects carried out in the three provinces.  
 
Unlike briges or clean water facilities, drainage or irrigation system was more evenly distributed 
in every region. Even though the total number of drainage developed by the program was not so 
significant, only 26 projects or 5.9 percent of the total 441 projects surveyed, data indicates that 
every region built irrigation system. Furthermore, there were no significant differences in 
number of drainage developed within each region. It would be certainly too early to conclude 
that the drainage or irrigation systems in every region were similarly bad or broken, yet these 
figures implied that to certain degree every region need drainage or irrigation system 
development. Except for West Kalimantan, in which the number of drainage and irrigation 
systems developed amounted to 10.5 percent, on average the number of drainage or irrigation 
system developed in every province ranged from 3.9 to 7 percent. 
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In general, roads or transportation infrastructure became people’s main priority or choices in 
the rural infrastructure development program. Except for South Sulawesi, in which the need 
for clean water was more urgent, all provinces spent most of the allocated budget on road or 
transportation infrastructure development. Included within this category is the development 
of bridges or tambatan perahu in West Kalimantan. Replacing the function of road in other 
regions, bridges and titian perahu in West Kalimantan facilitated the access point from/to 
many areas in the province. In total, road or transportation infrastructure absorbed 353 out of 
441 projects in 2005 (83.9 percent). Nevertheless, to further assess the impact of the program 
on the condition of transportation infrastructure in every region we still need more deeper or 
comprehensive studies. Even though the development of road or transportation infratsruture 
was quite evenly distributed in every region, ranging from 47 to 87 percent of the total 
infrastructure projects in each region, the avalibale data does not allow us to further make 
general comparison among the regions as data on the local condition prior to the 
implementation of PKPS BBM IP was not freely available.  
 
 
6.3 Efficiency and Administrative Cost 
 
For the PPM Prasarana, the GoI allocated approximately Rp 250 billion. This amount of 
money came from the government budget, especially from the reduction of fuel subsidy. 
Following the government decision to raise the price of fuel by 12 % in the final months of 
2000, the government reduced the fuel subsidy from from Rp 44 trillion to 43.2 trillion so that 
the government could save Rp 800 billion. It was from this money that the budget for the 
PPM Prasarana, as well as the budget for other subsidy removal compensation programs in 
2000, was taken. The official report of the Department of Settlement and Regional 
Infrastructure released in March 2001 stated that Rp 243.750.000.000 was allocated for 
infrastructure development in 2655 villages in 255 sub-districts (in 64 districts, 17 provinces) 
across the country. However, not this entire allocated budget was used. Until the end of 2000, 
62 villages chosen as the beneficiaries of the project in Riau and other 10 villages in East Nusa 
Tenggara reported no activities of spending the budget. As a result, until the end of the 
implementation of the PPM Prasarana, more than Rp 14 billion remained unused and was 
proposed to be allocated for the next PPM Prasarana II in 2001. As can be seen from the 
Table 6 below, out of more than Rp 243 billion allocated for the PPM Prasarana 2000, the 
project could manage to spend ‘only’ Rp. 229.670.390.000,00 or less than 95 percent. 
 
Table 6. Budget Realization of PPM Prasarana 2000 (Rp x 1000) 
No Region Districts Sub-districts Villages 
Budget 
Allocation Percent 
1. Sumatera  22 94 977 86.225.000 37.5 
2. Kalimantan  6 42 443 41.585.394 18.1 
5. Sulawesi  14 61 789 61.435.000 26.8 
6. NTT, NTB, Maluku, Papua 16 48 374 40.425.000 17.6 
Total 58 245 2583 229.670.394 100.0 
Source: Dept. Setlement and Regional Infrastructure, PPM-Prasarana 30 Maret 2001, Final Report. 
 
If we look at the number of villages receiving the grant as well as the amount of the grant 
itself, it is apparent that Sumatera received the most. Out of Rp. 229.6 billion that had been 
used for the project, 37.5 percent or approximately Rp. 86.2 billion went to 977 villages in 94 
sub-distritcs or totally 22 districts and 6 provinces in Sumatera. Second only to Sumatera was 
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Sulawesi Island in which 789 villages in 14 districts across 4 provinces in the Island absorbed 
nearly 27 percent of the total budget realized or Rp Rp. 61.435.000.000. Finally, the rest of the 
budget was shared quite equally between Kalimantan and other islands with each part took 
18.1 and 17.6 percent respectively of the total realized budget. Other than this ‘rough’ 
calculation, however, there is no data available on how the budget was precisely spent in every 
region, as how much of the budget was used for hiring the workers, the percentage of funding 
allocation for materials as well as the administrative tasks. There is no information either on 
the monitoring of the project implementation.  
 
With different scheme and emphasize, the GoI continued to fund infrastructure developments 
in village level. In 2001, another program called the Clean Water Program was launched with 
total budget allocated Rp 170 billion. Replacing the PPM Prasarana as ‘open menu’ grants for 
different types of infrastructure projects, the Clean Water program was concentrated on the 
development of clean water facilities. Implemented for the period of 4 years, the budget 
allocated for the program is quite huge. After slightly decreasing to Rp 150 billion in 2002, the 
budget allocated for the program increased significantly in the next two years as the GoI 
allocated Rp 250 for clean water facilities development every year. In total, for 4 years of the 
program implementation, no less than Rp 820 billion has been provided by the government 
for funding the program. Yet in practice, as can be seen from the Table 7 below, except for 
the first year, the realization of the program never exceeded the total allocated budget. Quite 
far below the funding allocation, the four-year implementation of the Clean Water program 
spent Rp. 789.890.000.000 or approximately 96.33 percent of the total allocated budget. The 
table also showed that approximately 3 to 5 percent of the budget was allocated for 
safeguarding activities.    
 
Table 7. Budget for PKPS-BBM Clean Water and the Realization (x1000 Rupiah) 
Year Allocation Realization Safeguarding* 
2001 170.000.000 174.000.000 5.623.161 
2002 150.000.000 128.795.984 3.269.000 
2003 250.000.000 245.955.651 13.263.802 
2004 250.000.000 241.138.042 n.d 
Total 820.000 789.890 22.155** 
* From the budget realized 
** Excluding the safeguarding allocation for 2004 
Sources: taken from different sources, primarily from Departemen Permukiman dan Prasarana Wilayah, n.d., 
Program Subsidi Energi – Air Bersih; Departemen Permukiman dan Prasarana Wilayah dan PT. Indah Karya, 2003, 
Laporan Monitoring Pelaksanaan PKPS-BBM untuk Penyediaan Prasarana Air Bersih (Program SB-AB) TA. 2003; 
and Ministry of Finance. 
 
In terms of regional distribution, the data confirms the above-mentioned fact that outer 
islands (non-Java) received considerable part of the project. Despite the high percentage of 
urban poverty in Java and Bali, that 7.77 million urban poor live in the region, until 2003 the 
region absorbed ‘only’ 27.32 percent of the total realized budget. In contrast, Sumatera with its 
2.22 million urban poor received no less than 26.33 percent. Nevertheless, looking at the 
condition of poverty in eastern part of Indonesia, especially in Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and 
Papua, it is right that more budgets should have been dispersed in the region. Compared to 
Kalimantan and Sulawesi that received 16.21 and 13.33 percent respectively, Nusa Tenggara, 
Maluku and Papua only got 12.75 percent of the total budget. While in fact, the occurrence of 
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urban poverty in these islands is much higher than those in Kalimantan and Sulawesi. 
According to BPS, 0.73 million urban dwellers, or 22.84 percent of the population of Nusa 
Tenggara, Maluku and Irian lived below the poverty line in 2003. In contrast, Kalimantan and 
Sulawesi had 0.38 and 0.37 million urban poor respectively, or approximately 8.9 and 8.7 
percent of their population.45 
 
Table 8. Budget Allocation of PKPS BBM Clean Water 2001, 2002 and 2003 (x1000) 
Region 2001 2002 2003 Total Percent. 
Sumatera  44.335.832 32.300.000 67.877.810 144.513.642 26.33 
Java and Bali 56.231.200  40.700.000  53.012.633  149.943.833 27.32  
Kalimantan  26.031.785 19.850.000 43.084.669 88.966.454 16.21 
Sulawesi 23.118.180 17.850.000 32.201.438 73.169.618 13.33 
NTB, NTT, Maluku and 
Papua 
18.659.842 14.800.000 36.515.644 69.975.486 12.75 
Sub Total 168.376.839 125.500.000 232.692.198 526.569.037 95.96 
Safeguarding 5.623.161 3.269.000 13.263.802 22.155.963 4.04 
Total Budget 174.000.000 128.796.000 245.956.000 548.752.000 100.00 
Sources: taken from different sources, primarily from Departemen Permukiman dan Prasarana Wilayah, n.d., Program 
Subsidi Energi – Air Bersih; Departemen Permukiman dan Prasarana Wilayah dan PT. Indah Karya, 2003, Laporan 
Monitoring Pelaksanaan PKPS-BBM untuk Penyediaan Prasarana Air Bersih (Program SB-AB) TA. 2003. 
 
Table 9. The Percentage of Budget Allocation for the Clean Water Program 2001 – 
2003  
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2001 2002 2003
Sumatera
Java and Bali
Kalimantan
Sulawesi
Other Islands
 
 
Much bigger that the budget allocated for the Clean Water program, in 2005 the GoI allocated 
Rp 3.342 trillion or equivalent to 24.9% of the overall the 2005 PKPS BBM budget for 
developing rural infrastructure (PKPS BBM IP). This budget was derived from the State 
Budget (APBN 2005) with the condition that local governments provide administrative cost 
(dana pembinaan dan administrasi proyek) for every projects carried out in their regions.46 
With around 4 percent of the budget allocated for safeguarding activities, the allocation of 
funding per village was around Rp250 million. Diagram 1 below shows the budget allocation 
by regions (see also Annex 2 and 3 for provincial allocation). 
 
 
 
                                                 
45BPS, Statistik Indonesia 2005/2006, p. 567. 
46Dept. Pekerjaan Umum, 2005, PKPS BBM Bidang Infrastruktur Perdesaan: Pedoman Umum, p. 14 
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Diagram 1. Budget Allocation of 2005 PKPS BBM IP by Regions (x1000 rupiah) 
 
The budget allocation for each district was determined by a central coordinating team using 
certain criteria, among others the condition of the village to obtain drinking water project, 
village poverty status, and the availability of clean water investments in the area. Funds was 
transferred directly to the person who was responsible for the construction of clean water 
facilities at the community level after the community decided the cost of such activities.   
 
The fund received by the targeted villages was delay.  By the end of September 2005, only 
10% of targeted villages (or around 1.135 villages from 12.834 villages) have received the first 
trance. As regulated in the Guidelines, the fund was transferred to the village level from the 
Ministry of Public Works in 3 trances, 40% when the project was begun and the other 40% 
and 20% were transferred during the construction period. By October 2005, it was reported 
from the 888 targeted villages in 16 districts in NTT, only 55 villages have received the funds.   
 
Findings of Monitoring Team of Ministry of Finance also shows there was some delays in the 
absorption of safeguarding fund and the revision of the budget before the second trance to 
adjust the fuel price escalation. It is also found that the local governments did not provide 
APBD for dana pendamping as required in the guidelines. There were questions in the field 
regarding the unavailability funds to covered transportation and honorarium for the district 
team and village officials who have been very active in conducting the program. To complete 
the provision of the purchase order took 2 months and this has caused the delay of the 
implementation of the projects. It is predicted that the program will not be completed by the 
end of 2005. The completion of the infrastructure projects in the village faced several 
problems, such as overlapping with other similar programs, queuing heavy machine for 
constructions, lacking of materials (cement, asphalt, others), depending on the season, such as 
rainy and harvest season, and distance/accessibility. Based on the Minister of Finance 
decision, the funds can be transferred in the fiscal year of 2006. It is also found that few 
villages received more than the allocation of Rp250 million regulated in the guidelines as one 
village also received Rp500 million. 
 
 
6.5 Institutional Structure and Incentive Effects 
 
Based on a SMERU study on the 2000 PKPS BBM PPM Prasarana the proposed activities in 
Kabupaten Kapuas, Central Kalimantan was resulted from only a one day meeting held in the 
kecamatan, which was attended by the Camat, local village or kelurahan officials, and the 
community leaders.  Meanwhile study in Kabupaten Barito Kuala in South Kalimantan, shows 
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that this region already had prepared a development proposal for the year 2000 under the 
Kecamatan Development Program (KDP). The planning process and the submission of 
proposals was carried out through several stages of discussion and approval, which involved 
the local community throughout.   
 
The introduction and implementation of the PPM-Prasarana program in both these regions 
was planned to be carried out between October and the end of December 2000. Since the 
time frame was considered too short, the schedule was extended until the end of March, 2001.  
Almost all the projects in Kabupaten Kapuas were in fact completed by December 2000.  
However, several projects in Kabupaten Barito Kuala remained incomplete at the end of 
March 2001 due to environmental obstacles such as heavy rain and high tides. 
 
The role of the Kecamatan Program Facilitator was not actually included in the design of the 
PPM Prasarana program, even though in reality these facilitators became one of the most 
important forces driving the program’s success.  In addition, Village Facilitators and Technical 
Assistants were urgently needed in the villages. However, due to limited local human resources 
some of those Village Facilitators who were recruited were unable to give the guidance or 
advice that was really needed. 
 
The key to the successful implementation of the PPM-Prasarana program was community 
empowerment.  Thus, the implementation of this program in Kabupaten Barito Kuala, 
facilitated by the KDP, was generally considered to be more successful, compared to those 
areas that did not have similar assistance, for the following reasons: (i) these village 
communities were already empowered by the previous support from the KDP, before the 
PPM-Prasarana program began; (ii) the project proposals were based on existing planning 
decisions which were subsequently verified and discussed at the UDKP II Plus Forum, a 
kecamatan coordination committee grouping organized especially to discuss the fuel subsidy 
program; and (iii) the facilitators from the KDP provided constant support for the PPM-
Prasarana program. 
 
The main aim of introducing community empowerment into the PPM-Prasarana program was 
not only to achieve better results in terms of the quality of construction, but also to increase 
community involvement in the planning and implementation process. Where KDP facilitators 
were involved in the implementation of the PPM-Prasarana program, better performance was 
achieved in both of these areas.  Many consider the physical quality of buildings constructed 
by the community in these areas to be superior to the work by contractors.   
 
Despite these advantages, the following problems remained evident where KDP facilitators 
had assisted the PPM-Prasarana program, those are: (i) the short time frame available to 
complete the PPM-Prasarana program was a distraction for the KDP facilitators and a 
disruption to the work of that program; (ii) there was an increased workload and greater 
responsibility for both the KDP facilitators and the Kabupaten Management Consultant, 
without the incentive of any adequate extra compensation; and (iii) the reluctance of many 
members of the community to reprimand others for poor performance. 
 
At the same time there were also several discernable weaknesses in the implementation of the 
PPM-Prasarana program in those areas that were not facilitated by the KDP: (i) the promotion 
of the program and the collection of project proposals were carried out over a very short time 
period (2-4 days), and entire projects were meant to be completed in no more than 50 days.  
Consequently, some sections of the community were not even aware that projects were being 
implemented in their area; (ii) the organization of the program implementers was too unwieldy 
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and there was no clarity about their precise tasks and responsibilities; (iii) program proposals 
were based on the outcomes of meetings that included the village elite and excluded the wider 
community. Hence, some proposals were rejected and revised; (iv) there was no genuine 
process of community participation because the empowerment element had been interpreted 
in such a way that the community was only regarded as the workforce; and (v) monitoring and 
supervision were inadequate. 
 
The strength of the PKPS BBM Clean Water is the availability of central coordinating team at 
the national level and the execution of the program decentralized to local governments.   
However, there were some weakness of the program, those are lack of proper preparation at 
the community level and as of other similar programs, the whole activity of the program 
(from design to implementation) implemented only in very short period, 3 months, and the 
maintenance was handed over to the community, while government officials did not properly 
monitor the facility resulting facilities were not functioning well due to lack of maintenance. 
 
The Monitoring Team of Ministry of Finance views that the size of teams involved in 2005 
PKPS BBM IP program is too big. The ‘pendampingan’ was also not effective. The involvement 
of kecamatan consultant/facilitators was late so that they were not able to assist the OMS 
(Organisasi Masyarakat Setempat) and their role has changed from ‘pendampingan’ to 
supervision and evaluation. Only in certain region, like in Kabupaten Banggai was the 
coordination among teams (Satker, TKK, kecamatan consultant/ facilitator, KPPN) of PKPS 
BBM IP considered good.  
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Annex 1. Budget Allocation for PKPS BBM Clean Water, 2002 
Allocation 
 
Province (thousand rupiah) 
1 NAD  3,500,000  
2 North Sumatra  6,500,000  
3 West Sumatra  3,500,000  
4 Riau  5,500,000  
5 Jambi  2,000,000  
6 South Sumatra  3,500,000  
7 Bangka Belitung  2,700,000  
8 Bengkulu  2,100,000  
9 Lampung  3,000,000  
10 Jakarta  6,000,000  
11 West Java  8,350,000  
12 Banten  4,500,000  
13 Central Java  9,500,000  
14 Yogjakarta  1,850,000  
15 East Java  8,500,000  
16 West Kalimantan  5,750,000  
17 Central Kalimantan  3,500,000  
18 South Kalimantan  5,100,000  
19 East Kalimantan  5,500,000  
20 Bali   2,000,000  
21 West Nusa Tenggara  2,200,000  
22 East Nusa Tenggara  3,900,000  
23 North Sulawesi  2,300,000  
24 Gorontalo  1,900,000  
25 Central Sulawesi  3,300,000  
26 South Sulawesi  8,600,000  
27 Southeast Sulawesi  1,750,000  
28 Maluku  1,800,000  
29 North Maluku  1,600,000  
30 Papua  5,300,000  
 
Total 125,500,000 
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Annex 2. Budget Allocation for the PKPS BBM Rural Infrastructure, 2005 
 
Province Targeted District 
Targeted 
Subdistrict 
Targeted 
Village 
Physical 
Construction Safeguarding Total 
1 NAD 13 103 260  65,000,000 2,738,022 67,738,022 
2 North Sumatra 25 188 586 146,500,000 5,558,822 152,058,822 
3 West Sumatra 19 119 286 96,500,000  3,825,366   100,325,366  
4 Riau 11 96 285 71,250,000  2,829,580     74,079,580  
5 Riau Archipelago 6 27 95 23,750,000  1,192,480     24,942,480  
6 Jambi 10 58 236 59,000,000  2,303,133      61,303,133  
7 South Sumatra 14 116 533 133,250,000  4,473,020    137,723,020  
8 Bangka Belitung 7 34 146 36,500,000  1,503,553      38,003,553  
9 Bengkulu 9 55 348 87,000,000  2,874,660      89,874,660  
10 Lampung 10 105 348 87,000,000  3,237,080        90,237,080  
11 Jakarta 1 2 6 1,500,000  28,830         1,528,830  
12 West Java 25 319 573 143,250,000  6,286,370   149,536,370  
13 Banten 6 68 166 41,500,000  1,814,545     43,314,545  
14 Central Java 35 335 810 202,500,000  7,956,530 210,456,530  
15 Yogjakarta 5 45 118 29,500,000  1,326,762     30,826,762  
16 East Java 38 361 936 234,000,000  9,255,295   243,255,295  
17 West Kalimantan 12 120 536 134,000,000  4,563,281   138,563,281  
18 Central Kalimantan 14 71 474 118,500,000  3,806,185    122,306,185  
19 South Kalimantan 13 99 351 87,750,000  3,324,075      91,074,075  
20 East Kalimantan 13 82 344 86,000,000  3,144,540      89,144,540  
21 Bali  9 49 166 41,500,000  1,811,845      43,311,845  
22 West Nusa Tenggara 9 86 367 91,750,000  3,190,577      94,940,577  
23 East Nusa Tenggara 16 175 888 222,000,000  7,055,781   229,055,781  
24 North Sulawesi 9 61 210 50,250,000  2,125,680      52,375,680  
25 Gorontalo 5 34 149 37,250,000  1,514,407      38,764,407  
26 Central Sulawesi 10 68 404 101,000,000  3,625,335     104,625,335  
27 West Sulawesi 5 40 187 46,750,000  1,738,312       48,488,312  
28 South Sulawesi 23 202 680 170,000,000  6,099,127    176,099,127  
29 Southeast Sulawesi 10 75 366 91,500,000  3,274,730      94,774,730  
30 Maluku 8 54 362 88,000,000  2,960,147      90,960,147  
31 North Maluku 8 44 302 75,500,000  2,680,002       78,180,002  
32 West Irian Jaya 9 38 351 87,750,000  2,942,629      90,692,629  
33 Papua 20 118 884 221,000,000  7,933,569     228,933,569  
        
 
Central 14,630,730       14,630,730  
 Central Coordination Team 7,122,020        7,122,020  
 Ministry of Lift-behind Regions 1,163,270         1,163,270  
 Consultant for Technical Assistance 4,360,440         4,360,440  
 Consultant for Monitoring and Evaluation 1,985,000         1,985,000  
 
Total 
   133,625,000   3,342,125,000  
Source: Directorate General Cipta Karya, Ministry of Public Works, 2005 
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Annex 3. Budget Allocation for the PKPS BBM Rural Infrastructure 2005 (per region) 
No Region Number of Districts 
Number of 
Location 
Budget Allocation 
(Rp.x1000) Percentage 
1. Sumatera Island 124 3123 805.750.000 24.11 
2. Java Island 110 2609 652.250.000 19.52 
3. Bali 9 166 41.500.000 1.25 
3. Kalimantan Island 52 1705 426.250.000 12.75 
4. Sulawesi Island 62 1996 496.750.000 14.86 
5. NTB, NTT, Maluku 
Utara and Papua 
70 3154 786.000.000 23.52 
Sub Total 427 12.753 3.208.500.000 96.00 
Dana Pengawasan  118.994.270 3.56 
Dana Monitoring dan Evaluasi (Pusat) 14.630.730 0.44 
Total Anggaran PKPS BBM Air Bersih 2003 3.342.125.000 100.00 
 
 
